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FRICTIONS AS A CONSTRAINT ON TAX PLANNING
David M. Schizer*
The government often uses narrow tax reforms to target specific planning strategies. Sometimes the targeted transactionis stopped. But in other
cases, taxpayers press on, tweaking the deal just enough to sidestep the reform. The difference often lies in transaction costs, financial accounting,
and other 'frictions," which are constraints on tax planningexternal to the
tax law.
This Article contributes a methodology for determiningwhetherfrictions
will block end runs, and illustrates the effect of frictions by comparing the
constructive sale rule of section 1259 with the constructive ownership rule of
section 1260. These reforms use the same statutory language to target tax
motivated derivatives transactions,but taxpayers have responded differently.
Theoretically, taxpayers can avoid either rule through relatively modest
changes in economic return. Although the strategy is common for section

1259, however, it is rarely used for section 1260 because securities dealers
cannot supply the necessary derivative. Thus, if a friction blocks a transaction, the tax law does not have to block it, too. More attention to frictions is
warranted, and legal academics should offer greater assistance. Without a
grounding in frictions, narrow reforms are unlikely to play a constructive
role.
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INTRODUCTION

For years, the tax system has wrestled with the problem of wasteful
tax planning. Because similar transactions are taxed differently, taxpayers rearrange their affairs to qualify for the lowest tax. They do so not
only in so called tax shelters, which are not the focus of this Article, but
also in real business deals such as sale of an asset or financing of a venture. These efforts would cease if all transactions were taxed consistently.
Yet there is no political appetite for ambitious reforms that theoretically
offer consistency, such as mark-to-market accounting or a consumption
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tax.' Instead, in recent years the government has used a less satisfying
strategy: narrow reforms that target specific planning strategies. 2 Sometimes these transactional responses stop the targeted transaction. But in
other cases taxpayers press on, tweaking the deal just enough to sidestep
the reform. 3 These avoidable measures cannot raise revenue or increase
the tax burden on wealthy taxpayers. Instead, end runs consume re4
sources and warp transactions, yielding social waste.
A key question, therefore, is why some narrow rules are easily
avoided, but others are not. The central theme of this Article is that the
answer lies outside the tax law itself. For example, taxpayers abandon
end runs because of high transaction costs, adverse financial accounting,
or unappealing regulatory treatment. This Article borrows from the economics literature, and specifically from Professors Scholes and Wolfson,
in using the term "frictions" to describe constraints on tax planning external to the tax law.5 When the right kind of friction reinforces a narrow
reform, end runs will be uncommon. This Article contributes a method1. Under mark-to-market accounting, investment returns are taxed annually based on
changes in the asset's fair market value, regardless of whether the property has been sold.
See generally David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1111-18 (1986) (proposing broader use of mark-tomarket taxation). Under a consumption tax, investment returns generally would not be
taxed. See generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1113-23 (1974) (arguing that a consumption tax
would be more simple, fair, and efficient than an accretion-type tax). Political and other
obstacles to either reform are thoroughly explored elsewhere. See generally Uneasy
Compromise: Problems of a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax (HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds.,
1988).
2. These "revenue raisers" have figured prominently in recent tax legislation. This
Article focuses on the constructive sale rule of section 1259, I.R.C. § 1259, and the
constructive ownership rule of section 1260, id. § 1260, which are discussed in Parts II and
III, respectively. There are many other recently enacted transactional responses. See, e.g.,
id. § 355(e) (placing limits on the so called "Morris trust" spin-off); id. § 1059 (responding
to the Seagrams transaction); id. § 901(k) (prescribing holding period rules for claiming
foreign tax credits); id. § 163(l) (denying interest deductions on debt that converts
mandatorily into equity). Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase "section" refers to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C.) as amended and codified at 26
U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The phrase "regulation" refers to regulations promulgated
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the Treasury) to implement the Internal Revenue
Code.
3. Professor Yin has described this process as the "Tax Avoidance game." George K.
Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History, 54
SMU L. Rev. 209, 216-17 (2001) (describing taxpayer efforts to evade incremental reform,
and resulting inefficiency caused by this process).
4. See generally Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Papers 172, 179-82 (1996)
(listing five potential sources of social waste from tax reforms: the costs of substitution
effects, avoidance, compliance, administration, and evasion).
5. Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning
Approach 7 (1992) ("By frictions we mean transaction costs incurred in the marketplace
that make implementation of certain tax-planning strategies costly."). Professor Scholes is
a Nobel Prize winning economist, and Professor Wolfson is a distinguished academic
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ology for determining whether the right kind of friction is present, and
offers examples to enhance the empirical understanding of frictions.
While many government officials recognize the significance of frictions, they lack key information. In general, reforms should cover close
substitutes, as Professors Shaviro and Weisbach have shown. 6 Yet when
does one transaction substitute for another? The question is difficult and
underexplored. The argument here is that in sophisticated commercial
transactions, the answer lies not so much in murky notions of consumer
taste, but in accounting conventions, securities laws, and other frictions
that are unfamiliar to many government tax reformers. Empirical work is
especially important because many frictions have weakened in recent
years, due to globalization, deregulation, and financial engineering; indeed, it is well understood that these developments pose new challenges
to the tax system. 7 But certain frictions endure, a helpful reality, that
accountant. Another respected economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has also emphasized the key

role of transaction costs and capital market imperfections in constraining tax avoidance:
In a perfect capital market, these principles of tax avoidance are so powerful as to
enable the astute taxpayer to eliminate all taxation on capital income, and
possibly all taxation on wage income as well. The fact that the tax system raises
revenue is thus a tribute to the lack of astuteness of the taxpayer and/or the lack
of perfection of the capital market.
This in turn has an important implication: one should treat with some
skepticism models which attempt to analyze the effects of taxation assuming
rational, maximizing taxpayers working within a perfect capital market.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax Avoidance, 38 Nat'l TaxJ. 325, 335 (1985).
6. Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules
Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1, 31 (1992) [hereinafter Shaviro,
Realization and Recognition Rules] ("It is a standard optimal tax insight that we want to
tax high-rent, relatively inelastic events ..
"); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine,
and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627, 1663 (1999) (emphasizing
relevance of cross elasticity to line drawing). This Article extends the efforts of Professors
Shaviro and Weisbach to apply optimal tax principles to incremental tax reform. They
seek to base legal distinctions on the cross elasticity of taxpayer demand for various
substitutes. Yet Professors Shaviro and Weisbach do not explore the specifics of what cross
elasticity means in sophisticated commercial transactions. Professor Schlunk has recently
questioned their recommendation by asserting that elasticity is not a meaningful concept
in such transactions. He argues that, through financial engineering, taxpayers typically
can package cash flows in different ways that are all equally appealing, but are taxed
differently. HerwigJ. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology
Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 2-3,
on file with the Columbia Law Review). While Professor Schlunk's argument could well
apply in the long run, depending upon the evolution of financial engineering and
deregulation, his claim often does not hold under current conditions. A main point of this
Article is that, in some commercial transactions, elasticity is a meaningful concept because
of frictions. An important challenge for reformers is to understand when frictions are
sufficiently meaningful to constrain planning, and when they are not.
7. See, e.g., Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Deferral of Income
Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations 75 (2000) [hereinafter The
Deferral of Income] ("The ability of taxpayers to provide services (as well as goods) over
the Internet and through other electronic media will present further challenges to the
current subpart F regime."); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International

2001]

FRICTIONS AND TAX PLANNING

1317

some commentators have assumed away. 8 Although over long periods of
time some frictions will dissipate, many will remain relevant in the next
decade or more, and it is vital to identify these. While accountants on
business school faculties have produced empirical work on frictions, legal
academics largely have not, though they are well positioned to do so because legal regimes other than the tax law are an important source of
frictions. 9 Studying frictions thus should become a priority for legal
commentators.
This Article has three parts, a general discussion followed by two case
studies. After outlining the values at stake in targeting tax planning, Part
I explains which frictions constrain end runs.10 Most promising are "disTaxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301, 1304 (1996) (arguing that
principles of international tax are obsolete because of "the growth of internationally
mobile capital markets for portfolio investment and the rise of integrated multinational
enterprises"); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency
and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731, 736 (1995)
(investigating "the frictionless world" because "[o]ne of the most striking developments in
financial markets in recent years has been a steady decline in transactions costs," and so
"[t]he Article thus can be read as exploring problems that can be expected to get worse,
absent redesign of the [tax] rules"); Schlunk, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3) ("For as
financial innovation becomes cheaper and cheaper (and in the limit becomes costless),
inconsistent tax categories can and will be ever more quickly exploited in a 'race to the
bottom' yielding, in the end, an effectively elective (but therefore consistent) tax structure
for all income items."); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary, Financial Contract Innovation
and Income Tax Policy, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 461 (1993) ("Continuous disaggregation,
recombination, and risk reallocation have produced a changing array of new financial
contracts that pose a serious challenge for the income tax.").
8. For example, financial innovation is known to create tax planning opportunities.
In making this important point, commentators typically assume away transaction costs and
other frictions. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 7, at 733 ("I focus on a world with no
transactions costs."); Warren, supra note 7, at 467 ("To simplify the exposition, we have
made some assumptions that the reader may regard as unrealistic. For example, we have
ignored transaction costs and credit risks."). This assumption is useful in dramatizing long
term challenges to the system, but less helpful in crafting narrow transactional reforms
that, for now, are the only ones that are politically viable. These measures work best when
reinforced by frictions, and so we need to know where the frictions are.
9. For a survey of the accounting literature, see Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry
Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. Acct. & Econ. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 7-35, on file with the Columbia Law Review). The role of securities and
commodities laws, incomplete markets, credit risk, and other frictions remains largely
unexplored. The legal academy generally has not joined in this inquiry, with the
exception of Mark Gergen, whose insightful but brief article emphasizes "the down-toearth factors of transaction costs, credit risk and legal risk as constraints on financial
contracting." Mark P. Gergen, Afterword: Apocalypse Not?, 50 Tax L. Rev. 833, 834
(1995). As "transaction cost engineers," lawyers have a comparative advantage in probing
legal regimes and transaction costs. RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 255 (1984).
10. In highlighting frictions as a constraint on tax planning, this Article parts
company with Mark Gergen and Paula Schmitz, who emphasize tax uncertainty. See Mark
P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the
United States: 1981-1997, 52 Tax L. Rev. 119, 121 (1997). Yet uncertainty about tax
treatment will not always keep a tax advantaged deal from catching on. As Professor
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continuous" frictions that impose unavoidable and significant costs when
taxpayers depart from the transaction covered by the reform. When supported by these frictions, even a narrow reform can be effective, a term
used here to describe success in stopping the targeted planning. Yet reformers must learn esoteric institutional details, and must consider both
the instability of frictions over time and the effects on behavior other
than tax planning.
To illustrate Part I's generalizations, Parts II and III compare two
recent statutory provisions. Both target a tax motivated use of derivative
financial securities. 1 These reforms use the same statutory language, but
taxpayers have responded differently, and frictions explain this difference. The first reform, the "constructive sale" rule of section 1259,
targets use of derivatives in effect to sell an appreciated asset without paying tax. The second, the "constructive ownership" rule of section 1260,
targets use of derivatives in effect to invest in a hedge fund (or other passthru entity) without the usual adverse tax consequences (i.e., less deferral
and a higher tax rate). 12 Theoretically, taxpayers can avoid either rule
through relatively modest changes in the derivative's economic return.
As discussed in Part II, this strategy is commonly used to avoid section
1259, a reality understood by government officials when the measure was
enacted, and tolerated for reasons of politics and administrability. In
contrast, it is considerably more difficult, and thus much less common,
for taxpayers to use this strategy to avoid section 1260. As Part III shows,
the difference, which was not well understood by section 1260's drafters,
is that it is hard for securities dealers to supply derivatives that theoretically avoid the rule. This is not to say that section 1260 is never avoided.
Securities dealers are constantly exploring ways to crack this nut. Meanwhile, taxpayers have substituted insurance contracts and investments in
offshore insurance firms for derivatives, although these strategies are impeded by other fiictions and tax rules, and could be blocked entirely by
surgical responses from the Treasury.
The case studies offer three general lessons. First, even the same statutory language can induce different taxpayer responses, depending upon
Bankman has emphasized, corporate taxpayers often are tolerant of tax risk because the
odds of an audit are low. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83
Tax Notes 1775, 1776 (1999). Likewise, several structures have thrived notwithstanding
uncertain tax treatment. See, e.g., David Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock:
Electivity and the Tax Treatment of Issuers and Holders, Derivatives Rep., Mar. 2000, at 10,
10, 18 [hereinafter Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock] (noting that the tax
treatment of DECS is uncertain, but transaction is common).
11. A derivative financial security is a contract whose value derives from some
financial fact. See generally Global Derivatives Study Group, Derivatives: Practices and
Principles 28 (1993) ("In the most general terms, a derivatives transaction is a bilateral
contract or payments exchange agreement whose value derives, as its name implies, from
the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index."). For instance, an
option to buy stock is a derivative.
12. For a description of hedge funds, see infra note 203.
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the frictions involved. Second, the dealer's difficulties in hedging can be
a key friction in derivatives transactions. Finally, when a tax reform impedes use of derivatives to pursue a planning strategy, taxpayers are likely
to try insurance and offshore investments. The government should anticipate this predictable response in crafting reforms. Indeed, the growing
economic convergence between derivatives and insurance-while their
tax treatment remains thoroughly inconsistent-is a salient capital markets trend that warrants greater attention from reformers and
commentators.
I. BACKSTOPPING NARROW RULES WITH FRICTIONS

This Part offers general guidance about which narrow tax reforms
can easily be avoided, and which cannot. In other words, what sort of
frictions will prevent end runs? Moreover, what pitfalls are likely to arise
when reformers rely on frictions? Before these issues are explored, two
threshold questions require attention. First, why should the government
strive to curtail tax planning and, relatedly, why should we be concerned
when taxpayers circumvent these efforts? Second, if such avoidance is
undesirable, why not broaden the reform's scope so that end runs can be
blocked without relying on frictions?
A. Policy Goals in Targeting Tax Planning
The reasons for curtailing tax planning are familiar and can be
stated briefly. Obviously, more revenue is collected, so the government is
funded without need for other taxes that are less appealing. In addition,
13
social waste is reduced as taxpayers refrain from tax motivated behavior.
Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers have an edge in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a more equitable distribution of tax burdens.1 4 The average taxpayer's faith in the system is preserved, promoting voluntary compliance and the attendant savings in enforcement
costs. 15

Yet not every attack on tax planning is advisable. Planning functions
as a tax reduction, and in some cases taxes should be reduced.1 6 It is
13. See generally Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 284-303 (5th ed. 1999) (noting
that a tax is efficient if it raises revenue with a minimum of behavioral distortions and
other sources of deadweight loss).
14. This conclusion assumes that the benefits of planning are not fully capitalized into
pretax prices, and also that other features of the Tax Code, such as the rate structure, have
not already been adjusted to account for the planning.
15. SeeJoel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance 2 (Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing "whether taxpayers' evaluations of
government expenditures or the fairness of the tax system affect their willingness to
comply with the tax law"). See generally Taxpayer Compliance (Jeffrey A. Roth et al. eds.,
1989) (offering empirical and theoretical discussions of taxpayer compliance).
16. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 6, at 1679 (stating that one of the "most important
factors" in deciding where to draw a line in the tax law is "whether transactions are taxed
appropriately when considered by themselves").
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usually better, though, to reduce the rate or even repeal the undesirable
tax, thereby eliminating the need for wasteful taxpayer self help.' 7 Since
explicit tax reductions are relatively easy to implement (or, at least, they
present different issues), this Article focuses instead on challenges in
maintaining or increasing the tax burden. In other words, the targeted
planning is assumed to yield an inappropriately low tax.
Even so, targeting planning can be costly. Reforms add complexity
to the law, consume administrative resources, raise compliance costs, and
may also undermine "good" transactions that are not tax motivated. 8
Most importantly for our purposes, halfhearted efforts may merely add to
the cost of planning without deterring anyone, thereby increasing social
waste without collecting more revenue.' 9 Indeed, even if some planning
is stopped, total planning waste could still increase if those who continue
to plan face higher costs. The added waste from their continuing efforts
sometimes will outweigh the savings from those who stop.20 If political or
administrability constraints keep a reform from being effective, it may be
better to do nothing, or even to make the targeted planning easier. Al17. The "check the box" rules are an example of this approach. See Treas. Reg.
301.7701-3 (2001). Under these regulations, taxpayers are able to choose whether
designated entities will be treated as corporations or pass-thru entities for tax purposes.
Under prior law, this status turned on a four factor test. Since the test was malleable,
taxpayers often could attain the status they desired, but had to tweak their transactions to
get there. The "check the box" rules spare them the trouble. An unexpected effect has
been to prompt sophisticated cross border tax planning, in which taxpayers use so called
hybrids (which are corporations for foreign tax purposes but pass-thru entities for U.S. tax
purposes) to reduce their foreign tax burdens without increasing their U.S. burden. See
The Deferral of Income, supra note 7, at 62-64 (illustrating use of hybrids to avoid rules
for controlled foreign corporations). A key issue with explicit repeals and tax reductions
of this kind, then, is to ensure that they are used only as intended. This issue is beyond this
Article's scope.
18. See David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 19-21, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing tradeoffs in anti-avoidance measures, including concerns about
"error," i.e., application to transactions that are not tax motivated). The meaning of
"good" depends on the context and normative value being pursued. For instance, we may
wish to impose a tax increase or other penalty only when taxpayer demand for the
transaction is inelastic or when the transaction is motivated primarily by tax considerations.
Likewise, we may deny a tax preference if the transaction does not generate positive
externalities, or if the taxpayer has too high an income.
19. Professor Shaviro has recently emphasized this point. See Daniel N. Shaviro,
Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221, 223
(2000) [hereinafter Shaviro, Economic Substance] (stating that the desirability of
economic substance doctrine depends in part on "the extent to which it succeeds in
generating such deterrence rather than simply inducing taxpayers to jump through a few
extra hoops before getting the desired tax consequences anyway").
20. Professor Kaplow has emphasized this tradeoff between welfare gains from
deterring marginal taxpayers, on one hand, and welfare costs from inducing more waste by
inframarginal taxpayers, on the other. Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly
Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. Pub. Econ. 221, 233 (1990).

§

20011

FRICTIONS AND TAX PLANNING

1321

though revenue would not be raised, at least planning waste would be
reduced.
Nevertheless, even relatively ineffective efforts to curtail planning
sometimes yield symbolic benefits. By responding to highly publicized
planning, the government signals to average taxpayers that everyone, including wealthy taxpayers, must pay tax. Average taxpayers thus may be
encouraged to comply voluntarily with other tax rules (for example, to
pay tax on untraceable cash receipts). Ironically, this benefit can arise
even if the measure is toothless-as long as average taxpayers lack the
sophistication to see that it is toothless. For sophisticated transactions,
average taxpayers could well be fooled in this way for some period of
time, but eventually they are likely to learn the truth, for instance,
2
through media coverage of avoidance. '
The appeal of any effort to curtail planning depends upon the particular balance of all of these benefits and costs. 22 This Article focuses on
a key component of this inquiry: whether a narrow reform will actually
stop the targeted planning. In other words, when will a measure offer
benefits beyond the symbolic?
B. Impediments to Use of Broad Legal Responses
A broad response is more likely to stop the targeted planning, but
often is not feasible. Indeed, fundamental tax reform, such as universal
mark-to-market accounting, could eliminate planning by treating all
equivalent transactions consistently and accurately. But obstacles to this
step are well known. 23 In a more modest strategy, broad anti-abuse rules
would target particular planning strategies, covering not only the current
version, but also every imaginable mutation. Yet to avoid burdening
"good" transactions, we sometimes will need detailed exceptions or subtle
tests that are expensive to draft and enforce. 24 While the tax bar often
will help flag overbroad applications, and also may "save" good transac21. Cf. Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change 19-21 (2000) (assuming, based on
rational expectations methodology, that it is difficult for the government consistently to
deceive taxpayers).
22. See generally Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 4, at 174 (noting that tax reforms
are efficient in creating the least social waste per dollar of additional revenue).
23. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing
Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1343 n.10 (2000) [hereinafter Schizer,
Sticks and Snakes] (citing various commentators who have concluded that comprehensive
mark-to-market taxation is unlikely to be enacted soon); Reed Shuldiner, A General
Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 246 (1992)
("Most, if not all of these problems [with taxing financial instruments] could be solved
by... adopting mark-to-market accounting for financial instruments... [but] it is unlikely
that Congress (or the financial community) will accept wholesale use of mark-to-market
accounting.").
24. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L.J. 557, 562-70 (1992) (noting tradeoff between cost of formulating more detailed
rules and waste from overbroad applications or from amending the rule later).
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tions through creative interpretations, 25 such self help is expensive 26 and
does not work in all cases. Aggressive taxpayers have an advantage, and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has discretion that may not be used
27
responsibly.
On the merits, then, broad rules are not appropriate in all cases.
Even when a broad response is desirable-and, in my view, it often ispolitics can stand in the way. Ironically, even though politics may motivate government officials to respond to tax planning, politics may also
impel them to respond ineffectively. The impetus to respond in some
way-effectively or not-derives in part from the need for "revenue raisers" to fund other initiatives. 28 In addition, when the press focuses popular attention on an abusive strategy, politicians feel pressure to respond.
25. For example, the contingent debt rules of Treasury Regulation section 1.12754,
which offer unfavorable treatment to holders, apply to any debt not eligible for an
enumerated exception. Treas. Reg. § 1.12754 (as amended in 1999). Under a literal
reading, the regulations could apply to a fixed rate bond of a foreign issuer, merely
because the coupon would be increased if a foreign jurisdiction were to begin withholding
tax on interest. Although no exception quite fits these bonds, opinions are consistently
given that the contingent debt rules do not apply. See NYSBA Urges IRS to Issue Revenue
Ruling on Contingent Payment Debt Regs., Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, July 31, 1997,
LEXIS, 97 TNT 147-82 (seeking ruling that contingent debt rules are not triggered by
gross-ups). I thank Robin Shifrin for this example.
Likewise, when legislative history directs the Treasury to remedy overbreadth through
regulations, advisors often do not wait for regulations before issuing favorable opinions.
For instance, section 355(d) was meant to keep corporations from attaining tax free
treatment for certain spin-offs that would otherwise be taxable sales. I.R.C. § 355(d). As
Professors Ginsburg and Levin have observed, "Because Code § 355(d) is broadly drafted,
it facially encompasses a variety of Code § 355 distributions that do not appear to raise the
concerns that prompted Congress to enact Code § 355(d)." 1 Martin D. Ginsburg &Jack
S. Levin, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts 1009.9, at 10-79 (Nov. 2000). To solve this
problem, the legislative history authorized the Treasury to issue regulations excluding
from the provision "transactions that do not violate the purposes of this provision,"
including distributions that do not increase ownership in the distributing or controlled
firm or provide a basis step-up. H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., Conference
Committee Report 101-964 (Comm. Print 1990), [2001] 6 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
1 16,460, at 32,390-91. Yet tax advisors applied these exceptions years before these
regulations were issued. I thank Michael Schler for this example. For another, see the
discussion of unbalanced straddles in David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The
Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 478-80
(2000) [hereinafter Schizer, Executives and Hedging].
26. Edward Kleinbard has described the costliness and time intensiveness of giving tax
advice. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial
Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1319 (1991).
27. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65,
75 (1983) (arguing that imprecise rules allow discretion to the administrator, the
desirability of which depends upon the trustworthiness of this agent).
28. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 515-18 (1998)
(describing demand created for "revenue raisers" by "pay-as-you-go" offset requirements).
The key is not how much revenue actually will be raised, but how much congressional
staffers can claim. The incentive to manipulate revenue estimates, and the feasibility of
doing so, are well documented. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax
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Yet countervailing pressure comes from affected taxpayers. They try to
keep the measure narrow, for instance, with warnings about overbreadth
(especially if a narrow measure would be easy to avoid). In response,
overworked and inexperienced government drafters sometimes narrow
the measure more than they realize by agreeing to subtle changes in language or legislative history. Or reformers may realize what is being given
up, but see no other way to get the measure enacted. Either way, a narrow measure can yield symbolic benefits because the general public lacks
the sophistication to judge whether a reform targeting complex commercial transactions will be effective. For the same reason, self interested legislators can use narrow measures to placate affected interest groups (by
leaving alternatives open), while claiming exaggerated credit with the
general public (who do not yet know that planning will continue).
C. In Search of Effective Frictions
In sum, broad legal responses sometimes are not viable for substantive and political reasons. Yet narrow rules can still be effective, especially
in reinforcing other anti-abuse measures that already are on the books.
Even if a narrow rule does not cover a particular avoidance strategy, taxpayers will not use this "out" if key business and legal objectives cannot be
satisfied. How can reformers anticipate whether frictions will prevent
30
end runs? 29 Taxpayer preferences about the friction must be inelastic,
but this merely restates the inquiry. Likewise, the cost imposed by the
friction must outweigh the tax benefit, but this generalization gives no
specific guidance.
1. General Guidance. - Four factors make the inquiry more concrete.
First, how large is the tax benefit that planning can provide? Obviously,
the larger it is, the more persuasive the friction must be. Thus, is the tax
benefit deferral or forgiveness? The latter is a greater prize, so a stronger
friction is needed. Likewise, what tax rate applies? Is it the rate for capital gain or ordinary income? Since the ordinary rate is higher for individLawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 613 (1995) (faulting revenue process for reliance on
"misleading or wrongheaded mathematical straightjackets").
29. Wasteful planning can arise not only when taxpayers avoid a reform, but also when
they deliberately qualify. For instance, sometimes a reform imposes treatment that is
unfavorable in the context that reformers are considering, but is unduly generous in some
other context unknown to reformers. The reform thus prompts taxpayers to change their
behavior to become eligible for a regime, not to avoid it. As I have addressed this issue
elsewhere, I do not focus on it here. See generally Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, supra note
23, at 1345-46. A (partial) response is to use so called one-way rules that, in most cases,
serve only to increase the tax burden (e.g., in accelerating gains but not losses) and are less
likely to offer taxpayers a result they could not otherwise attain. The case studies in this
Article, sections 1259 and 1260, are one-way rules. They accelerate gains only, without
affecting losses. As a result, they are less likely to offer new tax reduction strategies. For
taxpayers who want to accelerate gain, there are cheaper ways than triggering these rules.
30. See Shaviro, Realization and Recognition Rules, supra note 6, at 31 (emphasizing
importance of elasticity); Weisbach, supra note 6, at 1656-59 (same).
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uals but not for corporations, which type of taxpayer is involved? How
much income is at stake? Has this income already been earned economically (e.g., built-in gain), or does the tax strategy apply only to future
gains? In the latter case, the tax benefit is less alluring because it may
never materialize if no pretax profit is earned, so weaker frictions can still
be effective.
Second, how "strong" is the friction? In other words, how much do
taxpayers care about it? In seeking to avoid a tax rule, will they face slight
inconvenience or real pain? For instance, assume that a reform shuts
down a planning strategy with one exception. The tax benefit is still available to taxpayers who "materially participate" in the venture that generates the tax benefit. 31 To judge the strength of this friction, we must
know how much time taxpayers must devote to qualify as "materially participating," and how different the venture is from their usual activities.
Mink farmers will not mind raising minks in order to claim generous depreciation deductions, but dentists are likely to feel differently, especially
if they would have to spend one day per week to do so (instead of, say,
one week per year in a sunny locale).
Not only must the friction matter in the abstract, but it also must be
hard to avoid. Taxpayers must be forced to choose between the friction
and tax benefit. In addition to the strength of the friction, then, we must
understand how difficult it is for the taxpayer to attain the benefits of the
friction, or to avoid the costs it imposes, while still achieving the tax objective.3 2 Since many frictions are quite important to taxpayers, this third
question-the "malleability" of a friction-is often crucial. For example,
corporate taxpayers often care about the earnings reported to shareholders, so financial accounting is a "strong" friction. To maintain impressive
reported earnings, corporate managers may well abandon a transaction
that offers a tax benefit but also would depress earnings. Issuance of a
simple debt security, for instance, creates interest expense that is tax deductible but also would reduce earnings. But what if the best of both
worlds is available? Can the deal be tweaked so the expense no longer
3
If
depresses accounting earnings, but still generates a tax deduction?
so, the accounting friction is malleable and will not stop the tax planning.
Thus, the friction must be both strong and rigid (i.e., not malleable).
If only one of these conditions holds, planning will continue. This is the
case if the friction is strong but malleable, as the preceding example
31. E.g., I.R.C. § 469 (disallowing losses from passive activities, which are defined as
activities in which taxpayer does not "materially participate").
32. Cf. Shaviro, Realization and Recognition Rules, supra note 6, at 32 (observing that
in determining elasticity, we must ask "how strongly ... the taxpayer [is] constrained" by
the friction and "what alternative routes with different tax consequences ... the taxpayer
[could] use").
33. See generally Ellen Engel et al., Debt-Equity Hybrid Securities, 37J. Acct. Res. 249
(1999) (studying Monthly Income Preferred Shares (MIPS) and other securities that were
treated as debt for tax purposes, but not for rating agency and accounting purposes).
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shows. The same is true if the friction is rigid but weak. Assume, for
instance, that a narrow reform blocks a widely used planning strategy. To
find a new way to do the transaction, the taxpayer must incur a legal fee.
This fee is unavoidable, since the deal cannot be modified without extensive expert consultations. While the fee is thus a rigid friction, it may not
be strong enough. Assume the fee will be $100,000, but the tax savings is
$1 million. Since the fee is less than the tax savings, the friction is too
weak to stop the tax planning. Hence, no new revenue is collected by this
reform and, assuming the payment to counsel is not an efficient allocation of resources, social waste increases.
In addition to considering the size of the tax benefit at issue, and the
strength and rigidity of the relevant friction, reformers must consider the
"position" of the friction-that is, who is affected by it. 3 4 Frictions that
affect taxpayers themselves obviously are relevant, but so are frictions affecting advisors or likely counterparties. 35 For instance, if the taxpayer
must have a legal opinion in order to avoid penalties, frictions that dis36
courage counsel from rendering the opinion will impede planning.
Likewise, if the taxpayer needs a securities dealer for a planning strategy,
frictions that prevent the dealer from supplying the requisite security can
stop planning as effectively as frictions that govern the taxpayer directly.
Reformers should learn about frictions that affect likely tax accommodation parties such as dealers, foreign banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, Indian tribes, and charities. If a friction affects only some of these
potential counterparties, reformers should consider whether other
counterparties would step in. For instance, if a securities dealer cannot
supply an avoidance transaction, can an insurance company supply it?
In sum, end runs are unlikely if, in changing the transaction to avoid
the reform, the taxpayer or an irreplaceable counterparty would suffer a
dramatic and unavoidable decline in utility, and this cost would exceed
the tax benefit at issue. In other words, a minor tweak would carry a
major cost. In this Article, a friction with this effect is called a "discontinuous" friction. 3 7 Such a friction can help a narrow reform to be effective:
34. In a sense, the position of a friction is merely an aspect of its strength and
malleability, since the party that nominally is affected by the friction will seek to pass the
burden on to the taxpayer through a higher fee.
35. This point is an extension of Professors Scholes and Wolfson's observation that
the tax constraints of all parties must be considered. See Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 5,
at 2. Likewise, nontax constraints of all parties are relevant.
36. Recognizing the importance of legal opinions, the government recently tightened
up standards for rendering them. See IRS Issues Proposed Circular 230 Regs., Tax
Analysts, Tax Notes Today, Jan. 12, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 9-6. Similarly, the government
has proposed enhanced disclosure and registration requirements for tax shelters. See
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,133, 41,135 (Aug. 7, 2001); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6011-2T, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,133, 41,136 (Aug. 7, 2001).
37. In an insightful article, Professor Strnad uses the concept of continuity to describe
tax rules and, specifically, to explore whether minor changes in the transaction trigger
major changes in tax treatment. Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A
Conceptual Framework, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 569, 597-99 (1994). The concept is extended
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Even if the reform fails to block a substitute, the friction will block it. For
example, assume that a tax benefit can be attained if the taxpayer bears
some risk in a transaction, even a modest amount. If taking this risk violates a regulatory regime-so that the taxpayer would lose the ability to
conduct all business-the taxpayer will prefer to pay the tax. The regulatory regime serves here as a discontinuous friction. In contrast, with a
"continuous" friction, such as risk for the average taxpayer, minor
changes in the transaction (a modicum of extra risk) have a proportionally modest effect on taxpayer welfare. Such frictions are less likely to
prevent avoidance of a narrow rule. Instead, the rule must be broader so
the cumulative effect of the continuous friction (e.g., the need to take a
lot more risk) is an adequate deterrent. To change the metaphor, in the
first case the taxpayer is standing on the edge of a cliff and cannot move
over (i.e., to avoid tax) without falling off. In the other case, the taxpayer
is on a slope, and so a step to one side, although perhaps unwelcome, is
38
likely to be feasible.
2. Some Usual Suspects. - Thus, a narrow rule can still stop a planning strategy as long as discontinuous frictions prevent end runs. This
state of affairs will exist in some cases, but not in others. While fact-specific inquiries are needed, it is worth listing three categories of frictions
that commonly affect sophisticated transactions: taxpayer preferences regarding business activity, the state of technology and markets, and legal
and regulatory constraints other than tax. Each category contains both
continuous and discontinuous frictions, and, depending upon the facts,
the same friction can have either quality.
a. TaxpayerPreferencesRegarding BusinessActivity. - Taxpayers share a
variety of nontax preferences regarding their business activities. In addition to risk, 39 timing can be important (for example, how long taxpayers

here to frictions. The difference between discontinuous and continuous frictions also
resembles Professor Cooter's distinction between sanctions and prices, in that a sanction
causes a dramatic change in utility, whereas a price does not. See Robert Cooter, Prices
and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1552 (1984). Yet Professor Cooter's terminology
works better for regulatory regimes, in that some authority is imposing the sanction.
Discontinuous frictions arise not only from regulatory regimes, but also from imperfect
markets or technological limitations.
38. I thank Reed Shuldiner for this metaphor.
39. Some rules impose a tax when taxpayers take risk-reducing measures, presumably
on the theory that risk-reducing behavior is inelastic. Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules
and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 Tax L. Rev. 643, 647-51 (1995) [hereinafter
Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules]. Likewise, some tax rules deny a tax benefit to taxpayers who
fail to take risk, on the theory that this nontax "price" allocates the tax benefit to those who
should receive it (e.g., because they have nontax reasons for engaging in the benefitgenerating behavior). Id. at 650. More generally, the tax system has tried to distinguish
between risk based and time-value based returns, although developments in the financial
markets have undermined this distinction. Warren, supra note 7, at 460-61.
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must hold an asset 40 or wait before taking a particular step 4 l), as can the
extent of a taxpayer's participation in a venture. 42 Whether weak or
strong, these frictions tend to be continuous. One can always take a little
more risk, wait a little longer, or participate a bit more, and so marginal
changes are less likely to be significant. In contrast, other preferences
about business activity may be much more significant. For instance, taxpayers often have strong preferences about the control they exert over
the investment 43 and the political jurisdiction in which relevant activity
occurs (e.g., inside or outside of the United States). 4 4 Yet the strength
and malleability of these frictions will vary with the facts. For example,
control may technically require more than 50% of the voting power, and
so a change from 50.01% to 49.99% may be quite significant. In some
cases, though, 40% (or less) can represent effective control, such as in a
public firm with no other large shareholders.
b. The State of Technology and Markets. - Tax planning is constrained
not only by economic attributes that taxpayers demand, but also by limits
on what can be supplied. 4 5 If planners need a particular security, but
securities dealers cannot supply it at reasonable cost, the planning will
not occur. This reality features prominently in the case studies discussed
in this Article. 46 Of particular relevance are the state of financial technol40. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901(k) (prescribing fifteen day holding period for claim of
foreign tax credit); Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra note 19, at 222 (discussing section
901 (k)).
41. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 355(e) (providing that control of distributing or controlled
corporation may not change hands within two years of spin-off); id. § 1091 (providing that
taxpayer may not repurchase asset within thirty days before or after sale at a loss).
42. See, e.g., id. § 469 (requiring "material participation").
43. For instance, taxpayers may have a relatively inelastic preference for owning more
than 50% of an enterprise, and so tax consequences might vary based on such control.
See, e.g., id. § 355(e) (taxing certain spin-offs as sales if they are part of a plan or series of
transactions to acquire a 50% or greater interest in controlled or distributing corporation).
44. Along with jurisdictional considerations, this friction explains why the United
States is more likely to tax earnings that are "effectively connected" to the United States.
See id. § 864(c) (determining whether income, gain, or loss is treated as effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States). To the extent
that economic actors have strong nontax reasons to do business in the United States, the
U.S. government can tax them without fear that they will substitute business activities
offshore.
45. For instance, improvements in communications technology have made it easier
for U.S. taxpayers to move income generating operations to low tax jurisdictions. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1590-91 (2000). Likewise, development of new financial
instruments has created planning opportunities. See Warren, supra note 7, at 460-61.
46. As discussed in Parts II and III, the "constructive ownership" provision (section
1260) has largely stopped the targeted derivatives transaction, notwithstanding the rule's
narrow scope, because dealers have difficulty hedging the derivative that theoretically
could avoid the rule. In contrast, the "constructive sale" provision (section 1259) is less
effective-even though this rule uses essentially the same statutory test-because dealers
are able to hedge more effectively in this context.
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ogy and the completeness of financial markets. 47 For instance, assume a
special tax is imposed on publicly traded assets, where markets are relatively complete. Although the tax theoretically could be avoided by investing in private assets, many taxpayers will pay the tax in order to enjoy
48
benefits of public trading.
c. Legal and Accounting Constraints. - A transaction that yields a tax
benefit is considerably less appealing if prohibited, or rendered more
costly or risky, by a legal or regulatory regime other than the tax law.
Legal regimes are an especially fruitful source of discontinuous frictions
because they often use arbitrary distinctions. Legal frictions can be influential in at least four ways.
i. Substantive Preconditions.- First, such regimes impose substantive
preconditions. Some step is required for the transaction to be legally
binding or for parties to avoid legal penalties. For instance, so called
over-the-counter derivatives transactions (i.e., derivatives acquired from a
securities dealer, instead of an organized exchange) are not legally enforceable unless the relevant parties satisfy certain wealth tests. 49 Ineligi47. For instance, although taxpayers frequently hedge publicly traded securities, why
don't they hedge the value of their future salary earnings, and then borrow against this
hedged wealth? Under current law, a cash-basis taxpayer arguably would not be taxed until
the wage was actually earned, even though this money would be enjoyed far earlier
through the loan. Yet a tax rule is not needed to foreclose this strategy, since the relevant
transactions cannot be implemented at reasonable cost. Lenders will not lend at a
reasonable interest rate-and may not lend at all-unless the future wages are guaranteed
(e.g., against the risk of being fired or having an expertise that ceases to be profitable). Yet
there currently is no insurance or derivatives market for wages of individuals, or even for
wages of professional groups. As Professor Shiller has observed, although financial
markets are far more developed than ever before, individuals still cannot hedge human
capital or nonfungible assets such as closely held businesses, investments in real property,
and the like. See Robert J. Shiller, Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing
Society's Largest Economic Risks 3 (1993) ("It is odd that there appear to have been no
practical proposals for establishing a set of markets to hedge the biggest risks to standards
of living."); see also Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 39, at 656-59 (noting that
financial markets are still incomplete with respect to privately owned businesses, real
estate, and the like). However regrettable the incompleteness of these markets may be for
the economy as a whole, the silver lining is that certain tax planning strategies are
meaningfully constrained.
48. Benefits of public trading are well understood. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J.L. & Econ. 301, 312 (1983)
(arguing that markets enable the use of equity compensation for management); Rebecca
Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
965, 1103-06 (1989) (noting that public markets supply liquidity); Walter Bagehot, The
Only Game in Town, Fin. AnalystsJ., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 12, 14 (stating that public markets
reduce the information disparity between buyers and sellers by creating a pool of monitors
and, more generally, by forming a price that incorporates available information); Bernard
S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, J.
Applied Corp. Fin., Winter 1999, at 36, 36, 44-45 (emphasizing public markets' role in
facilitating venture capital investments).
49. Under the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1994), so called futures
contracts generally are enforceable only if conducted through an organized exchange.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has spared investors who meet
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ble parties cannot use these contracts in tax planning. Likewise, state
laws regulating gambling sometimes must be considered. 50 Breaches of
the federal securities laws, whether in derivatives transactions or in other
planning strategies, could expose the taxpayer to private lawsuits or an
action by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) .51 Similar constraints are posed by "position limits" for options, 52 and by laws governing
pensions and investment companies, including ERISA 53 and the Invest54
ment Company Act of 1940.
ii. Agency Costs. - Second, agency costs can impede tax planning.
Self interested agents may choose not to pursue otherwise promising
strategies that are complex or risky, or that take considerable time and
effort to develop. For instance, evidence of success may be required
before an arbitrary date, such as the cutoff date for an investment
banker's annual bonus. Or agents may be more wary of a particular friction than their principals would be. A tax strategy might oblige a firm to
bear business risks, for example, and managers may be more averse to
these risks than are shareholders.5 5 Likewise, pursuit of the tax reducing
minimum wealth requirements from these constraints. As a result, over-the-counter
derivatives are clearly enforceable for wealthy investors. See Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation (1993), reprinted in A Guide to
Federal Regulation of Derivatives 1 1004, at 193 (James Hamilton et al. eds., 1998) (noting
that CEA exemptions "generally are based on the status or resources of the counterparties"
and "provide broad relief"). Congress recently developed and codified these exceptions in
December 2000 legislation. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-365.
50. For this reason, Congress provided in 1982 that derivatives listed on an exchange
could not be invalidated under the gambling laws. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1994); Louis Loss &Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities
Regulation 273 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing amendment to section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). The remainder of this Article will refer to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 as the "Exchange Act."
51. For instance, the derivatives transactions of issuers and so called affiliates and
insiders are constrained by registration and holding period requirements of section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 (e) (1994), and SEC Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144
(2001), respectively, as well as by section 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p). These
issues are discussed in infra text accompanying notes 133-139. The remainder of this
Article will refer to the Securities Act of 1933 as the "Securities Act."
52. For a discussion of position limits, see infra note 140.
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). See generally Steven Lofchie, A Guide to BrokerDealer Regulation 129-49 (2000) (discussing issues that ERISA creates for securities
dealers).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1994); see also Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id.
§§ 80b-1 to -21. See generally Loss & Seligman, supra note 50, at 40-51 (giving overview of
regime).
55. A recently litigated tax shelter supplies an example. Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999). Compaq Computer Corporation ("Compaq") tried to claim
a tax benefit-a generous foreign tax credit-by being record owner of a particular stock
(in an unrelated firm) when this stock paid a dividend. Id. at 219. If Compaq had been
willing to hold the stock for a month or more, its claim to the tax benefit would have been
quite strong. Instead, Compaq held the stock for a matter of moments only. Id. at 217-18.
As a result, the government successfully denied the tax benefit, on the theory that Compaq
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strategy may require an organizational form that is less effective at constraining agency costs (e.g., a limited partnership instead of a corporation). In some cases, taxpayers will choose better governance over tax
reduction.
iii. Credit Risk. - Third, enforcement of a legal right can be costly,
especially against someone with no assets. The risk of incurring these
costs, so called "credit risk," can deter tax planning. For example, since
corporate taxpayers have a tax based preference for debt (which generates deductible interest) instead of equity (which generates nondeductible dividends), why is equity so pervasive? Indeed, a basic principle of
economics, "put-call parity," is that a share of stock has the same cash flow
as a debt security coupled with a forward contract to buy stock in the
future. 5 6 Given this equivalence, why don't corporations replace stock
with debt and forward contracts? According to Professor Schlunk, we
57
should expect a high volume of these transactions.
Yet the erosion he predicts in the corporate tax base has been tempered so far by frictions, including credit risk, that have reinforced the
narrow tax rules blocking this strategy. Specifically, the interest deduction will be denied if the debt and forward are too closely related. These
two instruments would be treated as a single equity security for tax purposes, for instance, if they were sold to the same investor, could not be
legally separated, and had the same maturity date. 58 To avoid this
recharacterization, the corporation theoretically could sell the debt and

had no valid business purpose in purchasing the stock. Why did Compaq elect not to hold
the stock longer? Admittedly, Compaq could have lost money if the unrelated firm's stock
price declined. Yet this risk presumably was more daunting to Compaq's undiversified
managers than to its diversified shareholders. But see IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253
F.3d 350, 354 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding tax benefit on similar facts and
distinguishing Compaq).
56. A forward contract is a contract for one party to buy a stated amount of property
from another for a designated price on a specified future date. An example of the
financial equivalence described above is that a share of stock worth $100 generates the
same cash flow as the following unit: a bond that sells for $100 and pays $123 in three
years, and a forward contract to buy stock in three years for $123. After three years, assume
the stock is worth $223. Investment in the stock obviously yields a profit of $123. So too
does the bond and forward. The bond yields a profit of $23 (in yielding $123 on a bond
that cost $100). The forward yields a profit of $100 (in permitting the investor to buy stock
worth $223 for only $123). For a discussion of put-call parity, see Warren, supra note 7, at
465-67.
57. Schlunk, supra note 6 (manuscript at 29-31) (predicting that equity will "at an
ever increasing rate, disappear," and will be replaced by debt combined with equity
derivatives such as swaps).
58. See I.R.C. § 163(l); I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (stating that debt that is
mandatorily convertible is taxed as equity). The legislative history of § 163(l) says that
interest cannot be deducted from an instrument that is "part of an arrangement designed
to result in such payment of the instrument with or by reference to ... stock, such as in the
case of certain issuances of a forward contract in connection with the issuance of debt."
H.R. Rep. No. 105-148 (1997), [2001] 3 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
9102, at 23,019.
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forward to separate investors. 59 Yet it is not practical to sell a forward
contract by itself. What assurance is there that a public investor will
honor it if the stock price declines? The expense of suing each public
investor renders a "naked" forward unworkable. Instead, the forward
contract must be secured by collateral, such as a Treasury bond. Yet an
investor seeking an equity return usually is not satisfied with the low yield
of a Treasury bond, and so the issuer must kick in a significant (nondeductible) fee (e.g., 2%). 6o This expense, coupled with the cost of two
public offerings, renders the transaction uncommon. 6'
A more common alternative, a transaction called "FELINE PRIDES,"
is somewhat less costly but involves more tax risk. 62 Indeed, note the pattern, which recurs throughout this Article: In some cases, an effort to
avoid a friction will weaken the tax analysis and, correspondingly, an attempt to improve the tax treatment will founder on frictions. In FELINE
PRIDES, the debt and forward are sold to the same investor (averting the
cost of a second offering) and the debt serves as collateral for the forward. Three features discourage recharacterization as equity for tax purposes, although the outcome is not free of doubt. First, holders may sell
the debt upon pledging a Treasury bond as collateral (at which point the
issuer begins incurring a fee, but this cost arises in only the rare case
when holders sell the bond). Second, the bond matures six months after
the forward, and holders may elect to settle the forward with cash while
retaining the bond. Third, in some offerings, the bond's interest rate
resets when the forward matures to encourage holders to keep the bond.
To an extent, complexity and tax uncertainty have kept this structure
from becoming pervasive, 63 although many transactions have been
done. 64 An understanding of the credit risk constraint would enable the
government to block the transaction with a narrow rule. The interest
59. Cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-52-027 (Dec. 29, 2000) (holding that section 163(l) does
not apply to issuer that issues notes and buys put options from separate investors).
60. The fee is not deductible as interest. Although the taxpayer might deduct it as a
business expense, the fee arguably should be capitalized as a cost of the offering. Cf.
Indopco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 88-90 (1992) (holding that investment banking fees
incurred by a corporation when it was being acquired are not deductible because the
takeover generates significant future benefits to the firm in subsequent years). Yet basis in
the equity being sold has no value to the issuer, since section 1032 provides
nonrecognition treatment. I.R.C. § 1032.
61. Based on conversations with practitioners and my own experience advising
investment banks in the development of new debt-equity hybrids, I am aware of only two
public transactions using this structure. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 10,000,000
Automatic Common Exchange Securities 7.25%, Prospectus dated June 23, 1995; MCN
Corp., 5,100,000 PRIDES (SM) 8.75%, Prospectus dated Apr. 22, 1996.
62. See, e.g., Conseco, Inc. Conseco Financing Trust IV, 10,000,000 FELINE PRIDES
(SM), Prospectus dated Dec. 8, 1997.
63. Cf. Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 121 (emphasizing tax uncertainty as a
constraint on tax planning).
64. While I have not conducted a study to determine the precise volume of these
transactions, a LEXIS search of the EDGARPlus(R) database of "feline w/4 prides" yields a
large number of matches.
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deduction could be disallowed for interest from any debt that collateralizes
a forward contract for the issuer's equity. 65 The only public security that
would avoid this rule is the one described above, 6 6 and issuers are un-

likely to use

7

it.6

65. This step could be taken through a notice or regulation interpreting section
163(l). See I.R.C. § 163(l)(5).
66. It is worth monitoring whether issuers may begin issuing publicly traded forward
contracts through the futures market. Previously, it was illegal for futures exchanges to list
futures based on a single stock. But these securities were authorized by Congress in
December 2000 and presumably will begin trading in late 2001 or in 2002. See Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 201-210, 251-53, 114 Stat.
2763A-365, 2763A-413 to -449. Investors in these publicly traded forward contracts will still
have to pledge collateral, but less of it (i.e., some multiple of the amount owed on the
forward on a given date, adjusted on a mark-to-market basis). An important question is
how the securities laws will apply if issuers sell futures on their own stock. For instance,
must a prospectus be delivered? How feasible will this be? What would the issuer's
accounting treatment be? Will these futures have long enough terms? I suspect these
frictions will be formidable, but an exploration of this question is beyond this Article's
scope.
67. The above discussion is meant to illustrate the role of credit risk, and not to
provide an exhaustive analysis of debt-forward transactions. At the risk of a brief digression
from credit risk, it is worth mentioning three other alternatives and the frictions that
constrain them. First, a securities dealer theoretically could supply a naked forward
contract, while the issuer borrows from a third party. Yet, although credit risk is less of a
concern, the securities laws make this transaction impractical. The dealer will hedge
through short sales in the public markets. These sales will probably render the dealer an
"underwriter" under the securities laws, thereby requiring the dealer to deliver a
prospectus. See Securities Act § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (1994); cf. Loss &
Seligman, supra note 50, at 285-301 (discussing significance of qualifying as "underwriter"
under section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act, and describing scope of definition). Yet this
step is impractical, especially if the dealer is hedging dynamically through a perpetual
stream of short sales, and thus would have to provide constantly updated disclosure.
Second, another private market alternative would be to find a creditworthy
counterparty, such as an offshore fund, that wants to invest in the firm, and thus would not
hedge the forward contract. But this investor would demand a discount because a private
forward contract would be less liquid. In addition, the pool of creditworthy investorswho would not have to pledge collateral, or at least would not have to be compensated with
extra yield for doing so-is probably not large enough, given the volume of equity that
theoretically could be turned into forward contracts. Some public securities would have to
remain outstanding, moreover, or the private forward contract could not be valued easily.
Finally, as Robert Scarborough has emphasized, a firm could lever in a somewhat
different way by using derivatives to hedge certain risks (e.g., currency, raw materials,
weather, and the like). A hedged firm can borrow more without risking insolvency. See
Robert H. Scarborough, How Derivatives Use Affects Double Taxation of Corporate
Income 1 (Mar. 29, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review),
available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/tppf/taxforum542.pdf ("A corporation that hedges
business risks with derivatives can increase its debt-to-equity ratio without increasing the
riskiness of its debt."). There is empirical evidence that firms hedge to increase borrowing
capacity. See John R. Graham & Daniel A. Rogers, Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax
Incentives?, 57J. Fin. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 3, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("Our results indicate that hedging leads to greater debt capacity."). Yet another
friction, financial accounting, limits this strategy. In some cases, hedging leads to volatility
in reported earnings. See infra Part II.B.3.d (discussing Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 133, and its effects on reported earnings). Interest expense also depresses
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iv. Regulatory and Financial Accounting. - As the prior discussion
shows, legal and regulatory regimes can block a tax planning strategy
through substantive preconditions, agency costs, and credit risk. Finally,
these regimes also can chill planning indirectly-not by stopping the
transaction itself, but by causing this transaction to undermine the taxpayer's other business. For instance, regulators require securities dealers
and banks to have minimum levels of capital. These institutions may be
unwilling to engage in a tax reducing transaction-whether for themselves or for a client-if they would incur a "capital charge" under these
68
regimes, and thus would need more liquid capital to satisfy regulators.
On the other hand, sometimes dealers can avoid regulatory capital constraints through sophisticated planning, for instance, by routing transac69
tions offshore.
Unappealing financial accounting or adverse treatment by rating
agencies can also chill tax planning. In an efficient market, these constraints would not matter. Investors simply would look beyond accounting or rating-agency conventions to the underlying financial reality. But
these conventions do matter when the market is not perfectly efficient. It
can be expensive for investors to look through these conventions, for instance, if the investor must value particular assets or liabilities on her
own. 70 Nor is it profitable to develop more accurate numbers if other
reported earnings. The significance of accounting earnings to managers is discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
68. Under the regulatory capital regime for securities dealers, the liabilities they may
incur-including indebtedness and dealer activities such as short sales-are limited by the
amount of "regulatory capital" the dealers have. See generally SEC Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (2001) (prescribing net capital requirements for brokers or dealers).
Activities that reduce the amount of regulatory capital bear a significant opportunity cost.
The main way to refresh the supply of regulatory capital is to issue common stock, but this
method of funding is more expensive than debt. No interest deduction is available and,
more importantly, the return expected by equity investors is considerably higher than a
dealer's borrowing cost. See generally Lofchie, supra note 53, at 387-442 (discussing net
capital requirements); Anne Beatty et al., Managing Financial Reports of Commercial
Banks: The Influence of Taxes, Regulatory Capital, and Earnings, 33 J. Acct. Res. 231
(1995) (focusing on categories of decisions by banks, including loan charge-offs, issuance
of new securities, and pension settlements);Julie H. Collins et al., Bank Differences in the
Coordination of Regulatory Capital, Earnings, and Taxes, 33 J. Acct. Res. 263 (1995)
(studying decisions of particular banks over time); Myron S. Scholes et al., Tax Planning,
Regulatory Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks, 3
Rev. Fin. Stud. 625 (1990) (analyzing commercial bank investment portfolio management
to discern tradeoff between regulatory capital and tax planning).
69. See Lofchie, supra note 53, at 393 ("[T]he effect of the net capital rule, for better
or worse, is not to eliminate the financial risks that result from derivative transactions, but
rather to force this risk into entities that are regulated by agencies other than the SEC, if
they are regulated at all.").
70. See generally Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock
Markets when Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. Fin. 573, 574 (1976) ("If there is no
noise and information collection is costly, then a perfect competitive market will break
down because no equilibrium exists where information collectors earn a return on their
information, and no equilibrium exists where no one collects information.").
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investors, who set the market price, will continue to be influenced (or,
indeed, misled) by the old ones.7' In any event, managers and their advisors jealously guard accounting and rating agency treatment. These efforts are documented in empirical studies, 72 in anecdotal evidence from
equity research analysts, 7 3 and by investment bankers who develop tax
and accounting arbitrages.74 Likewise, in my experience as a tax practitioner, a tax reducing strategy often is "dead" if the accounting treatment
is unappealing. A caveat, though, is that accounting rules can prove malleable. Often, a transaction can be modified to attain both tax and accounting goals.
D. PotentialPitfalls of FrictionsBased Strategies
When frictions are sufficiently strong and hard to avoid, they enable
narrow tax rules to stop the targeted transaction, thereby averting the
political, overbreadth, and administrability problems of a broader rule.
On the other hand, if the friction is too weak or easy to avoid, reliance on
it may well be counterproductive because planning will continue in more
wasteful form. In addition, four other problems can undermine reliance
on frictions, and reformers must take into account these pitfalls.
71. An analogy may be drawn to the "noise trader" literature. If unsophisticated
investors (or "noise traders") overvalue tulips or Internet stocks, sophisticated investors
should engage in short sales that will be profitable once the bubble bursts and, indeed,
should help it to burst. Why, then, do bubbles ever arise? According to the noise trader
literature, sophisticated investors will do these short sales only if they expect the market to
decline in the near term. If there is doubt about when (or whether) noise traders will
recognize their error, arbitrage becomes very risky, and less is supplied. See David M.
Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1941, 1949 & n.31 (2001)
(invoking noise trader literature to explain the relevance of accounting); see also J.
Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98J. Pol. Econ. 703, 705
(1990) ("The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset
that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them.");J. Bradford De
Long et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44J. Fin. 681, 688
(1989) (arguing that noise trading can impose substantial costs on rational investors);
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance,J. Econ.
Persp., Spring 1990, at 19, 19-20 (describing "an alternative to the efficient market
paradigm that stresses the roles of investor sentiment and limited arbitrage in determining
asset prices").
72. See, e.g., Engel et al., supra note 33, at 263 (noting that firms offering MIPS,
which were treated as debt for tax purposes but not for accounting and rating agency
purposes, used to incur extra expenses totaling approximately 4% of the offering price, or
$9.3 million in the average offering, to secure better accounting treatment for otherwise
comparable securities); Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 9, at 11-41 (describing studies
of tradeoff between accounting and tax reduction in use of LIFO, compensation,
depreciation, income shifting, capital structure, acquisitions, etc.).
73. To emphasize the costliness of looking through accounting conventions, Andrew
Steinerman, a research analyst at Bear Stearns & Co., asked, "When you read an academic
paper, do you read all the sources cited in the footnotes?"
74. As one put it, "If the market were truly efficient, I could not make so much money
doing this-but have you seen my house?"
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1. Information Costs. - First, tax reformers must learn a wide range
of institutional details, including the securities and commodities laws, the
state of financial technology, accounting, and broker-dealer regulations.
This seems like a tall order for government officials who already are overworked, underpaid, and may have limited transactional experience. The
challenge, moreover, is to ensure that frictions block not just a particular
avoidance strategy, but all avoidance strategies. Tax reformers must, in
effect, prove a negative. There must be no viable way to avoid the narrow
rule. 75 For instance, assume a reform is meant to stop a tax motivated use
of derivatives. Once reformers accomplish this mission, which is no easy
task (as the first case study shows), they must consider whether the same
tax benefit can be attained without derivatives-for instance, with insurance contracts and offshore corporations (which feature prominently in
the second case study).
Perfect foresight admittedly is not realistic, but some success in uncovering the relevant information should be possible. Nor is this challenge always more daunting than the administrability and political burdens imposed by broader rules. For narrow transactional responses,
reformers need to understand all aspects of the targeted transaction, not
just the tax analysis. Although the transaction's promoter will be reluctant to share this information, competitors are often willing to offer anonymous tips. 7 6 Organizations such as the New York State Bar Association
(NYSBA) may also be fruitful sources of information. 77 To some extent,
reformers already are asking about frictions, although in an ad hoc man-

75. I thank Diane Ring for this observation.
76. Cf. Bankman, supra note 10, at 1781 ("A commonly reported source of 'leakage'
[about corporate tax shelters] is from a prospective purchaser, to one of its advisors, to
another company, or, even worse, from the advisor to a competitor and then to another
company.").
77. The NYSBA is the oldest and largest voluntary state bar association in the United
States, with more than 67,000 members. The New York State Bar Association, at http://
www.nysba.org (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
NYSBA has numerous subgroups or "Sections," organized by specialty. The Tax Section
includes many of the most prominent tax lawyers in New York. Its various committees
study existing law and proposed reforms, offering recommendations in the form of letters
or reports. The focus usually is on technical issues of implementation, instead of on
broader political questions, such as what tax rates should be. Although the NYSBA is an
organization of private lawyers, its mission is not to lobby for the private interests of
taxpayers and tax advisors. Rather, the stated purpose of the group is "to support, promote
and initiate desirable tax reforms, and to oppose changes in the tax laws and
administration which would not be in the public interest." NewYork State Bar Association,
Tax Section Purpose, at http://www.nysba.org/sections/tax/mission.html
(last visited
Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). My sense is that the NYSBA Tax
Section is more "pro-government" than other organizations of tax professionals, and thus
is more likely than others to endorse government efforts to curtail planning. In the
interests of full disclosure, I should state that I serve on the Tax Section's executive
committee.
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ner that often depends on which officials are working on the reform,
78
what experience they have, and whom they know.
Commentators can provide valuable assistance here in identifying
and evaluating significant frictions. In addition, more systematic and sustained government efforts are needed. Tax reformers should coordinate
with other federal agencies, for instance, by asking the SEC about a securities law issue or the Federal Reserve about bank regulatory concerns. To
some extent, this coordination already occurs. Yet turf battles can impede cooperation, and seeking input can lead to delay and loss of control. The success of cooperation often depends on personalities and relationships of particular staffers. 79 It would be useful to institutionalize
such coordination so an appropriate level is always supplied and the process is smoother. Although these steps are not always easy or cheap, the
government often will avoid the potentially greater costs of a tax reform
that is ineffective or, alternatively, very broad. (I say "often" because in
some cases a reliable friction will not be present.)
2. Instability. - Another disadvantage of relying on frictions is that
they may prove unstable. Although a legal or accounting rule may seem to
constrain avoidance, the relevant rule may change, or creative advisors
may circumvent this obstacle. Likewise, even if the financial markets are
unable to supply a particular security today, tomorrow may be different.
Indeed, two pressing academic debates about the future of taxation-the
impact of financial innovation and tax competition-derive from erosion
of frictions.8 0 Of course, this process can work the other way as well. A
friction that seems unimportant today can become more daunting over
time.8 1 Yet the trend is toward less effective frictions, due to globalization, deregulation, and more complete financial markets. 8 2 In response,
78. I am indebted to Ron Pearlman for this insight. His, distinguished career in
government includes service as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy and as
Chief of Staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation.
79. Professor Pearlman is also the source of this observation.
80. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 45, at 1575-76 (stating that improvements in
communications technology have enabled taxpayers to shift income to low tax
jurisdictions); Warren, supra note 7, at 460-61 (arguing that development of new financial
instruments has undermined taxation of capital).
81. For instance, tinder the wash sale rules of section 1091, taxpayers who sell a
security at a loss cannot recognize it currently unless they wait thirty days before
repurchasing the security. I.R.C. § 1091. While such a long period may have been needed
when section 1091 was enacted, a shorter interval would be sufficient in today's volatile
markets.
82. Professor Schlunk has emphasized a related point about the sequence in which
financial markets become complete. As each new instrument is developed, the
government will try to group it with the closest existing substitute. Order matters here.
For instance, assume A is taxed one way, and Z is taxed another. K is closer to A (i.e., ten
letters away), so if K is the next new instrument, the A rule will apply. What if P is
developed next? It is closer to K than Z so, again, the A/K rule will apply. But what if P
arises before K? Since P is closer to Z than A, the Z rule would have applied instead. See
Schlunk, supra note 6 (manuscript at 4) (discussing path dependence inherent in
commodity tax methodology).
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reformers must assess the relevant friction's durability. They also must
monitor the friction even after the reform is enacted. This process is
helped if tax reformers coordinate with other parts of the government
(e.g., the SEC, CFTC, etc.), but the information costs are real.
3. DistributionalEffects. - Rules that depend on frictions can redistribute tax burdens in random or undesirable ways. The problem is that
some taxpayers may be uniquely able to avoid the friction. For instance,
if securities dealers cannot supply a particular avoidance transaction, but
insurance companies can, a reform may transfer wealth from dealers to
insurers. Likewise, if a tax benefit is conditioned on adverse accounting,8 3 the benefit may be claimed only by firms that are relatively unconcerned about this regime. Since indifference to the friction has little to
do with ability to pay, normatively comparable firms will be taxed
differently.
In many cases, wealthier taxpayers will have an advantage. For instance, regimes that protect investors (including the securities and commodities laws, broker-dealer regulations, and the like) usually have exceptions for wealthy investors, who are thought to need less protection.
Moreover, if a fixed cost is needed to circumvent a friction, such as a fee
to an expert, wealthy taxpayers can amortize this cost over greater tax
savings. On the other hand, wealthier taxpayers will not have a particular
edge if the cost of the friction rises with the size of the transaction, as is
the case with a regulatory penalty or fee that is scaled to the size of the
transaction.
4. Overbreadth and Nontax Effects. - Just as a friction can be underinclusive in failing to deter the wealthiest taxpayers, so too can it be overinclusive. For example, a recent accounting rule for derivatives (inadvertently) deters tax planning, but the rule also has been criticized-by Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, among others-for discouraging useful transactions that are not tax motivated.8 4 Once tax authorities begin to rely on the friction, they may become a constituency for
keeping it, notwithstanding its unfortunate nontax effects (e.g., on corporate governance or capital market efficiency). Alternatively, the lifespans
of the friction and tax reform can be linked in a different way: The tax
reform may be harder to defend politically if it relies on an unpopular
friction. Lobbyists will ask, for instance, "Why should the tax law follow
the accounting rule, which is bad policy anyway?"
83. For instance, the Treasury proposed (unsuccessfully) to deny interest deductions
to MIPS and certain other securities not treated as debt for financial accounting purposes.
For a description of MIPS, see John Reid, MIPS Besieged-A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 77 Tax Notes 1057, 1058-59 (1997) (discussing Clinton administration's
legislative proposal).
84. The rule, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, requires certain
derivatives transactions to be marked to market. For a discussion, see infra Part II.B.3.d. A
number of commentators have voiced concern about the nontax effects of this rule. See
infra note 164. The rule obviously has defenders as well, including Arthur Levitt, former
Chairman of the SEC. See infra note 161.
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Problems can arise not only if the friction has adverse nontax effects,
but also if it serves a useful nontax function. It would be undesirable for
the tax law to undermine a useful friction. For instance, assume the relevant friction is the taxpayer's desire for public trading. Various governmental efforts support public trading, such as the SEC's registration of
public securities and monitoring of trading practices. These public investments are often defended because of positive externalities, or the
benefits that liquid markets provide to third parties. For instance, more
accurate pricing of assets provides valuable guidance even for people who
are not currently trading. What if the tax burden on publicly traded securities is raised? Ideally, the nontax benefits of trading would always
outweigh the tax savings, so no one would stop trading in these markets.
But, in contrast, if the tax savings outweigh these nontax benefits, causing
taxpayers to stop trading, taxpayers and third parties would no longer
enjoy the benefits of these transactions.
Similarly, it is undesirable for the tax law to create political pressure
to repeal a helpful friction. For instance, assume that a regulated financial institution cannot claim a tax deduction without triggering adverse
regulatory treatment, as when accounting losses require regulators to
take over the institution. If this tough regulatory treatment ensures the
solvency of regulated institutions, it would be undesirable for regulators
to weaken their standards solely to make the tax deduction easier to
claim.8 5 In light of these risks, reformers should prefer a friction that is
important enough to persuade taxpayers not to ignore it or to seek its
repeal.
E. All Narrow Reforms Are Not Created Equal
To sum up, the appeal of a narrow tax rule-whether compared with
the status quo, or with a broader measure-depends to a significant extent on frictions. If discontinuous frictions are not present, a narrow rule
may not be worth instituting. Even if it is, a broader rule is likely to fare
better. On the other hand, what if discontinuous frictions are present? A
narrow rule is much less likely to be counterproductive. In addition, the
narrow measure may even fare better than a broader rule, although costs
and benefits of each alternative must be compared; for instance, the cost
of learning about and monitoring the friction should be balanced against
85. See, e.g., Cottage Savs. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 557 (1991) (noting that
through Memorandum R-49, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had weakened its
regulatory accounting standards to enable savings and loan associations to claim tax losses
without triggering losses for regulatory accounting purposes). A similar dynamic played
out when banks petitioned the Federal Reserve to designate so called trust-preferred
securities as "tier one" capital. These securities were eligible for a tax deduction, but their
debt-like features rendered them, at least initially, an insufficiently reliable source of core
capital for regulated banks. Eventually, though, the Federal Reserve relaxed its standards
enough to offer these securities a "tier one" designation. Torn Pratt, Fed Gives Go-Ahead
for New Form of Tier I Capital, Inv. Dealers' Dig., May 27, 1996, at 9, 9.
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the cost of introducing enough nuance in a broad rule to avoid
overbreadth.
In short, all narrow reforms are not created equal. Given their pervasiveness, it is important for reformers to predict, through fact specific
inquiries, which of the above results is most likely for a given reform.
Admittedly, this inquiry can be difficult. Yet these efforts are needed to
ensure that narrow reforms, the day-to-day grist of tax reform, are playing
a constructive role. While this genre of policymaking is less satisfying
than crafting more fundamental reforms, ambitious alternatives are politically unrealistic for now. Thus, in addition to studying first-best solutions, commentators should offer guidance about more modest reforms
that are under active consideration. More information is needed, and
legal academics should help gather it. Admittedly, commodities laws and
credit risk seem far removed from classic tax policy measures, such as the
Haig-Simons definition of income,8 6 and are sometimes more obscure
and inaccessible. Yet it is hard to craft normatively appealing transactional responses without understanding these ingredients of elasticity.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE SALES: WHEN FRICTIONS

ARE WEAK

To illustrate the importance of frictions, Parts II and III compare two
recent transactional responses involving the taxation of derivative financial instruments. These reforms use essentially the same statutory language. Under each, favorable tax treatment is still available as long as
subtle changes are made in the derivative's economic return. As Part II
shows, this strategy is commonly used to avoid the constructive sale rule
of section 1259. Consequently, the targeted transaction, use of derivatives in effect to sell appreciated assets without paying tax, remains pervasive. In contrast, as Part III demonstrates, frictions discourage taxpayers
from using the same strategy-a derivative with a modified economic return-to avoid the constructive ownership rule of section 1260, which was
enacted two years later. The volume of hedge fund derivatives is rela.tively modest, although other strategies involving insurance are coming
into wider use. While each reform raises a number of normative and
political issues, a comprehensive exploration is beyond this Article's
scope. Rather, the emphasis here is on avoidance of these seemingly similar measures, and frictions that stand in the way.
Given the private nature of these transactions, reliable and detailed
information is not easy to acquire. I draw on my practice experience in
this area, as well as on more than fifty conversations during 2000 and
86. In widely cited works, Robert Haig and Henry Simons define income as the sum of
consumption and the market value of increases in the value of the taxpayer's property.
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in The
Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921); Henry C. Simons, Personal
Income Taxation 50 (1938).
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2001 with investment bankers and tax and securities lawyers.8 7 This research focuses on major Wall Street investment banks, which have been
the leading innovators in over-the-counter derivatives, rather than on
smaller institutions elsewhere in the country. A condition of these conversations was that persons and institutions would not be identified.
Since financial innovation is a fast-paced business, a caveat is that research for this Article was finalized in August 2001, and the transactions
discussed here can be expected to evolve over time.
For each case study, the first Section describes the targeted transaction and statutory response. To evaluate various methods of avoiding
these measures, the second Section describes the relevant tax benefit
from such avoidance, the effect of requiring taxpayers to accept a modified economic return, and the impact of other frictions. The third Section briefly considers normative implications of these empirical findings.
A. Targeted Transaction
Under section 1259, capital gains tax is due not only when appreciated assets are sold, but also when they are hedged in some cases.88 The
87. I practiced actively in this area from 1995 through 1998. As co-chair of the
Committee on Financial Instruments of the NYSBA Tax Section, I remain familiar with the
details of various transactions described in this Article. To supplement and update my
knowledge for this Article, I have spoken with numerous experts between May of 2000 and
August of 2001. Thus, I have spoken to nine investment bankers, all based in New York
City. Two work on both private and public transactions, at boutiques specializing in tax
planning. Since they work with a range of other investment banks, they are intimately
familiar with market practice. Six work at top-tier, internationally known investment
banks, and one works at a smaller investment bank but until recently worked at a top-tier
firm. Of the seven with top-tier firm experience, four are "private client" bankers who have
relationships with wealthy clients and propose various transactions to them. For a
discussion of "private client" bankers, see infra note 125. The remaining three are
derivatives specialists who are called in to implement these transactions. One specializes in
over-the-counter transactions and the other two in public transactions. In addition, I also
have spoken with a tax lawyer who used to trade options on public options markets and has
remained familiar with the trading practices on these markets, including those involving
LEAPS and other long term options. For a discussion of LEAPS, see infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
During the same period, I have spoken to five corporate attorneys who specialize in
derivatives transactions, including standard documentation used in over-the-counter and
public deals, as well as common issues that arise under securities laws, commodities laws,
regulatory capital rules, and broker-dealer regulations. Finally, I have spoken to
approximately thirty tax lawyers who give advice about these transactions, including some
who helped devise the relevant transactions and others who served in government while
the relevant rules were being crafted. Most are based in New York City, but some are based
in Washington, D.C., and Chicago. Some of these conversations occurred over the
telephone, and others were in person.
88. "Hedging" in this context means that the asset's owner enters into a separate
transaction that, in effect, cancels out the economic return in the appreciated asset. When
one goes up, the other goes down.
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measure was a response to growing use of short sales against the box 89
and other hedging strategies involving derivatives. 90 These transactions
offered the benefits of a sale, including reduced risk and cash proceeds,
but for formalistic reasons were not taxed as sales. 91 Even though short
sales against the box date back at least to 1932,92 it became easier in the
last two decades to borrow the stock needed for this transaction. 93 Tax
legislation in 1978 protected stock lenders from adverse tax consequences. 94 Brokers also had more stock to lend because investors were
89. A short sale is a bet that the stock price will decline, implemented through sale of
stock that the taxpayer does not own. To effect such a sale, the taxpayer's broker typically
borrows shares and sells them on the taxpayer's behalf. The taxpayer promises to deliver
shares to the broker in the future, and hopes declines in the stock price will make these
"replacement" shares cheaper. For a discussion, see generally Edward D. Kleinbard &
Erika W. Nijenhuis, Short Sales and Short Sale Principles in Contemporary Applications,
53 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 17 (1995). What distinguishes a short sale "against the box" is that
the short seller already owns stock identical to the stock she is selling. By holding two
offsetting positions-the short sale (a bet that the price will decline) and shares of stock (a
bet that the price will rise)-the taxpayer is perfectly hedged. If the stock price declines,
any loss on the stock she owns is offset by an equivalent gain on the short sale. Thus,
subsequent volatility in the stock price does not affect her, and she also can spend the cash
proceeds she receives from the short sale. For all practical purposes, the taxpayer feels as if
she has sold the stock.
90. For instance, assume the appreciated asset has a zero basis and a $100 fair market
value. Instead of selling the asset and paying tax on $100 of gain, the taxpayer enters into a
forward contract committing her to sell the stock in three years at $115. If the stock
declines to $90, she loses $10 on the stock but makes $10 on the forward because the
ability to sell at $115 becomes correspondingly more valuable as the market price declines.
91. The theory was that, for fungible property, a transfer of title or control was
needed to identify the shares being sold, and thus their basis-a necessary function as
taxpayers traditionally have been permitted to designate the shares being sold. Thus, tax
was not owed unless and until the taxpayer delivered her appreciated shares to "cover" the
short (i.e., by returning shares to the party who lent the shares used in the short sale). For
a discussion, see Peter L. Faber et al., The Ownership and Disposition of Property: New
Rules for Old Problems, 75 Taxes 768, 775 (1997); Edward Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless
Positions in Securities, 71 Taxes 783, 793-94 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Bingham v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 186, 189-90 (1932) (applying open
transaction treatment to a short sale, even though taxpayer held substantially identical
stock).
93. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) rules generally prevent a broker-dealer from even offering to make a short sale
before locating a source from which to borrow stock. See N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 440C,
reprinted in N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 3793 (1995); Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Rule
3370(b) (2), reprinted in N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 4690 (2001). For a discussion of this
"locate" requirement, see Martin Shubik, Michael Powers & David Schizer, Sin, Short
Selling, Taxes, Bubbles, and the Price of Shares 18-19 (May 22, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). The reader may wonder why it was
necessary to borrow stock since the taxpayer already had some. Why not simply lend your
own lot to your broker, so the broker could use these shares to execute your short sale?
The favorable tax treatment would be lost. See Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487; infra
note 148.
94. Taxable investors had worried that a loan of stock would be taxed as a sale. But
see I.R.C. § 1058 (providing nonrecognition to lender of stock when certain conditions are
satisfied). Tax-exempt investors had feared that fees earned from lending stock would be
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keeping shares in brokerage accounts instead of in bank vaults. 95 Also,
substitutes for short sales against the box, including equity swaps, options,
and forward contracts, became more widely available in the over-thecounter derivatives market during the 1980s and 1990s. 9 6 These hedges
could be used, for instance, when a short sale would violate the securities
laws. 97 Since a short sale against the box did not trigger tax, these alternatives were thought to give the same result (although, in retrospect, a
98
2000 IRS ruling has introduced some doubt on this question).
taxable as unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). But see I.R.C. § 512(a) (5)
(providing that income from securities loans is not UBTI); see also S. Rep. No. 95-762
(1978), [2001] 9 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
22,830, at 42,362 (describing Congress's
concern that securities lending not trigger adverse tax consequences).
95. Indeed, if the stock is held in a margin account, the broker does not need
permission to lend the shares. See SEC Rule 15c3-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2001); H.R.
Rep. No. 102-414, at 4 (1991). While permission is needed to lend stock in "cash"
accounts, such permission is routinely granted. This is often a condition the broker
requires in setting up the account.
96. A swap is a two-party contract that binds each party to make periodic payments
based on an objective indicator, such as an interest rate or (in the case of an equity swap) a
stock price. For a description, see Global Derivatives Study Group, supra note 11, at 31.
An option contract entitles the holder to buy or sell stock for a given price, but does not
obligate her to do so; in contrast, forward contracts require a commitment. Id. at 30-32.
The volume of derivatives contracts sold privately by securities dealers in the over-thecounter market grew dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton
& Timothy L. O'Brien, Financiers Plan to Put Controls on Derivatives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1999, at C1 (noting that $37 trillion worth of privately traded derivatives contracts were
outstanding in January 1999, compared to only $865 billion in 1987).
97. For instance, securities laws bar senior corporate officers and large shareholders
from engaging in short sales. See Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1994). Yet
"synthetic" short sales with derivatives are sometimes allowed. See SEC Rule 16c-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.16c-4 (2001) (allowing certain "put equivalent" positions). For a discussion of
regulatory relief provided for hedging under Rule 16c-4, see Schizer, Executives and
Hedging, supra note 25, at 463-64. Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)-(c)
(1994), would also prevent sales of restricted stock, but hedging this stock with derivatives
is sometimes thought to be permissible. For discussion of this issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 133-139.
98. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-11-011 (Dec. 6, 2000) concludes that a hedging transaction is a
sale under common law. (The ruling does not discuss the constructive sale rule, the tax
reform discussed in text below; apparently, the transaction at issue in this ruling predates
the rule.) The taxpayers, controlling shareholders in a publicly traded firm, entered into a
physically settled forward contract. To an extent, the taxpayers were still affected by
fluctuations in the stock price through changes in the number of shares to be delivered.
In treating the forward contract as a current sale, the field service advice said the taxpayers
were irrevocably committed to delivering their appreciated shares. While the transaction
resembles variable delivery forward contracts currently used to avoid section 1259, there
are two differences. First, unlike current deals, the forward contract could not be cash
settled (presumably because of commodities law concerns that since have faded). With a
cash settled forward contract, the taxpayer might never part with any shares, and so it is
more persuasive to delay sale treatment until she actually delivers shares. Second, the
taxpayers in the ruling had voting control even without the hedged shares. Hence, voting
the hedged shares was not meaningful evidence of continued ownership. This fact pattern
presumably is not common. Thus, while the ruling has introduced some uncertainty,
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Notwithstanding the permissive tax rule' and erosion of frictions, a
lot of capital gain was still taxed. For instance, individuals realized $170.4
billion of net capital gain in 1995. 99 In some cases, taxpayers presumably
were not willing to incur the relatively low transaction costs to use short
sales against the box, including fees for lawyers and for borrowing stock.
Taxable gain also derived from the growing popularity of mutual funds.
Because these funds traditionally have been ranked on pretax returns,
fund managers have an incentive to maximize this return-as opposed to
after-tax returns. 0 0 As a result, managers traditionally have traded actively, leaving investors with high tax bills. In effect, agency costs have
inflated taxes.
Even so, hedging was becoming increasingly common and well publicized. High profile articles were appearing in the press. 10 1 In response,
Congress enacted the constructive sale rule in 1997.102 Under section
1259, taxpayers recognize gain (but not loss), as if they have made a
sale, 10 3 whenever they use a short sale, forward contract, swap, or compamany advisors believe it reads the law incorrectly and, in any event, should not apply to
cash settled forward contracts popular today.
99. Therese Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, 1995, Stat. Income Bull.
(Internal Revenue Serv.), Fall 1997, at 9, 9. It is not clear how much of this gain comes
from liquid publicly traded assets, as opposed to real estate, closely held firms, collectibles,
and other nonfungible assets that could not be hedged tax free.
100. In response, the SEC recently required mutual funds to disclose after-tax returns
in certain instances. See Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, Securities Act
Release Nos. 33-7941, 34-43857, 66 Fed. Reg. 9002 (Feb. 5, 2001) (issuing final regulation
concerning disclosure of mutual fund after-tax returns).
101. Particular attention was focused on a public offering of stock in Estee Lauder.
Instead of selling their own shares, family members borrowed each other's stock, thereby
rendering the public offering a short sale against the box. As the family members did not
plan to "cover" the short until after they died, the tax deferral ordinarily offered by a short
sale against the box would become tax forgiveness. See Sheryl Stratton, Treasury Targets
Capital Gains Tax-Deferral Strategies, 70 Tax Notes 347, 348 (1996) ("'You have the wellpublicized Lauder transaction,' which brought the tax-avoidance aspect of the short sale
against the box into the national limelight." (quoting Steven Rosenthal, former legislation
counsel for the Joint Committee on Taxation)). The New York Times followed up with
coverage of various other large hedging transactions. Diana B. Henriques & Floyd Norris,
Rushing Away from Taxes: The Capital Gains Bypass-A Special Report, N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1996, at Al.
102. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001, 111 Stat. 788, 903
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1259).
103. Section 1259(a) provides the consequences of a constructive sale:
If there is a constructive sale of an appreciated financial position(1) the taxpayer shall recognize gain as if such position were sold, assigned, or
otherwise terminated at its fair market value on the date of such constructive
sale (and any gain shall be taken into account for the taxable year which
includes such date), and
(2) for purposes of applying this title for periods after the constructive sale(A) proper adjustment shall be made in the amount of any gain or loss
subsequently realized with respect to such position for any gain taken
into account by reason of paragraph (1), and
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rable transaction to eliminate "substantially all" of the risk of loss and
opportunity for gain in an appreciated security.104
This language reflects a political compromise. Many in the Treasury
would have preferred a broader measure, but did not believe one could
be enacted.10 5 Since members of Congress were thought to be committed to the realization rule,' 0 6 the measure is limited to hedges that closely
resemble sales. The securities industry was also lobbying to keep the re(B) the holding period of such position shall be determined as if such
position were originally acquired on the date of such constructive sale.
I.R.C. § 1259(a).
104. For a detailed discussion of the statutory language and technical issues it raises,
see generally David M. Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, 80 Tax Notes 345 (1998)
[hereinafter Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259]. Section 1259(c)(1) offers the
statutory definition of a constructive sale:
(c) Constructive Sale
For purposes of this section(1) In general
A taxpayer shall be treated as having made a constructive sale of an
appreciated financial position [defined generally in section 1259(b)(1)
as appreciated stock, debt, or partnership interests] if the taxpayer (or a
related person)(A) enters into a short sale of the same or substantially identical
property,
(B) enters into an offsetting notional principal contract with respect to
the same or substantially identical property,
(C) enters into a futures or forward contract to deliver the same or
substantially identical property,
(D) in the case of an appreciated financial position that is a short sale or
a contract described in subparagraph (B) or (C) with respect to any
such property, acquires the same or substantially identical property,
or
(E) to the extent prescribed by the Secretary in regulations, enters into
1 or more other transactions (or acquires 1 or more positions) that
have substantially the same effect as a transaction described in any of
the preceding subparagraphs.
I.R.C. § 1259(c)(1). The common theme of these enumerated transactions, according to
widely cited legislative history, is that these "financial transactions ... have the effect of
eliminating substantially all of the taxpayer's risk of loss and opportunity for income or
gain with respect to the appreciated financial position." Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 105th
Cong., General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997 (Comm. Print 1997)
[hereinafter Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997], [2001] 13 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
1 31,130, at 56,715.
105. Three tax lawyers who worked in the Treasury during this period have indicated
to me that they would have preferred a broader measure but believed that the political
obstacles were too great.
106. Under the realization rule, tax is not due until appreciated property is sold. The
principle is fundamental to the U.S. tax system, and was once thought to be
constitutionally ordained. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 214-15 (1920) (ruling
that congressional efforts to tax a stock dividend are unconstitutional and reasoning that
"enrichment through increase in value of capital investment is not income in any proper
meaning of the term"); see also David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1549, 1593-1600, 1606-09 (1998) [hereinafter Schizer, Realization as Subsidy] (discussing
deep political and administrability roots of realization rule).
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form narrow. 10 7 A narrow measure could still offer symbolic benefits,
which were important to many officials in the Treasury and Congress.
But to what extent has section 1259 stopped hedging?
B. Frictions and Avoidance
To answer this question, this Section briefly considers the tax benefit
from hedging, and then analyzes the strength, malleability, and position
of relevant frictions. Hedging proves difficult for positions worth less
than $1 million, but viable, although not cost free, for larger positions.
1. Tax Benefit. - The main tax benefit from hedging is deferral.' 08
The longer the hedge lasts, the greater this advantage. An additional tax
benefit, available for at least another decade, is that income tax is avoided
altogether if the hedge lasts until the taxpayer dies, since the current rule
is that basis in appreciated property "steps up" at death.10 9 These benefits-i.e., deferral and forgiveness-are especially appealing when the
capital gains tax rate is high since, from the taxpayer's perspective, avoiding a high tax is even better than avoiding a low one. In the same tax bill
that contained section 1259, Congress reduced the individual long term
capital gains rate for stock from 28% to 20%, thereby reducing the tax
benefit from hedging.
2. Derivatives with Modified Return. - The typical way to avoid section
1259, understood by the government and taxpayer alike, is to retain some
exposure to the hedged asset's return-in other words, to use a partial
hedge. For example, if an asset is worth $100, the taxpayer can accept
risk of loss from $100 to $95 (by buying a put at $95), while retaining
opportunity for gain from $100 to $115 (by selling a call at $115).110 This
107. See Lee Sheppard, Rethinking DECS, and New Ways to Carve Out Debt, 83 Tax
Notes 347, 349 (1999) (discussing influence of "Wall Street lobbying" on the scope of
section 1259).
108. By deferring a tax, taxpayers can continue to invest, and earn a return on, money
that otherwise would fund the tax. For a discussion, see Schizer, Realization as Subsidy,
supra note 106, at 1555.
109. For example, if a taxpayer dies holding property worth $100 with a zero basis, the
heir takes the property with a $100 basis. Thus, the income tax never reaches this
appreciation. See I.R.C. § 1014. This rule is scheduled to change for transfers after
December 31, 2009, in connection with repeal of the estate tax, although it is possible that
Congress will decide not to follow through with these changes. For a discussion, see infra
note 198.
110. The "put" option offers the taxpayer the right, but not the obligation, to sell at
$95, thereby guaranteeing her at least that price. In selling the call option, the taxpayer
gives her counterparty the right, but not the obligation, to buy at $115. Thus, the taxpayer
will not benefit from any appreciation above $115. Taxpayers usually prefer to retain as
little exposure as possible, but the government has not offered clear guidance about
precisely how much is needed. The answer is expected when regulations are promulgated
under section 1259.
Numerous authorities construe the meaning of "substantially all" in other contexts.
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 569 (indicating that "substantially all" means, in
the context of reorganizations, 70% of gross value and 90% of net value); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.731-2(c) (3) (i) (as amended in 1997) (providing that "substantially all" means 90% in
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combination of owning a put and selling a call is known as a "collar." 1 '
Other derivatives, such as swaps and forward contracts, can offer the same
result. 12
In some cases, the taxpayer would rather make a taxable sale than
remain exposed, even in this limited way. The point of tax deferral, after
all, is to earn a return on money that otherwise would fund the tax. This
benefitis especially appealing if this money can be invested in any asset,
as under prior law. A short sale against the box yielded 95% of the
11 3
hedged asset's value as cash, which could be invested in anything.
Under section 1259, in contrast, a portion of the taxpayer's deferred
determining whether marketable securities or cash constitute "substantially all" of an
entity's assets); Treas. Reg. § 1.448-IT(e)(4) (as amended in 1993) (indicating that
"substantially all" means 95% in determining whether personal services constitute
substantially all of a corporation's activities); see also Schizer, Hedging Under Section
1259, supra note 104, at 352 (discussing meaning of "substantially all").
In the interim, the market convention generally has been a spread equal to 10% or
20% of the hedged asset's fair market value on the date of the hedge. See Thomas J.
Boczar, Stock Concentration Risk Management After TRA '97, Trusts & Estates, Mar. 1998,
at 45, 48 [hereinafter Boczar, Stock Concentration Risk Management] (noting that need
for a 15% spread is common advice, and that this spread derives from example in
legislative history). The 20% spread derives from a report of the NYSBA. See New York
State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on H.R. 846, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today,
May 21, 1997, LEXIS, 97 TNT 103-11 [hereinafter NYSBA Tax Section, Comments on H.R.
846]. In the interests of full disclosure, I should state that I was a principal drafter of that
report, but the 20% test reflects the consensus of the organization's executive committee.
For a description of the NYSBA, see supra note 77. Since the NYSBA is a private
organization, its recommendations obviously do not constitute legal authority. However,
in the absence of clear guidance from the government, practitioners often read NYSBA
reports with interest because the Treasury and Congress accept NYSBA recommendations
with some frequency, and because the NYSBA's executive committee includes many of the
nation's most prominent tax lawyers.
111. The legislative history directs the Treasury to develop standards for collars in
prospective regulations:
It is anticipated that the Treasury regulations, when issued, will provide specific
standards for determining whether several common transactions will be treated as
constructive sales. One such transaction is a "collar."...
... In order to determine whether collars have substantially the same effect as the
transactions specified in the provision, it is anticipated that Treasury regulations
will provide specific standards that take into account various factors with respect
to the appreciated financial position, including its volatility. Similarly, it is
expected that several aspects of the collar transaction will be relevant, including
the spread between the put and call prices, the period of the transaction, and the
extent to which the taxpayer retains the right to periodic payments on the
appreciated financial position (e.g., the dividends on collared stock). The
Committee expects that the Treasury regulations with respect to collars will be
applied prospectively, except in cases to prevent abuse.
Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997, supra note 104, at 56,716.
112. See Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, supra note 104, at 351-53.
113. See Boczar, Stock Concentration Risk Management, supra note 110, at 45. In
return, the taxpayer paid a modest (deductible) fee for borrowing the stock (e.g., less than
1% of the hedged asset's value), while foregoing any return on the 5% of proceeds that
could not be withdrawn.
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tax-and, indeed, of her entire position-must remain invested in the
hedged asset. If this asset appreciates, a collar is usually better than a
taxable sale. But as Appendix A shows, if the hedged asset declines in
value, a taxable sale may be better, especially if the tax rate is low and sale
proceeds are invested profitably. Thus, a taxpayer who has no confidence
in the hedged asset may prefer a taxable sale. In my experience, though,
investors usually accord some value to the retained exposure. 1 4 For
many, risk functions as a weak, continuous friction.' 15 A key question is
116
whether other frictions burden partial hedges.
3. Other Frictions: Four Types of Investors. - In general, there are no
discontinuous frictions supporting section 1259, making constructive
sales a difficult problem to target with a narrow rule. To illustrate the
point, four types of investors are considered: individuals with positions
worth less than $1 million, who face the most daunting frictions and are
least likely to hedge; individuals with positions worth between $1 million
and $75 million, who face only weak frictions and have become the core
clientele of a thriving hedging industry; individuals with positions worth
more than $75 million, whose larger positions create frictions that have
proved manageable so far, although narrow tax rules could be crafted to
114. Indeed, one hedging boutique, Derivium, uses this retained exposure as part of a
sales pitch, describing it as a valuable feature without mentioning the tax benefit this
retained exposure offers:
Our tools enable you to preserve, in the words of financial managers, "upside
potential." We offer tactical, structured transactions that provide a confluence of
benefits-including the ability to retain ownership of the investments that have
helped create your wealth, so you can continue to take advantage of their longterm potential.
Derivium Capital, Opportunity, at http://www.derivium.com/Benefits/Opportunity.cfm
(last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
115. Some may consider risk not to be a friction here, but a normatively appropriate
basis for distinguishing a collar from a hedge. For discussion of this perspective, see infra
Part II.C.1.
116. The transaction is also burdened by another tax regime, the straddle rules of
sections 1092 and 263(g). Congress enacted these rules to address other abuses. For
instance, taxpayers were using offsetting positions, such as contracts to buy and sell silver,
to engineer an artificial timing benefit by closing out the loss on December 31 (and thus
deducting the loss that year) while closing out the gain on January 1 (and deferring the
taxable gain until the next year). Kevin M. Keyes, Federal Taxation of Financial
17.01, at 17-3 (1997). In response, the straddle rules
Instruments and Transactions
impose three adverse consequences. First, the deduction for certain losses is deferred until
offsetting gain is recognized. I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1). Second, taxpayers may not deduct
interest expense "incurred . . . to purchase or carry" a straddle position. Id.
§ 263(g) (1)-(2) (A) (i). Third, taxpayers generally cannot attain the long term capital
gains holding period for property that is part of a straddle. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)2(T) (a) (1) (as amended in 1986). In hedging transactions, therefore, interest may not be
deductible, hedging losses may be deferred, and hedging gains may be taxed as short term
capital gain even if the hedge lasts for more than one year. Yet well advised taxpayers can
sometimes avoid these results, depending upon the particular facts. Application of the
straddle rules to a hedging transaction is, therefore, a complex topic that is beyond this
Article's scope.
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exploit these frictions; and, finally, corporate taxpayers, for whom hedging also has been relatively easy, although a recent change in financial
accounting rules has added a potentially important friction.
a. Individuals with Positions Worth Less than $1 Million. - For those
with stock worth less than $1 million, frictions are strongest. Before section 1259 was enacted, this group used short sales against the box. Now,
these taxpayers would want to use over-the-counter derivatives, but generally cannot do so. Under the commodities laws, these transactions are
17
not enforceable for those with less than $1 million of investable assets.
Nor is deferral of only $300,000 of tax 118 likely to be enough to justify
fixed costs, including fees of the legal advisor and securities dealer.
These costs are fixed because experts must devote a minimum amount of
time, regardless of the transaction's size. As a result, leading investment
banks generally will not undertake a transaction below the $1 million
threshold.'1 19 Since over-the-counter derivatives usually are not available,
retail investors might use options transactions in public markets to construct collars.1 21° Yet in recent years, the term of most publicly traded
options-one year or less-has been too short to provide meaningful
deferral, even if the taxpayer is willing to pay for tax advice. 12 1 This transaction presumably is becoming more common as the market for long
term exchange traded options, such as LEAPS and E-FLEX options, be117. See supra note 49.
118. The taxpayer is assumed to have a basis of zero, a federal tax rate of 20%, and a
state tax rate of 10%.
119. A position worth $1 million was described as the approximate cutoff point by
three bankers in the relevant department of three different banks-the so called private
client group, whose role is discussed infra note 125. Each also said that exceptions
sometimes are made for particularly valued clients. Others suggest a higher threshold,
such as $1.5 million or even $2 million. See, e.g., Thomas J. Boczar, Conceptualizing &
Implementing a Stock Concentration Risk Management Program, Trust & Investments,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 23, 24 [hereinafter Boczar, Risk Management Program] (noting that
over-the-counter options are appropriate only for positions worth $2 million or more);
AdvisorTeam, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.equitycollar.com/faq.htm (last
visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing $1.5 million as a
minimum, "[k]eep[ing] in mind that pooling of a few smaller positions of the same stock
to achieve the $1,500,000 minimum can be done").
120. For a discussion of the difference between over-the-counter and publicly traded
derivatives, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
121. The taxpayer can enter into a series of hedges, though. For instance, when the
stock is at $100, she can enter into a $100-$120 one-year collar. If the stock is worth $150
after a year, the taxpayer can settle the collar with a $30 cash payment, without selling the
stock. Then the taxpayer can enter into a new one-year collar. There are two tax costs
here, though. Under the straddle rules, losses in settling the short call will not be
deductible unless the "qualified covered call option" exception applies. See I.R.C.
§ 1092(c) (4). This exception does not apply if the stock is already part of a straddle, as it
arguably is (i.e., the stock and the put). Second, if the stock price declines, the taxpayer's
profit will shift from the stock (where it was long term capital gain) to the cash settled put
(where it is short term capital gain).
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comes cheaper and more liquid.' 22 In addition, vehicles may someday be
formed in which small investors hedge together, and some players may
market.1 23 For now, though, friceventually develop new ways to tap this
24
group.'
this
for
meaningful
tions are
b. Individuals with Positions Worth $1 Million to $75 Million. - In contrast, taxpayers with positions worth $1 million to $75 million face much
weaker frictions, and thus are the core clientele for "private client" investment bankers who implement these transactions.1 2 5 Every major invest122. The acronym LEAPS stands for Long Term Equity Anticipation Securities, and
the acronym E-FLEX stands for Equity Flexible Exchange Options. Currently, LEAPS are
available only for a subset of listed equities. The website of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange indicates that LEAPS are offered for "over 300 equities." Chi. Bd. Options
Exch., Options Products, at http://www.cboe.com/OptProd/understanding-products.asp
(last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Unlike most exchange
traded options, which have standard terms, "FLEX options allow users to custom tailor
most contract terms." Id. E-FLEX options are not available to would-be hedgers of small
positions because there is a minimum size requirement of at least 25,000 shares. Chi. Bd.
Options Exch., Flex Options, at http://www.cboe.com/Institutional/Flex.asp (last visited
Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
123. For instance, one hedging boutique, Derivium, claims on its website that
"Derivium Capital provides wealthy individuals-investors, entrepreneurs, and
executives-with the benefits of sophisticated, structured financial transactions that were
once exclusively the province of large institutional and professional investors." Derivium
Capital, Powerful Products Backed by Exceptional Service, at http://www.derivium.com/
Services/index.cfrn (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review). Their
marketing materials claim that in some instances they will help hedge positions as small as
$100,000. See Derivium Capital, 90% Stock LoanS": Basic Mechanics, at http://
www.derivium.com/Services/Stock_- Loan.cfm (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("You transfer an equity position (or positions) of $100,000 or more
to Derivium Capital; we establish hedging transactions to protect the value of your
collateral and subsequently provide you with 90% of the hedged value of your shares for a
minimum term of three years.").
124. Since section 1259(c) (3) offers an exception for short term hedges (i.e., those
covered within thirty days of the end of the taxable year), retail investors can still use the
short sale against the box for short term hedging. Yet the strategy is less viable for long
term hedging. While the taxpayer can do a series of short term hedges, she must accept
total exposure (i.e., no hedging except for market risk) for sixty days between these
hedges. See I.R.C. § 1259(c) (3) (A). Another disadvantage of this strategy is that it may
convert what otherwise would be long term capital gain into short term capital gain or give
rise to losses that may not be deducted currently. For a discussion of this issue, see Schizer,
Hedging Under Section 1259, supra note 104, at 348-49.
125. The "private client" group advises "high net worth" clients who have investable
assets above a threshold level (e.g., $1 million). These groups are important businesses.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., 2000 Annual Report 3 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch,
Annual Report] (describing "Private Client" group as one of its "three complementary
businesses," the others being "Corporate and Institutional" and "Investment Managers"),
available at http://www.ml.com/woml/annrepOO/pdfs/ar2OOOEdit.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Annual Report 2000: Letter to
Shareholders (2001) ("We also are taking steps to expand our business with high net worth
individuals and to increase further the productivity of our financial advisors."), available at
(on file with the
http://www.morganstanley.com/ar2000/letter/printableletter.htm
Columbia Law Review). A core function is to provide hedging transactions. See Merrill
Lynch & Co., supra, at 15 (highlighting role of "[s]pecially trained advisors" who "offer

1350

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1312

ment bank, as well as numerous boutiques, have active hedging desks for
such clients. 12 6 The necessary derivative can be supplied at a reasonable
cost-a key difference between section 1259 and section 1260, as discussed in Part 111.127 While the dealer's compensation is high-often 1%
of the hedged asset's initial value for each year of the hedge-clients do
not pay it in cash. Instead, they typically give the dealer opportunity for
gain to pay for protection from risk of loss, and the opportunity for gain
has a higher fair market value. 128 As a result, clients pay in a currency,
opportunity for gain, that they do not especially value and, in some cases,
are not adept at quantifying. 129 Nor are the commodities laws an obstasophisticated tax and estate planning, together with concentrated stock strategies"); see
also Boczar, Risk Management Program, supra note 119, at 11 ("Low-cost basis stock might
be viewed as a 'hidden profit center' at most banks and trust companies.").
126. According to one boutique's website:
Not surprisingly, competition between Wall Street firms is fierce, especially in
soliciting companies that have just gone public. Generally, investment banks will
send their private client service ("PCS") brokers to make presentations to the
officers and board members in an attempt to parley the investment banking
relationship into other forms of business. Besides offering general brokerage
services and money management, these firms offer "Equity Collars." All of the
major Wall Street Firms have derivative underwriting capabilities.
AdvisorTeam, supra note 119.
127. The reason for this difference is that dealers can use "dynamic" hedging to
hedge these securities, but not the securities needed to avoid section 1260. For a
discussion, see infra Part lII.B.2.
128. According to the managing director of Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.'s Family
Wealth Group:
A number of factors relating to both the options and the underlying stock go into
pricing a cashless collar, but the key is that the sold call is usually worth more
than the purchased put. And so by equilibrating the call and put premiums,
dealers are expecting to realize a profit on the collar. Typically, this implicit cost
is in the range of 1% per year on the initial value of the stock, which investors
may well consider reasonable.
Alan R. Feld, High Exposure to Low-Basis Stock: Too Much of a Good Thing?, CPA J.,
Nov. 1999, at 60, 64.
129. For example, assume the hedged asset is worth $100. The client's protection
from risk of loss below $100 (the put option) is worth approximately $18.50. An even
trade would allow the dealer opportunity for gain above $151 (since a call option with a
$151 exercise price is also worth approximately $18.50). Instead, the dealer might claim
opportunity for gain above $120, which is worth approximately $26. The dealer thus
receives an extra $7.50 of value as a fee, but in a form that, in many cases, the client
privately values at less than $7.50. Dealers value this exposure at $7.50, though, because
they can convert it to cash through dynamic hedging, a process explained in Part III.B.2.
The numbers in this hypothetical transaction presume a volatility of .4, an interest rate of
5%, a right to exercise options only at maturity (so called European-style options), and a
term of three years, using Numerical Algorithms Group's option calculator. Numerical
Algorithms Group, Demonstration Black Scholes Calculator, at http://www.nag.com/
numeric/CL/Financial/StdBlack-Scholes.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review), [hereinafter NAG Option Calculator] (estimating value of
European-style and American-style call options). As I have not done a comprehensive
survey of exercise prices and volatilities in the typical private transaction, I do not mean to
assert that a 7.5% fee is typical. I suspect the fee is usually lower.
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cle, since wealthier clients typically are exempt. 30 Theoretically, the
margin rules could limit the cash proceeds a taxpayer could claim from a
hedging transaction, but, as a practical matter, taxpayers often can receive up to 90% of the hedged asset's value in cash, which can be reinvested. 131 Of course, the transaction requires time, effort, and legal fees,
132
but these demands are not prohibitive.
These deals are somewhat more difficult, but often still manageable,
for taxpayers who hedge stock received in a private placement or who
serve as senior officers, directors, or major shareholders (so called "affiliates"). 1 33 Various provisions of the federal securities laws limit these taxpayers' ability to sell the stock in public markets. 134 Technically, there is
130. See supra note 49.
131. The margin rules limit the amount of credit that dealers can extend to clients,
both to protect the client from taking overly risky bets, and to protect the economy from a
market crash as investors sell in a falling market to pay their lenders. See generally Loss &
Seligman, supra note 50, at 803 (describing rationales for margin rules). Section 7 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (2) (B) (1994), authorizes the Federal Reserve to set the
relevant limits, and the Fed has implemented this mandate primarily in Regulation T, 12
C.F.R. § 220 (2001). In certain 'circumstances, this regulation prevents investors from
borrowing more than 50% of the value of securities that serve as collateral for the loan.
For a discussion, see generally Lofchie, supra note 53, at 458-72. These rules create legal
issues for taxpayers who wish to extract cash from a hedging transaction. If taxpayers
borrow money, they could trigger the 50% limitation. Instead, taxpayers use prepaid
forwards to avoid this regime. Technically, the payment they receive represents sale
proceeds, rather than a loan, and so the margin rules are thought not to apply. See, e.g.,
Schwab Institutional, Investment Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Concentrated Positions
5-8 (2000) (noting, in marketing literature, that a collar paired with a loan offers cash
proceeds up to 50% of the hedged asset's value, but a prepaid forward offers 90%); Burns
Matteson Capital Mgmt., Equity Hedging, at http://www.burnsmatteson.com/
c_corning.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating
in marketing materials that prepaid forwards offer immediate access to up to 90% of
proceeds).
132. According to one private client services banker, "The paperwork involved with
establishing a monetising collar transaction is about as voluminous as the documents used
in obtaining real-estate mortgage financing. Collars can be set up in about 10 days to two
weeks, or longer." John C. Braddock, Risk Primer: Zero-Cost Collars, Risk, Nov. 1997, at
50, 51, available at http://www.jcbraddock.com/other/risk-text.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). John C. Braddock is an Executive Director-Investments at CIBC
Oppenheimer, the Private Client Division of CIBC World Markets Corporation.
133. See Paul Beckett, SEC May Rein in Lucrative Hedging of Restricted Stock, Wall
St. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at BI5 (noting that hedging restricted stock "is increasingly common
as restricted stock has become a favored currency in mergers and acquisitions, particularly
in the high-technology sector").
134. Section 5 of the Securities Act generally requires every offer and sale of a security
to be "registered," such that adequate disclosure about the security is available. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1994). There is an exception in section 4(1) for ordinary trading, so the average
investor does not have to provide disclosure. Id. § 77d(1). Yet to keep this exception from
swallowing the rule, this relief does not apply to the issuer or to an "underwriter." Id.
Registration also is not required for so called "private placements," which are not
conducted through public markets. Id. § 77d(2). For this exception to apply, the buyer
often must satisfy certain wealth requirements, and thus is presumed not to need the
protection of registration. Likewise, the buyer can resell the securities to someone else
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no public sale in this private transaction with a derivatives dealer. But as
soon as this private transaction is completed, the dealer will sell stock in
the public markets. As in any private hedging transaction, the dealer is
left with most of the hedged asset's economic return. Since the dealer is
not in the business of betting on the market, the dealer must transfer this
135
return to someone else, usually through short sales in public markets.
An important securities law concern, then, is that the SEC might view the
dealer's short sales as a public offering because of the presence, behind
the scenes, of privately placed stock or an affiliate. If so, the dealer would
have to deliver a prospectus with the short sales, a cumbersome step that
often is impractical. 136 There is no clear law here, although the SEC has
been considering the issue for some time. 137 In this legal vacuum, investment banks have somewhat different views about which transactions are
permissible, but many transactions are done.13 3 Nonaffiliates usually face
who satisfies these requirements. SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2001). But the
buyer cannot resell the securities in the public markets unless specified conditions have
been satisfied, the most important of which is a minimum holding period. SEC Rule 144,
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2001). Similar conditions also apply to persons with a sufficiently
close relationship to the issuer, including senior officers, directors, and shareholders who
own more than 10% of the firm. These "affiliates" also cannot sell in the public markets
without satisfying the requirements spelled out in Rule 144. Id. For securities law
constraints that may apply to affiliates under sections 16(b) and 16(c) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)-(c), see infra note 139. Finally, the insider trading rules of SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001), obviously could apply if the taxpayer has inside
information.
135. Since there will be an economic mismatch between the derivative sold to the
client, on one side, and the short sale, on the other, the dealer will adjust the size of the
short sale. Such "dynamic" hedging strategies are discussed at infra Part III.B.2.
136. Relatedly, the dealer might refuse to accept restricted securities as collateral,
although, as the website of one investment bank indicates, the collateral issue can be
managed so that the derivative will not expire before the holding period required in SEC
Rule 144 is satisfied. Protection for Restricted Holdings, XXI Tailored Solutions: Persp.
for the Prof. Investor (Twenty-First Securities Corp.), May 1999, available at http://
www.twenty-first.com/newsletter/newsletter-may1999-4.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
137. See Revision of Rule 144, Rule 145 and Form 144, Securities Act Release No. 337391, 62 Fed. Reg. 9246, 9251-53 (Feb. 28, 1997) (soliciting comments on appropriate
treatment of hedging by affiliates).
138. For instance, some dealers are willing to hedge the stock as soon as the client
receives it. See Beckett, supra note 133 ("But some banks recently have begun to include
restricted-stock hedging services in merger negotiations, and some hedges are now
effective simultaneously with the issuance of the restricted stock."); Boczar, Stock
Concentration Risk Management, supra note 110, at 52-54 (noting that collars can be used
to hedge restricted stock as long as term of hedge lasts at least until end of applicable
holding period, and also noting that affiliates are not prohibited from using collars).
Other advisors want the client to have held for at least some period of time before hedging
(e.g., thirty days).
In addition to the holding period, advisors also consider the economic correlation
between the stock and the hedge. A mismatch is considered helpful to show that the
dealer's short sale is economically distinct from the derivative, and thus should not be
attributed to the client. In other words, the tactic for avoiding section 1259-retaining
some exposure to the hedged stock-also serves a securities law purpose. Observations in
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more lenient requirements than affiliates. 139
For individuals with positions worth less than $75 million, then, the
relevant frictions usually are weak or malleable. As a result, over-thecounter hedging transactions are very common. The precise volume is
difficult to ascertain, because these transactions are not publicly reported, and investment banks are secretive about their revenue sources.
Yet in off the record conversations, private client services bankers at several of the leading players, as well as the smaller ones, suggest that the
volume is extremely high, perhaps on the order of $150 billion a year or
more.
c. Individuals with Positions Worth More than $75 Million. - Positions
worth more than $75 million are more difficult, though not impossible,
for securities dealers to accommodate. The main problems arise when
the dealer tries to hedge such a large derivative. 140 Short sales become
more difficult because the dealer may be unable to borrow enough shares
cheaply. 141 In addition, dumping so many shares at once can cause a
temporary dip in the price. 142 These problems can be solved, but other
costs or tax risks arise-a tradeoff that is a familiar theme in this Article.
this note derive not only from the sources cited above, but also from conversations during
2000 and 2001 with five securities lawyers who commonly advise on these transactions.
139. Not only are affiliates subject to more rigorous requirements on this issue, but
they also face three additional securities law issues under section 16 of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 7 8p. First, section 16(c) would prevent affiliates from engaging in certain short
sales, although SEC Rule 16c-4 generally permits hedging with derivatives. See id.
§ 78p(c); SEC Rule 16c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16c-4 (2000) (permitting insiders to hedge, or
take so called "put equivalent position [s]," as long as their derivative short position is not
larger than the number of shares they own). Second, section 16(b) requires affiliates to
disgorge certain short term trading profits, and in some circumstances hedging could
trigger this penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). Third, affiliates generally would have to disclose
these transactions to shareholders. Id. § 78p(a). For discussions of these issues, see
Schizer, Executives and Hedging, supra note 25, at 461-65.
140. Another issue, unrelated to the dealer's hedge, derives from so called "position
limits" on options. To prevent any single trader from cornering the market, options
exchanges and over-the-counter markets limit the size of certain option contracts. See
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Conduct Rule 2860(a), (b) (3) (A) (vi)-(vii), reprinted in
N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 4711, 4718 (2001) (describing NASD's position limits); Saul S.
Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1993, 2000 (1995) ("Exchangetraded and OTC options are limited as to position size out of concern, derived from the
physical or commodity markets that they originated in, that someone could corner a
market, thereby exacting monopolistic profits from other traders."). Yet some lawyers
believe that position limits can be avoided if the derivative is structured as a swap instead of
an option. Id. at 1997-98 (describing transaction that otherwise would violate position
limits as "home free all" if treated as equity swap). Position limits also do not apply to
exchange traded E-FLEX options.
141. The dealer may face a "short squeeze," in which the supply of stock available for
borrowing is too small to accommodate demand. As a result, the cost of borrowing the
stock increases, sometimes dramatically.
142. Boczar, Risk Management Program, supra note 119, at 7 (noting that over-thecounter transactions are "attractive alternative [s]" for "investors holding appreciated stock
of a relatively modest size (less than $75 million)" but over-the-counter hedges are less
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For instance, instead of a transaction with a derivatives dealer, the
taxpayer can hedge by issuing a security in the public markets. The investment bank thus serves as an underwriter instead of a dealer. The taxpayer in effect borrows money from public investors and repays an
amount based on the hedged asset's value. The effect is to transfer most
of the hedged asset's return. Public investors usually bear full risk of loss
in the underlying stock, while receiving only a portion of the opportunity
14 3
for gain, leaving the taxpayer with enough to avoid a constructive sale.
But this hedge is harder for individuals than corporations. Under the
securities laws, it is not feasible for individuals to issue securities to the
public.1 44 Instead, an intermediary is needed. The intermediary buys the
hedging security from the taxpayer in a private transaction, and then issues an identical security to public investors.1 45 For instance, a trust can
be formed for this purpose. But frictions burden this variation as well,
including the large fees that must be paid to organize and administer the
trust. 146 As a result, although there has been a significant volume of
these transactions, it is not uncommon for taxpayers to explore them pre-

feasible for a large block because of "the borrowability and liquidity of the stock, option
position limits, etc.").
143. For example, assume the hedged stock is currently worth $100 per share. The
taxpayer issues a security that pays, in three years, an amount of stock (e.g., between .8
shares and one share) that varies with the stock price in three years. If the price declines
below $100, one share is delivered. The effect is to transfer the full risk of loss to the
public investor. If the price falls to $10, the taxpayer can settle the public obligation for
only $10. If the underlying stock price rises, less than one share is delivered. The effect is
for the taxpayer to keep enough opportunity for gain to avoid a constructive sale, while
transferring the rest to the public. Since public investors receive less than all the
opportunity for gain, they are compensated with a periodic payment that is higher than
the dividend on the underlying stock. For a discussion of these securities, see Schizer,
Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock, supra note 10, at 10.
144. While it is not technically illegal for an individual to serve as a registrant under
the securities laws, expert practitioners report that, to their knowledge, no individual has
ever done so. One described such a transaction as "unheard of."
145. Investment banks served this function in a few early transactions, but this
practice has become less common. The investment banks have been reluctant to clutter
the balance sheet of the entity authorized to issue public securities, typically the holding
company that otherwise holds stock of the bank's various subsidiaries. Investment banks
have been concerned that if they list numerous such transactions on the holding
company's balance sheet, investors would view these deals as an unexpected and somewhat
confusing use of the holding company's capital. Another risk is that regulators might treat
the holding company as a broker-dealer, an untenable status since the holding company
(unlike the dealer subsidiary) is not registered as a dealer and would not comply with
numerous regulatory requirements for dealers.
146. Thus, in a $95 million offering, approximately $600,000 of up-front expenses
were incurred to organize and administer the trust, including fees to the administrator,
custodian, paying agent, and to each of three trustees, and further annual payments were
projected. DECS Trust V, 5,000,000 DECS (SM), Prospectus dated Aug. 9, 1999, at 30.
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liminarily, and then to abandon them for private transactions, such as
47
collars and forwards with securities dealers.'
How, then, can a dealer implement a large private transaction of
$100 million or more? How can the dealer be sure to have borrowed
shares needed for the short sale? The dealer borrows the client's stockthat is, the stock being hedged. How is the dealer protected if the (very
large) short sale depresses the market price? The amount the dealer
owes the client on the derivative is tied to the dealer's proceeds from the
short sale.
Although these responses are common, they weaken the client's tax
analysis-ironically, not under section 1259, but under other tax rules. If
the client's return depends on the dealer's short sale, this sale might
seem, under general substance over form principles, to be a sale by the
client herself, with the dealer serving as agent. This impression is reinforced if the client's own stock is used in the dealer's short sale. Indeed,
under a 1972 revenue ruling, short sales against the box were not taxed as
sales-but only if the taxpayer's own stock was not delivered to the purchaser. 148 Moreover, when the client lends stock to the dealer, this step
itself might trigger tax. For a stock loan to be tax free to the stock lender
under section 1058, the "agreement shall.., not reduce the risk of loss or
opportunity for gain of the transferor of the securities in the securities
transferred." 149 Yet in the hedging transaction, the stock lender's (the
taxpayer's) risk of loss in the stock is in fact reduced by the borrower (the
investment bank), seemingly in violation of section 1058. How do taxpayers still claim to comply with this rule? Their risk is not reduced by "the
agreement" (i.e., the stock loan agreement itself, which literally is the
subject of section 1058), but by a formally separate transaction-a collar
or variable delivery forward. Also, these two steps are likely to be separated in time so, it is hoped, they would not be viewed as a single transaction under step transaction principles. Whatever the merits of this reading of section 1058, the government presumably could override it
through regulations (or, obviously, legislation). 1 50 This step would discourage use of the over-the-counter market for very large hedging trans147. See infra Appendix C (noting that of twenty trust transactions filed with SEC in
1999, only five were finalized; volume of finalized transactions in 1999 was approximately
$429 million).
148. See Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487 ("A transaction is a valid short sale which
will not be considered consummated until securities are delivered to close the sale where
the broker did not borrow identical securities held in the taxpayer's accounts for delivery
to the purchaser.").
149. I.R.C. § 1058(b) (3); see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1058-1 (b) (3), 48 Fed. Reg.
33,912 (July 26, 1983) (reiterating statute's risk-reduction requirement).
150. For example, a notice could define the phrase "agreement" in section 1058 to
include not only the stock loan agreement itself, but also related transactions in which the
stock borrower is reducing the stock lender's risk of loss. To illustrate the meaning of
"related," the notice could include an example in which the taxpayer lends stock to its
collar counterparty (or an affiliate), and then a week later the counterparty shorts the
borrowed stock to hedge a collar in which the stock lender is counterparty.
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actions. The broader lesson, featuring prominently in the next case
study, is that the dealer's ability to hedge is the soft underbelly of tax
advantaged derivatives transactions. So far, the government has not
taken advantage of this vulnerability to reinforce section 1259; the reason, I suspect, is that the government has not focused on the dealers'
difficulties in borrowing stock.
d. Public Corporationswith Stock in Unrelated Firms. - The preceding
discussion has focused on individual taxpayers. Public corporations
sometimes also have appreciated stock in other public corporations, and
hedging has been relatively easy for these taxpayers. Tax deferral is especially appealing because the federal corporate tax rate is high (35% instead of the 20% long term capital gains rate for individuals). 1 5 1 Even
though tax deferral is valuable, hedging arguably is not necessary because
another way to attain tax deferral is to hold the stock unhedged. While
the firm must bear risk of loss in this asset, diversified shareholders may
not be overly concerned about this risk. In other words, a public corporation with appreciated stock may have less need to hedge than a wealthy
entrepreneur whose personal wealth is concentrated in a single firm. On
the other hand, the public corporation can reduce its risk of bankruptcy
by hedging, 15 2 and risk averse corporate managers may find hedging ap15
pealing for similar reasons. 3
The mechanics, of hedging are easier for a corporation than for individuals. Unlike the latter, who must interpose a trust, corporations can
easily hedge by issuing public securities. In 1999, approximately $6 billion of these securities were issued. 154 Costs include a 3% underwriting
fee to the investment bank, as well as legal fees. 155 These transactions
A further question is whether section 1058 is the exclusive way to avoid sale treatment,
or a safe harbor. The legislative history implies the latter in calling the measure a
clarification of existing law. S. Rep. No. 95-762, supra note 94, at 42,362. But the Treasury
arguably could write regulations deeming section 1058 the exclusive avenue for
nonrecognition. A detailed exploration of the Treasury's regulatory authority is beyond
this Article's scope.
151. See I.R.C. § lI(b) (1) (D) (providing 35% tax rate for corporations with taxable
income in excess of $10 million).
152. Since the firm will want cash for other operations, an alternative is to borrow
against the appreciated asset without hedging it. Such borrowing will increase the riskiness
of the firm's equity.
153. This is an example in which agency costs encourage the tax motivated
transaction. For a discussion of situations in which agency costs can discourage tax
planning, see supra Part I.C.2.c.ii.
154. A list of 1999 transactions is included in Appendix B. Their economic terms
often are like those described in supra note 143, at least in the case of so called Debt
Exchangeable for Common Stock (DECS). In the Participating Hybrid Option Note
Exchangeable Securities (PHONES) structure, in contrast, the taxpayer in effect sells a
thirty-year at-the-money call option. For a description of the DECS and PHONES
structures, see Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock, supra note 10, at 10.
155. In a separate study, I am collaborating with Professor William Gentry, an
economist at Columbia Business School, to offer quantitative measurements of various
frictions associated with tax motivated hedging by corporations. See William Gentry &
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also tend to depress the price of the underlying stock temporarily, which
reduces the proceeds received in the hedging transaction. 56 Investors
also receive a periodic payment to compensate them for the appreciation
retained by the issuer.' 57 While investors theoretically could demand a
premium for such complex securities, legal frictions have reduced the
need for one by creating a loyal pool of buyers: Insurance companies
and pension funds use these securities to circumvent state law limits on
the amount of equity they can hold. 158 These regimes often (naively)
treat these securities as debt, even though the return closely tracks the
1 59
underlying equity.
Although hedging by corporations has been fairly common, a
change in the accounting rules has introduced an important new friction.
This new rule responds to recent high profile losses that firms sustained
in derivatives transactions, catching investors off guard. 160 To provide
investors with more complete disclosure about a firm's exposure to derivatives, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the nation's
governing body for the accounting profession, has implemented FinanDavid Schizer, Taxes and Financial Innovation: The Case of Exchangeable Debt 10-11
(June 11, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
156. See id. at 13-14 (studying this effect). The same price decline might also occur
if the firm simply sold its stock position either because of a temporary lack of liquidity in
the market, or because the sale was viewed as a negative signal.
157. Although the tax treatment of these payments is not clear, firms often have
deducted them as interest expense. See Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock,
supra note 10, at 12-13 (noting that issuers usually treat DECS as a forward contract paired
with an interest-bearing deposit). A recent proposed regulation would deny a current
deduction, instead adding this expense to the hedged stock's basis. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1092(d)-1(d), 66 Fed. Reg. 4751 Uan. 18, 2001) (deeming equity-linked debt
instrument to be "position with respect to personal property" and thus eligible to be part of
straddle); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(g)-3(c), 66 Fed. Reg. 4749, 4749-50 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(treating "[i]ndebtedness or other financing the payments on which are determined by
reference to payments with respect to . . . the value of . . . personal property" as
"indebtedness... incurred or continued to purchase or carry" straddle property); see also
Field Serv. Adv. 2001 31 015 (May 2, 2001), Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 6, 2001,
LEXIS, 2001 TNT 151-15 (concluding that periodic payments on DECS-type security are
subject to capitalization under section 263(g)).
158. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, supra note 23, at 1384 n.173 (discussing regulatory
reasons why insurance companies and pension funds favor contingent notes).
159. Another regulatory constraint on hedging by corporations is that the taxpayer
usually will want the security it is issuing to be listed on an exchange-not only to provide
liquidity for investors, but also to ensure that the transaction does not violate state gaming
laws. See Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994) (providing that state gaming
laws do not invalidate derivatives traded pursuant to the rules of an exchange or other self
regulatory organization). Novel securities may not clearly comply with exchange listing
requirements, and some effort may be required to arrange for listing. For instance, the
exchange may have to ask the SEC to change its requirements. See id. § 78s(b)(1)
(authorizing exchanges and other self regulatory organizations to request changes in their
rules).
160. SeeJill Dutt, Battle of the Bean Counters, Inv. Dealers' Dig., Oct. 27, 1997, at 16,
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cial Accounting Standard No. 133 (FAS 133).161 This measure, which became effective on July 1, 2000, requires corporations periodically to report on accounting statements the fair market value of certain derivatives
positions.1 62 Since firms could either owe or be entitled to a payment,
this value could be negative or positive.
Depending upon the rule's precise application, it could introduce
undesirable volatility in the earnings of a firm that hedges an appreciated
stock position-volatility that does not accurately reflect the firm's true
economic position. The concern is that the firm would have to report
changes in the hedging security's value, but would not also be able to
report offsetting changes in the underlying stock being hedged. As an
illustration of this accounting mismatch, assume the hedged stock appreciates by 50%. This gain is not reflected in earnings (because the stock is
not being marked to market), but the corresponding loss on the derivative would be (because it is being marked to market). 163 The firm would
64
thus appear unprofitable, even though no economic loss has occurred.
To avoid this mismatch, firms will want their transactions to qualify for so
called "hedge accounting," a special rule within FAS 133 that, in effect,
allows both positions-the hedge and the hedged asset-to be marked to
market.' 65 In the example above, losses on the hedging transaction
would be offset by gains on the hedged asset, so no accounting loss would
161. Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998)
[hereinafter FAS 133]. The FASB is a privately funded independent agency that sets
accounting standards for public companies. Theoretically, the SEC could overrule the
FASB, but rarely does. See Dutt, supra note 160, at 18-19 (describing the FASB's role). In
this case, Arthur Levitt, the former Chairman of the SEC, was a vocal supporter of FAS 133.
Id. at 18 ("My lifetime of work in the securities industry tells me that the FASB has gotten
this about right." (quoting Arthur Levitt)).
162. For a detailed discussion of FAS 133, see generally PriceWaterhouseCoopers
LLP, A Guide to Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (1998).
For a comparison of this accounting rule with the tax law, see generallyJohnJ. Ensminger,
Concerto for Piano vs. Orchestra: Can Tax and Financial Accounting Harmonize on
Hedges?, 16 Akron TaxJ. 23 (2001).
163. For instance, the stock might appreciate from $100 to $150, but this gain would
not be reflected in earnings until the stock is sold. On the derivative, the corporation will
have lost only, say, $30 (since the first 20% of appreciation is retained). Yet even though
the corporation has a net profit of $20, FAS 133-in focusing only on the derivative losswill reduce earnings by $30.
164. This result could also arise in hedging transactions that are not tax motivated. As
a result, the rule has attracted considerable opposition based on this risk of mismatches,
difficulties in valuing derivatives, and inconsistencies with European and Asian accounting
rules. See, e.g., Melanie Tringham, Hedging Cut Down to Size, Times (London), Sept. 21,
2000, at 10 (noting concern of experts that FAS 133 "could lead to increasing volatility in
company financial records and huge updating of computing systems"). For instance, Alan
Greenspan has been a vocal critic. See Hedge Rows, The Economist, Aug. 16, 1997, at 56,
57 (noting that Greenspan "fired off an unusual public letter to the FASB urging it to
reconsider its proposal").
165. See generally FAS 133, supra note 161, at FAS 133.18 (describing timing rules for
various types of hedges).
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be recorded. Yet hedge accounting is not always available. For example,
one prerequisite for hedge accounting is a relatively close correlation between the hedge and the hedged asset. 166 For tax reasons, however, the
taxpayer will not want the correlation to be too close, or the hedge will
trigger a constructive sale. While an exhaustive analysis of FAS 133 and
hedge accounting is beyond the Article's scope, anecdotal evidence suggests that the prospect of artificially volatile earnings has discouraged
some corporations from hedging appreciated stock. 1 67 Yet it is too soon
to assess the influence of this friction. More firms may conclude that
hedge accounting is available for these transactions, especially if the
FASB provides favorable guidance on the issue. Alternatively, firms may
respond by issuing two figures: one following FAS 133, and the other
8
correcting for it (i.e., by marking the hedged asset to market as well).16
In any event, for some firms accounting earnings are less important than
1 69
cash flow or volume of customers.
C. Normative Implications
The main purpose of these case studies is positive, rather than normative: to describe differences in frictions affecting two similar provisions, rather than to assess definitively whether either is good policy.
Others have outlined normative issues raised by section 1259, and so a
detailed exploration is not attempted here.1 7° Yet the insights here do
have normative implications. In general, a transactional reform that actu166. See generally FAS 133, supra note 161, at FAS 133.20(b) (requiring, as condition
for qualifying as fair value hedge, that "the hedging relationship is expected to be highly
effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value"). For a discussion of the criteria that
must be met in order to qualify for hedge accounting, see PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP,
supra note 162, at 63-176.
167. Volatility is introduced because FAS 133 also can increase reported earnings, for
instance, if the stock price declines, triggering unreported losses matched by reported
gains on the derivative. Although risk neutral corporate managers could be indifferent to
this volatility, given the similar probabilities of increases and decreases, managers
reportedly have not reacted in this way.
168. According to one tax lawyer, others are discussing issuance of hedging securities
through special purpose vehicles whose earnings would not be consolidated with the rest
of the issuer's earnings.
169. The same tax lawyer mentioned in supra note 168 also noted that cable
companies have continued to engage in these transactions, as their strength usually is
judged by the number of subscribers. This assertion finds support in Appendix B, which
shows that Comcast, a cable company, was responsible for two of the five largest such
offerings in 1999. Although FAS 133 did not become effective until July 1, 2000, firms no
doubt were aware in 1999 of their impending obligation to mark outstanding derivatives to
market.
170. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of
Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 50 (1996) (critiquing proposed
section 1259); Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration
Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 571, 574-79 (1995) (analyzing policy issues presented by
hedging); David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the Box Be a Realization Event?,
50 Nat'l TaxJ. 495, 503-04 (1997) (same).
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ally stops the targeted planning is better than one that merely induces a
more wasteful variation. Application of this idea to the case studies depends on one's premises, though, as well as on empirical issues that warrant further research.
1. Is Risk More than a Friction?- One premise, as to which there is
disagreement, is whether taxpayers who bear risk deserve a different tax
treatment than those who do not. If risk is normatively significant in this
way, short sales against the box should be treated differently from collars
and other partial return hedges. Under this line of reasoning, a collar is
not a method of avoidance, but a different transaction for which tax
deferral is justified. The theory is that in a realization based system, as
long as taxpayers retain enough risk, they have not made a sale and thus
should not be taxed. This reasoning implicitly judges a rule by its consistency with our system's formal logic, especially the realization rule. The
view is popular among tax practitioners, a reality that helps explain why
section 1259 permits collars.
A competing view, however, is that this focus on risk neglects the tax
system's underlying goal: to raise revenue equitably and efficiently. As
Professor Shaviro has emphasized, all else being equal, tax liabilities
should be based on the level of a taxpayer's income or consumption, and
not on the level of risk she takes. 17 1 For reasons of administrability, our
system traditionally has tested enrichment only when an asset is sold, and
so risk becomes a part of the inquiry-but only to make the system more
administrable, not because risk itself is normatively significant. 172 Once
we depart from the realization rule for hedging, there is no obvious reason to distinguish between partial and total return hedges, assuming administrability burdens are similar. Consistent with this view, the balance
of this Part analyzes retained risk as a friction, instead of as an independentjustification for tax deferral. Those who do not accept this premise,
though, would assess section 1259 more favorably.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis. The benefits offered by section 1259
should be compared with the costs. Assuming the tax on investments
should be maintained or increased-a core assumption of this Article, as
noted above-a contribution of section 1259 is to persuade would-be
hedgers to make taxable sales because, in some cases, the need to retain
risk is a sufficiently strong friction. 173 These sales can advance vertical
171. See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 39, at 708-23.
172. Id. at 646-47.
173. A threshold question, beyond this Article's scope, is whether investment returns
should be taxed at all-or, at least, whether the rate should be lower. Under a
consumption tax, such returns generally would not be taxed. Difficulties with taxing
capital, illustrated anecdotally here, reinforce the case for a consumption tax. On the
other hand, assuming the same revenue must be raised, taxes on labor would rise. This
would cause other distortions and avoidance, for instance, as owners of businesses claim
lower salaries and higher investment returns. Since wealthy taxpayers have more
investments, their share of the tax burden could decline. While there are strong
arguments on either side of this longstanding debate, the question for our purposes is
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equity in raising the tax burden on wealthy investors. 17 4 Since sales are
cheaper than hedges, efficiency is enhanced as taxpayers forego wasteful
hedging costs. 175 Revenue raised in this way eliminates the need for
other taxes, which themselves would produce waste. While empirical research on the magnitude of these benefits is needed, it is likely that many
investors are induced to sell, especially those with positions worth less
than $1 million. Indeed, in the three bull market years after section 1259
was enacted, the volume of short sales against the box probably would
have grown dramatically if not for the reform. Instead, individuals realized $424.3 billion of net capital gain in 1998.176 Robust receipts in later
years contributed to a budget surplus. Although some of this taxable gain
stems from actively managed mutual funds, a significant amount presum17 7
ably comes from taxpayers who can no longer hedge.
As noted above, section 1259 also offers symbolic benefits. Average
taxpayers may be more inclined to pay tax voluntarily if they believe a
wealthy taxpayer cannot avoid tax through a short sale against the box.
While the culture of compliance is worth protecting, section 1259's contribution is hard to assess. An important question is whether average taxpayers know that wealthy taxpayers can still hedge without paying tax.
While they probably do not know now, they may learn eventually, and so
the symbolic benefits would not last.
Balanced against these benefits are significant costs. In addition to
adding complexity and imposing new administrative and compliance
costs, section 1259 probably also has intensified lock-in, as some would-be
hedgers choose to keep their investment unhedged. The size of this effect warrants further study. As demonstrated here, moreover, section
1259 has induced many taxpayers to hedge in a more elaborate and
wasteful way. The volume of hedging among wealthy individuals and
easier. If the tax burden on investments should be lower, this goal should be implemented
directly through rate reductions or changes in the tax base, not through wasteful taxpayer
self help.
174. It is assumed here that the rate structure and other features of the tax system do
not already attain the desired distribution of tax burdens.
175. At first blush, it is tempting to claim a further efficiency advantage for section
1259: By encouraging sales, the measure seems to reduce lock-in. Yet although a sale does
indeed free taxpayers from lock-in, so does a hedge. Thus, when inducing taxpayers to
substitute sales for hedges, section 1259 does not necessarily ease lock-in.
176. Therese Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1998, Stat.
Income Bull. (Internal Revenue Serv.), Spring 2000, at 147, 148.
177. The revenue estimate for section 1259 is modest: $367 million in 1998; $121
million in 1999; $68 million in 2000; $73 million in 2001; $79 million in 2002; $85 million
in 2003; $91 million in 2004; $98 million in 2005; $105 million in 2006; $112 million in
2007. The total thus was $708 million in the first five years and $1.199 billion in the first
ten. Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 105th Cong., Comparison of the Estimated Budget Effects of
the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 2014 as Passed by the House and Senate 8 (Comm. Print
1997). This estimate may not have assumed a continuation of the bull market through the
beginning of 2000. In any event, revenue estimates are often unreliable, at least in
forecasting the effect of a single provision. See Graetz, supra note 28, at 670.
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public corporations is still quite high. Vertical equity concerns also arise
because the wealthiest taxpayers are least affected by the rule.' 7 8 Nor
could the Treasury stop this avoidance without further legislation, a polit179
ically difficult step.
Ultimately, the case for section 1259 turns on the empirical magnitude of these competing effects. My guess is the balance is close but
favorable. Yet a definitive conclusion is not possible without further empirical research. The contribution of this Article is to show that avoidance has been relatively easy for wealthy taxpayers, and to offer an explanation that can be generalized: There is no discontinuous friction
shoring up this narrow rule, as there is for the equally narrow rule, section 1260, discussed in Part III.
3. Alternatives to Section 1259. Notwithstanding this handicap,
could the Treasury have done better? Is there a more desirable alternative that also is politically and practically feasible? As emphasized above,
the government should focus more on dealers' costs in borrowing stock.
Beyond this observation, the question of superior alternatives is too broad
to be explored here, although three possibilities warrant brief discussion.
The first two are broader rules that theoretically would be more effective,
but are probably not politically or practically feasible. The third is more
practical, and might serve as an effective complement to section 1259, or
even a plausible substitute, although a definitive assessment is beyond this
Article's scope.
a. Straddle Standard.- First, the test for a constructive sale could be
based on "substantial diminution" instead of "substantial elimination":
that is, whether the hedge "substantially diminishes" risk of loss and opportunity for gain. This broad formulation, borrowed from the straddle

178. There may be an efficiency reason to favor wealthy taxpayers. In deciding
whether it is efficient to tax hedging, we must see how would-be hedgers will respond to
the tax. If wealthy taxpayers are more likely to keep the asset unhedged, instead of selling,
we might as well let them hedge. No revenue is lost, and social waste from lock-in is
avoided. Nevertheless, I suspect that many wealthy taxpayers would sell if they could not
hedge. In my experience, taxpayers with positions large enough to hedge under section
1259 often feel quite undiversified. Further empirical work on this question, however, is
needed.
179. While regulatory authority could be used to require a somewhat larger band of
retained exposure (e.g., 30% instead of 20%), further broadening of the rule-for
instance, use of the "substantial diminution" test discussed below-would probably require
legislation.
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rules, 811is much harder to avoid, and my guess is few would try. 18' The
main problem, though, is that this test is so much broader than the current section 1259 that the Treasury could not implement it through regulations. Just as broader legislation was politically unattainable at the
time, 18 2 I suspect it remains so today.
Assuming the political hurdle could be overcome, a broader rule
poses two other problems. First, it could intensify lock-in, as would-be
hedgers choose to hold the asset unhedged instead of selling. In addition, this straddle type rule could undermine "good" transactions. For
instance, when shareholders sign a contract agreeing to sell the firm, this
step might conceivably satisfy the substantial diminution test, even if the
contract is subject to significant closing conditions (and perhaps even if
nonrecognition treatment would apply when the acquisition is consummated).1 83 Likewise, very short term hedges arguably should not trigger
tax. If appetite for them is elastic, taxing them will simply terminate the
practice without inducing realizations. Yet exceptions can be offered to
avert such overbreadth, and the tax bar will help with this process. In180. See I.R.C. § 1092(c)(1) ("The term 'straddle' means offsetting positions with
respect to personal property."); id. § 1092(c) (2) (A) ("A taxpayer holds offsetting positions
with respect to personal property if there is a substantial diminution of the taxpayer's risk
of loss from holding any position with respect to personal property by reason of his
holding I or more other positions. ... ").For background on the straddle rules, see supra
note 116. In general, the rules apply whenever one position "substantially diminishes" risk
of loss in another. This test would apply even when the taxpayer retains considerable
exposure. For instance, assume the appreciated asset is worth $100. To avoid the rule, the
taxpayer no longer would use a put at $90 and a call at $110. Instead, the put might be at
$50 and the call at $200. Given the breadth of the "substantial diminution" test, it is not
clear that a 50-200 spread is sufficient. In fact, in my experience, major law firms are
generally unwilling to opine about how much exposure must be retained to avoid
"substantial diminution" when the question arises under the straddle rules. That
diversification alone does not trigger this test is one of the few points on which there is
certainty. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-201 (1981), [2001] 12 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
30,200, at 55,081. In contrast, opinions about "substantial elimination" under section
1259 are commonplace.
181. Professor Schenk has offered another alternative that is harder to avoid than
section 1259. See Schenk, supra note 170, at 583-90. Her proposal is somewhat broader
in scope, and narrower in effect. Gain recognition is triggered merely by eliminating risk
of loss, even if opportunity for gain is retained. Thus, if a taxpayer has a zero basis in an
asset worth $100, purchase of a put with a $40 exercise price would trigger gain. Yet the
amount of gain recognized is based, not on the hedged asset's fair market value, but on the
amount of gain that is protected from loss (e.g., $40 instead of $100). Id. at 586-87.
182. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
183. If a firm is going to be acquired, and the acquisition contract promises that
target shareholders will receive consideration of a specified value (e.g., in acquiror shares
and/or cash), their shares in the target company generally will not decline in value below
the amount they have been promised (assuming the market expects the acquisition to be
consummated). Such a contract could plausibly satisfy a "substantial diminution" test and
trigger a constructive sale-an odd result if consummation of the transaction would itself
qualify as a tax free reorganization. On the other hand, the point should not be
overstated. To my knowledge, tax lawyers do not generally advise target shareholders that
such a contract creates a straddle under section 1092.
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deed, when section 1259 was proposed, exceptions were added for cer18 5
tain acquisitions of a business 8 4 and for certain short term hedges.
Other refinements would also be needed, but this topic is too extensive to
be addressed here.
b. Delta Standard. - Another broad alternative is to treat a partial
hedge as a constructive sale-but only of a portion of the hedged shares.
In other words, instead of an "all or nothing" test that asks whether there
has been a constructive sale, a "part sale" test would always find a constructive sale, and would ask instead how much has been constructively
sold. For instance, a $90-$110 collar could be a constructive sale of 85%
of the hedged shares (i.e., for the shares' fair market value), while a wider
$80-$120 collar could be a constructive sale of only 70%. The percentage would depend on a relationship called "delta," which measures how
much the value of a hedge changes when the underlying stock price
changes by one dollar.' 8 6 For example, assume that, as the stock price
declines from $100 to $99, a $90-$110 collar appreciates-not by a full
dollar, but by $.85.187 For a hedge of one million shares, then, the $1
184. The NYSBA raised this issue, see NYSBA, Comments on H.R. 846, supra note
110, and Congress later enacted section 1259(c)(2). For a discussion of issues presented
by this exception, see Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, supra note 104, at 349.
185. In response to taxpayer lobbying, Congress added the short term hedging
exception of section 1259(c)(3). See Lee A. Sheppard, Taxwriters Hijack Constructive
Sale Rule, 75 Tax Notes 1798, 1803 (1997) (noting that taxwriting committees added
measure "to accommodate short-term portfolio hedging by corporate treasurers and
traders"). As proposed by the taxwriting committees, the original short term exception was
too broad. After the NYSBA flagged this problem, NYSBA Tax Section, Comments on H.R.
846, supra note 110, Congress narrowed the exception. Sheppard, supra, at 1803 (noting
that, in evaluating an early version of the short term safe harbor, "the NYSBA Tax Section
warned that this hedging exception would become the exception that eats the rule," and
noting that the taxwriting committees revised the rule "to address the Tax Section's
concerns"); see also William M. Paul, Constructive Sales Under New Section 1259, 76 Tax
Notes 1467, 1474-78 (1997) (describing various versions of constructive sale proposal and
their treatment of short term hedges); Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, supra note
104, at 348-49 (analyzing measure as it was enacted).
If section 1259 is modified to adopt the "substantial diminution" test recommended
here, there will be more interest in using the short term exception as a long term strategy.
Hence, more restrictions should be placed on it-for instance, the asset should not be
hedged more than a minimum total number of days in any taxable year (e.g., 90, as
opposed to the 300 permitted under current law).
186. See John C. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivative Securities 298 (2d ed.
1993) (defining delta of a derivative security as "the rate of change of its price with respect
to the price of the underlying asset").
187. At first blush, it may seem surprising that the collar appreciates at all. After all,
the collar will not actually yield a payment at maturity unless the stock price falls below $90.
(The collar entitles the holder to sell at $90, and this step is not profitable unless the stock
price is below $90.) Nevertheless, the collar grows more valuable as the stock price
declines from $100 to $99. At this price, even though the collar would not yield a profit if
exercised (so the collar has no so called "intrinsic value"), the collar still has value because
of the possibility that the stock price will fall below $90 before the collar expires. Options
have this so called "time value" before they expire just as lottery tickets have value before a
drawing. See id. at 140 (defining intrinsic value and time value); see also RonaldJ. Gilson
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million loss in the stock (i.e., $1 for each share) is partially offset by
$850,000 of appreciation on the collar (i.e., $.85 per share). The hedge
thus offers similar protection as a complete hedge of 85% of the shares,
such as a short sale of 850,000 shares. Under a delta approach, then, this
hedge would be treated as a constructive sale of 850,000 shares. This
approach avoids the stark discontinuity between total and partial hedges
and revokes the latter's tax advantage.
Notwithstanding this benefit, this broader formulation could exacerbate lock-in. In addition, this approach is even more daunting to administer than the straddle test. Computing delta is a difficult task that is beyond the abilities of most taxpayers, advisors, and IRS auditors. Although
a computer can help with the complex formula, 188 taxpayers would still
have to input the stock's volatility, a subjective assessment that itself calls
for mathematical expertise. 18 9 Not only is delta hard to compute, but it
also is somewhat unreliable: Delta constantly changes-for instance, as
the price of the underlying stock fluctuates, and as time passes "o°-but
& Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 238-43 (2d ed. 1995)
(noting that value of call option depends on various factors, including exercise price, time
remaining until maturity, and volatility of underlying asset price). Thus, a $90-$110 collar
appreciates as the stock price declines from $100 to $99. Yet this appreciation is less than
dollar-for-dollar because the stock may never actually fall below $90.
188. Computing delta involves elaborate mathematical formulas. For a discussion, see
Hull, supra note 186, at 298-307 (discussing delta hedging). Various Internet websites
compute delta for single call options. See, e.g., FI'S Black Scholes Calculator, at http://
mscf.gsia.cmu.edu/bsop.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (computing the price, delta, gamma, and vega for European-style call options). I
could not, however, find a site that computes delta for a complex derivative such as a
collar, although this service presumably would become more available if the tax law
created demand for it. To spare taxpayers the need to do computations, the government
could offer presumptions based on typical facts. For instance, a $90-$110 collar with a
term of three years could be presumed to trigger a constructive sale of 85% of the position.
Yet such presumptions may be attacked as inaccurate, weakening the government's
political and legal case for the delta methodology-a case that presumably would rest to a
considerable degree on the method's nuance and accuracy.
189. There are various ways to compute volatility, including use of past volatility or of
the volatility implied by the current price of publicly traded options. See Nassim Taleb,
Dynamic Hedging: Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options 88, 95 (1997) (defining "actual"
and "implied" volatility, and noting that use of data from different time periods can lead to
different assessments of volatility).
190. Hull, supra note 186, at 299. For instance, a call option with a $100 exercise
price will appreciate only modestly (e.g., by one cent) when the stock price increases from
$5 to $6-based on the marginally improved chance that the stock will reach $100. In
contrast, the call option will appreciate far more (e.g., by a dollar) when the stock price
increases from $500 to $501. The difference is that the option holder can actually collect
these gains by exercising the option. Thus, delta increases as an option becomes more "in
the money" (i.e., as it becomes increasingly profitable to exercise the option). Id. at 301
(explaining that delta approaches one as the option becomes deep-in-the-money, while it
approaches zero as the option becomes deep-out-of-the-money). As the expiration date
approaches, moreover, the stock price becomes less likely to change enough to transform
an out-of-the-money option (i.e., one that would not yield a profit if exercised) into an inthe-money option (i.e., one that would yield a profit if exercised). For out-of-the-money
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the tax law would test for a constructive sale only once, when the taxpayer
enters into the hedge. A hedge's initial effectiveness is not a sure indicator of its ultimate effectiveness at maturity. 19' Indeed, certain hedges become less effective (i.e., delta shrinks) as the stock price declines.1 9 2 Yet
193
if the delta test is used only for hedges with relatively stable deltas,
taxpayers will begin favoring less stable hedges that presumably would
still be subject to a permissive all-or-nothing test.
A delta standard is also likely to encounter effective taxpayer opposition. A shift from the all-or-nothing inquiry to a "part sale" test would
surprise experts in the area, and arguably would be inconsistent with the
statutory language and legislative history. 194 The delta methodology rests
on an analogy that is unfamiliar to most taxpayers, as well as to members
of Congress: Although a $90-$110 hedge of 100% of the position may be
and at-the-money options, then, delta declines over time. See id. at 301 (showing that
delta of out-of-the-money and at-the-money options grows with time remaining). Other
influences on delta include interest rates and the stock's volatility. See id. at 315-17
(discussing "rho," which reflects the influence of interest rates, and "vega," which reflects
the influence of volatility).
191. Compare a taxpayer who sells 85% of her one million shares ("the Seller") with
one who uses a $90-$110 collar with an initial delta of .85 ("the Collar-holder"). If the
stock price drops from $100 to $90, the Seller will suffer a $10 loss only on the 150,000
shares he kept ($1.5 million). The Collar-holder will be in a similar position if she sells (or
terminates) the collar right away at a profit: The collar will have appreciated because of
the increased probability of further declines in the stock price. See supra note 187. Yet if
the stock never actually falls below $90, the collar will expire without making a payment. If
the Collar-holder keeps the collar until maturity, she will lose $10 for each of her one
million shares ($10 million).
192. For example, one way to hedge stock worth $100 is to sell to someone else the
right to buy the stock for a lower price such as $70 (i.e., selling an in-the-money call). The
premium for this call (e.g., $45) will help offset depreciation in the stock. This hedge
initially will have a high delta (.84). However, if the stock declines to $50 after six months,
delta will decline precipitously (to .45) because the call has become significantly out-of-themoney. If the stock declines to $30, delta would fall even further (to .17). See supra note
190 (describing relationship between delta and stock price). These computations assume
a volatility of .5 and a three-year term, using the FTS Black Scholes Calculator, supra.
193. For instance, the delta on a collar is relatively stable. The reason is that as the
price moves in either direction, the collar becomes more deep-in-the-money. For example,
assume the collar's delta is .85 when the stock price is $100. If the stock price declines to
$30, any further declines are likely to cause dollar-for-dollar appreciation in the collar
(because the collar will be exercised as long as the stock price is below $90). Yet, although
changes in stock price are unlikely to reduce a collar's delta, other factors can depress
delta, such as the passage of time or changes in the stock's volatility. See supra note 190.
194. For instance, the statute indicates that a forward contract triggers a constructive
sale only if it provides for delivery of a "substantially fixed amount of property" at a
"substantially fixed price." I.R.C. § 1259(d) (1). The legislative history reinforces the point
by providing that there is no constructive sale if the amount of property to be delivered is
"subject to significant variation." Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997, supra note 104, at
56,715. Yet tinder a "part sale" approach, such a forward would still trigger a constructive
sale of some portion of the position. On the other hand, the Treasury's regulatory
authority is quite broad here, under the mandate to promulgate regulations for
transactions having "substantially the same effect" as those listed in the statute. I.R.C.
§ 1259(c) (1)(E).
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economically similar to a total hedge of 85% of the position, these two
deals are formally different. Moreover, this economic parallel is not per95
fect, as opponents of this methodology will be quick to point out.'
Therefore, although a delta approach is theoretically intriguing, it is
probably not practical.
c. Basis Step-Up. Significant political and administrability
problems burden the two broader alternatives discussed above. These
problems are largely avoided if the government instead focuses on a different aspect of the problem. The high profile hedging transactions that
prompted section 1259 exploited two tax rules: not just the realization
rule, but also section 1014's step-up in basis at death. It is possible that
targeting the latter rule, which is widely acknowledged as a policy monstrosity, 196 would have made better use of the political opportunity created by the media's focus on hedging. For instance, Congress could have
revoked the basis step-up for any property that was hedged (e.g., under a
broad "substantial diminution" standard) within three years of the tax97
payer's death.'
The question may have been rendered moot by a recent change in
law-the scheduled repeal in 2010 of the estate tax, and with it the basis
step-up for certain large estates-although uncertainty remains about
whether these changes will actually be finalized. 198 In any event, a rule
195. As shown in supra note 191, the parallel breaks down if the taxpayer holds the
hedge until maturity.
196. See, e.g., Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes:
The 1969 Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1381
(1970) (calling step-up in basis at death the "most serious defect in our federal tax
structure").
197. Section 1259 narrows section 1014 in a much more limited way, revoking the
basis step-up for certain grandfathered constructive sales. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001 (d) (3), 111 Stat. 788, 908. For a discussion, see Paul, supra note
185, at 1478-79 (describing conditions in which grandfathered constructive sales are
denied basis step-up).
198. The new rule will limit the step-up in basis to $1.3 million worth of property (or
$3 million for property passing to a spouse). This change does not take effect until 2010,
and automatically expires (along with the estate tax repeal) a year later. Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 38, 76
(providing that basis will not step-tip at death for certain decedents dying after December
31, 2009) (amending I.R.C. § 1014); id. § 901 (a) (2), 115 Stat. at 150 (providing that repeal
of basis step-up is in turn repealed for decedents dying after December 31, 2010). In other
words, as the law now stands, carryover basis would apply only to taxpayers who die during
2010, unless Congress chooses to extend the provision's life. Congress may well decide not
to keep the carryover basis rule, given difficulties with administering such a rule (e.g.,
forcing heirs to ascertain what the decedent's basis was), as well as budgetary pressures that
could drain Congress's enthusiasm for the new basis rule's companion measure, estate tax
repeal. Indeed, Congress repealed the basis step-up once before, only to reinstate it.
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 361, 365 (1993) (discussing
enactment of carryover basis rule in 1976 and repeal of this change in 1980 before it went
into effect). Even if the repeal is not reversed, the rule will endure for thirteen years after
section 1259's enactment, and indefinitely for taxpayers with smaller estates. Thus, an
opportunity may have been missed when the constructive sale rule was passed.
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barring the basis step-up for hedged assets would raise many issues, such
as the administrability of a carryover basis rule or of taxing gains at
death, 199 interaction with the estate tax, and the possibility of worsening
lock-in. A comprehensive analysis is beyond this Article's scope.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP: WHEN FRICTIONS ARE STRONG
Two years after section 1259 was enacted, Congress added section
1260.200 Although the latter aims at a different planning opportunity,
the bill had the same sponsor in the House of Representatives, Barbara
Kennelly of Connecticut, and borrowed liberally from section 1259's statutory language. 20 1 Yet the common method of avoiding section 1259using a derivative with a modified economic return-is not viable for section 1260. This difference, which derives from frictions, was not anticipated by government officials who crafted the reform. Since it is difficult
to use derivatives to avoid section 1260, taxpayers have turned to other
methods of avoidance involving insurance and offshore corporations. Yet
these strategies have also been impeded by frictions, as well as by other
tax rules. Unlike avoidance strategies for section 1259, moreover, these
strategies probably could be shut down through regulations, or even a
notice that regulations will be written with a retroactive effective date.
After a description of the targeted transaction in Section A, Section B
describes avoidance strategies for section 1260, and frictions that undermine their appeal. Section C briefly considers normative implications.
A. Targeted Planning
In cutting the long term capital gains rate from 28% to 20% in
1997,22 Congress reduced the attractiveness of investment strategies that
involve frequent trading, and thus do not generate this tax-preferred return. Most hedge funds use such strategies to earn impressive pretax returns.20 3 As partnerships for tax purposes, though, they pass their profits
199. For an insightful discussion of implementation issues associated with taxing gains
at death, see generally Zelenak, supra note 198 (analyzing technical issues associated with
treating death as realization event).
200. Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 534, 113 Stat. 1860,
1931 (codified at I.R.C. § 1260).
201. See Sheppard, supra note 185, at 1798 (noting that Barbara Kennelly sponsored
an early version of section 1259); Lee Sheppard, Constructive Ownership of a Bag of Dead
Cats, 17 Tax Notes Int'l 1329, 1330-31 (1998) (noting that Barbara Kennelly sponsored an
early version of section 1260). After Congresswoman Kennelly left the House for an
unsuccessful gubernatorial bid in Connecticut, Richard Neal of Massachusetts became the
chief sponsor of the bill. Id. at 1331.
202. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 323 (8th rev. ed. 1999).
203. Hedge funds are investment vehicles for wealthy individuals and institutions.
Because these funds are not registered under the federal securities laws as investment
companies, broker-dealers, or public corporations, and thus need not comply with
regulatory and disclosure requirements applicable to mutual funds, these ventures
generally are available only to investors meeting minimum wealth requirements. See
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through to investors as short term capital gains, taxable in the current
year. In response, investment bankers and their tax advisors developed a
way to convert these appealing pretax returns into deferred long term
capital gains: a derivative, such as a forward contract or swap, whose return was based on the hedge fund's value. 20 4 No tax was due until the
derivative was settled, and gains were taxed at long term rates if the taxpayer held the derivative for the requisite holding period (eighteen
months at the time, and currently one year).2°5 When selling such a derivative to a client, the investment bank would hedge its "short" derivative
position by investing in the hedge fund. In essence, the investment bank
would become a partner in the fund, and would use a derivative to trans20 6
fer the economic return to clients.
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons
of Long-Term Capital Management B-1 (April 1999) [hereinafter Lessons of LTCM]
(noting that U.S. hedge funds "rely on the 'private' investment company exclusions in
Sections 3(c) (1) and 3(c) (7) of the Investment Company Act," 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) (1),
(c)(7) (1994)). Managers generally are compensated with a fixed fee and a share of
profits above a minimum return (e.g., 20% of all returns above 15%). Id. at 1-12. Hedge
funds generally rely on "active trading," which "is a practice in which investment positions
are changed with high frequency"-sometimes "to maintain a desired risk-return profile as
market prices fluctuate," and sometimes "to profit from short-term changes in prices." Id.
at 5.
204. See E.S. Browning, Where There's a Tax Cut, Wall Street Finds a Way, Wall St.J.,
Oct. 21, 1997, at Cl (describing development of hedge fund derivatives by Wall Street
investment banks).
205. Unlike a partner in a partnership, who is treated as engaging in a pro rata share
of all the partnership's transactions, the holder of a derivative is not deemed to engage in
the underlying activity. Rather, the derivative is simply taxed as a free-standing contract,
and the holding period is the length of time before the contract is terminated. See I.R.C.
§ 1234A. While this analysis clearly holds for a forward contract, there is some
disagreement within the tax bar about whether a swap gives rise to ordinary income or
capital gain at maturity. Yet even for swaps, the law is clear that an unscheduled
termination gives rise to capital treatment. See Lewis R. Steinberg, Using OTC Equity
Derivatives for High-Net-Worth Individuals, in The Use of Derivatives in Tax Planning 211,
230 n.72 (FrankJ. Fabozzi ed., 1998) ("[S]ome taxpayers attempt to buttress their claim
for capital gain treatment by terminating the swap, prior to its stated maturity [date].").
206. The transaction had to be structured with care to ensure that the client was not
deemed the tax owner of the hedge fund interest held by the dealer. For instance, the
derivative typically had to be settled in cash and the investment bank typically was
contractually barred from sharing fund data or consulting on voting issues with the client.
For a discussion, see New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on H.R. 3170,
Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, July 16, 1998, LEXIS, 98 TNT 136-38 [hereinafter NYSBA
Tax Section, Comments on H.R. 3170]. Not all advisors agreed that the transaction
worked under prior law. Assuming it did, the transaction would make no sense if the
investment bank would suffer the same adverse consequences from investing in the fund as
the client. Yet because investment banks mark all their securities to market under
section 475, they suffer no adverse consequences, and thus can serve as tax
accommodation parties: Gains from the hedge fund are matched by mark-to-market
(ordinary) losses on the derivative. For a discussion, see Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, supra
note 23, at 1367-72. The preceding analysis assumes that dealers can apply mark-tomarket accounting to hedge fund interests; while practitioners generally have taken this
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After the transaction attracted media attention, 20 7 Congress responded (with lukewarm support from the Treasury218 ) by enacting the
constructive ownership rule of section 1260. Closely based on section
1259,209 section 1260 applies to derivatives that simulate the return of a
hedge fund or other pass-thru entity210 by offering the holder substantially all of the risk of loss and opportunity for gain from the underlying
asset. 2' If this hauntingly familiar test is satisfied, certain long term capital gain earned on settlement of the derivative is recharacterized as ordinary income, 21 2 and an interest charge is imposed to compensate the gov21 3
ernment for tax deferral.
position, some technical issues must be resolved. See id. at 1371-72 (discussing whether a
hedge fund interest is a "security" under section 475).
207. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 204.
208. A tax lawyer who worked in the Treasury at the time reported this ambivalence to
me in a conversation during 2001, as did two tax lawyers in private practice who had closely
followed the legislative process on behalf of clients.
209. See Barbara M. Flom, Constructive Ownership Transactions: The Sound of One
Shoe Dropping,J. Tax'n Fin. Products, Summer 2000, at 19, 28 n.5 ("[T]he drafters viewed
'constructive ownership' as the mirror image of 'constructive sale."').
210. Other pass-thru entities include regulated investment companies, real estate
investment trusts, S corporations, passive foreign investment corporations, and foreign
personal holding companies. I.R.C. § 1260(c) (2).
211. The definition of a constructive ownership transaction is based on, and closely
tracks, section 1259's definition of a constructive sale, discussed in supra note 104. Under
section 1260(d)(1):
The taxpayer shall be treated as having entered into a constructive ownership
transaction with respect to any financial asset if the taxpayer(A) holds a long position under a notional principal contract with respect to the
financial asset,
(B) enters into a forward or futures contract to acquire the financial asset,
(C) is the holder of a call option, and is the grantor of a put option, with respect
to the financial asset and such options have substantially equal strike prices
and substantially contemporaneous maturity dates, or
(D) to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, enters into
one or more other transactions (or acquires one or more positions) that
have substantially the same effect as a transaction described in any of the
preceding subparagraphs.
Id. § 1260(d)(1).
212. Specifically, gain is recharacterized to the extent it exceeds "net underlying longterm capital gain," which essentially is the long term capital gain that would have been
earned from investing in the underlying property. Section 1260(a) provides:
If the taxpayer has gain from a constructive ownership transaction with respect to
any financial asset and such gain would (without regard to this section) be treated
as a long-term capital gain-(1) such gain shall be treated as ordinary income to
the extent that such gain exceeds the net underlying long-term capital gain ....
Id. § 1260(a)(1).
213. Id. § 1260(b) (imposing interest charge on recharacterized gain). Two other tax
motivated uses of hedge fund derivatives were not explicitly addressed. First, tax-exempt
hedge fund investors can potentially earn taxable UBTI. Id. § 512(a)(1). In addition,
foreign hedge fund investors can potentially earn two types of income that would be
subject to U.S. tax, either "fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and
income" (FDAP), or "effectively connected income" (ECI). Id. § 871 (a) (1) (A) (defining
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B. Frictions and Avoidance
Notwithstanding the similarity of the two statutory formulae, section
1260 is harder to avoid. 2 14 To develop the contrast with section 1259, this
Section begins with the tax benefit from avoiding the measure and then
considers the strength, discontinuity, and position of relevant frictions.
1. Tax Benefit. - Avoiding section 1260 often yields less of a tax ben2 15
efit than avoiding section 1259, and so taxpayers may not try as hard.
Although each transaction offers deferral, and the possibility of tax forgiveness if the taxpayer dies (for the next decade, at least), deferral opportunities are greater in hedging appreciated assets. The reason is that
these assets are already appreciated when the derivatives transaction begins, so tax would otherwise be due immediately, and deferral erodes this
tax burden from the outset. In contrast, a hedge fund derivative is not
appreciated from the start. Since it allows taxpayers to pay the current
market price for the fund, 2 16 the derivative becomes valuable if, and only
if, the underlying fund appreciates during the period after the taxpayer
acquires the derivative. Thus, tax is not deferred from the beginning, but
only on gains earned after the transaction starts. 2 17 Even so, avoiding section 1260 offers a benefit, in addition to deferral, that does not arise from
avoiding section 1259: halving of the relevant tax rate from almost 40%
to 20%.218
In assessing the tax benefit of avoiding section 1260, there is an important caveat: Deferral and reduction of the rate are benefits only ifthe;
hedge fund appreciates. If instead the fund has losses, deferring these deductions and converting them from short to long term would increase the
FDAP); id. §§ 864(c), 897(a) (1) (B) (defining ECI). By investing instead in derivatives,
these investors can avoid these consequences in some cases. Section 1260 does not
recharacterize gain as either UBTI or EC. See Flom, supra note 209, at 19, 25-26
(arguing that section 1260 is unlikely to reach UBTI-avoiding strategies of tax-exempt
organizations, but could conceivably reach FDAP- and ECI-avoiding strategies for foreign
taxpayers, for instance, through regulations or case law).
214. See Flom, supra note 209, at 26 (noting that "much effort has been expended...
in designing structures which would escape taxation as COTs [constructive ownership
transactions]," but also noting that "the author is unaware of any new-style transactions
that have been effectuated").
215. For a numerical example illustrating the tax benefit offered by avoiding section
1260, see infra Appendix D.
216. To be precise, this price would be increased to account for the time value of
money if the taxpayer does not have to pay the purchase price today.
217. For discussion of this difference, see supra Part I.C.1.
218. Short term capital gains are not eligible for the 20% rate provided in
section 1 (h)(1)(C) for long term capital gains, I.R.C. § 1 (h)(1)(C), and thus are taxed at
the same rate as ordinary income, which is subject to a maximum rate of over 39% for
individuals. Id. § 1 (a). Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, this maximum rate will be gradually reduced over a six-year period-for instance,
from 39.6% to 39.1% in 2001-and is scheduled to be 35% in 2006 and thereafter. See
Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Summary of Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement
for H.R. 1836 (2001), [2001] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 3620, at 14,815-2 to -3.
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tax burden. Even so, taxpayers can head off this adverse result by settling
the derivative before the termination date (e.g., before the end of the
first tax year). 21 9 Ultimately, then, the hedge fund derivative offers a tax
reduction in the gain scenario that is not offset by a corresponding tax
increase in the loss scenario. Ex ante, this strategy is expected to reduce
the tax burden, but the expected benefit must be discounted for arising
only if the fund appreciates.
2. Derivatives with a Modified Return: Difficulty of Dynamic Hedging. Since section 1260 uses essentially the same statutory standard as section
1259, we might expect a similar avoidance strategy: use of derivatives that
offer most, but not all, of the fund's return. For a fund interest worth
$100, for instance, the taxpayer might bear the full risk of loss below $95
by selling a put with a $95 exercise price, while enjoying opportunity for
gain above $115 by purchasing a call with a $115 exercise price. In fact,
these "partial return" strategies reportedly are uncommon.
Although frictions ultimately account for the difference, disparities
in statutory language should be considered first. Unlike section 1259,
section 1260 does not have legislative history deeming the rule inapplicable when the return on the derivative differs sufficiently from the return
on the underlying property. 2 °11 The reason, I suspect, is that the point
was well understood because the standard was consciously lifted from section 1259. Even so, the two provisions treat forward contracts differently.
Unlike section 1259, section 1260 covers any forward contract, even one
that omits a portion of the underlying fund's economic return, and so
such forwards are not a viable means of avoidance. 221 Nevertheless, like
section 1259, section 1260 excludes options and equity swaps that do not

219. If taxpayers could not accelerate losses in this way, the value of the hedge fund
transaction, ex ante, would be diminished considerably. Fortunately for the taxpayers, if
the fund depreciates, the dealer will be willing to settle the derivative early. Of course the
dealer would be unwilling to provide this accommodation if the dealer was subject to the
same tax rule as the customer, since early settlement would accelerate not just the
customer's losses, but also the dealer's gain. Indeed, the dealer's tax bill would increase by
the same amount that the customer's tax bill declined, assuming the same rate applied.
Yet the dealer is required to mark the derivative to market under section 475. I.R.C.
§ 475(a)(1). Thus, early termination has no effect on the dealer's tax bill. For a
discussion, see Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, supra note 23, at 1372.
220. For citations to this legislative history under section 1259, see supra notes 104,
111, & 194. No such references appear in the legislative history for section 1260. See S.
Rep. No. 106-201, at 32-35 (1999).
221. See I.R.C. § 1260(d) (4) (defining forward contract as "any contract to acquire in
the future (or provide or receive credit for the future value of) any financial asset"). In
contrast, section 1259 does not cover forward contracts in which the amount of property
delivered varies significantly with the value of the underlying property. See id.
§ 1259(d)(1) (defining forward contract as "a contract to deliver a substantially fixed
amount of property (including cash) for a substantially fixed price"). Section 1260 covers
such variable delivery forward contracts, but regulatory authority is provided to exclude
them. Id. § 1260(g)(2). The Treasury has not yet used this authority.

2001]

FRICTIONS AND TAX PLANNING

1373

sufficiently track the underlying asset. 222 If these derivatives are used,
avoidance strategies like those employed for section 1259 would pass legal muster for section 1260.
The relative difficulty of avoiding section 1260, then, derives not
from the tax law itself, but from frictions-in particular, frictions affecting the dealer counterparty's ability to hedge. Before section 1260 was
enacted, the dealer could easily hedge by holding the fund interest. But
now that the derivative must convey less than all of the hedge fund's economic return-a requirement for avoiding section 1260-holding the
fund interest is no longer a perfect hedge. For instance, assume the investment bank is asked to sell a call for $115 and buy a put for $95. If the
fund appreciates from $100 to $115, this profit goes to the dealer. Yet if
the price declines from $100 to $95, the dealer cannot pass this loss on to
the client through the put.
Why is it important for securities dealers to hedge? Their business is
to provide a service-derivatives to those who want them-not to place
bets on hedge funds.2 2 3 It is not usually derivatives dealers, but specially
trained and monitored proprietary traders, that invest an investment
bank's own capital. Dealer subsidiaries must avoid unhedged risk because their creditworthiness is essential to their business. No one would
buy derivatives from an entity with poor credit, because of uncertainty
about whether the dealer could honor the contract. 224 In a world of perfect information, dealers could take intelligent unhedged risks, such as
bets that are priced favorably because a client is sharing a tax benefit with
the dealer. Yet it would be difficult for prospective customers of a dealer
222. With a pair of options, the regime is avoided as long as their exercise prices are
not "substantially equal." Id. § 1260(d)(1)(C) (providing that regime is triggered by
holding a call and selling a put, but only if "such options have substantially equal strike
prices and substantially contemporaneous maturity dates"). Similarly, section 1260 clearly
applies only to swaps offering the entire return (i.e., "substantially all" risk of loss and
opportunity for gain) of the hedge fund-but not to swaps offering only some of this
return. See id. § 1260(d) (3) (A), (B) (providing that a person has a "long position under a
notional principal contract," and thus is covered by statute, if the person has "the right to
be paid (or receive credit for) all or substantially all of the investment yield (including
appreciation) on such financial asset for a specified period," and "is obligated to reimburse
(or provide credit for) all or substantially all of any decline in the value of such financial
asset"). The standard under section 1259 is identical in all relevant respects. See id.
§ 1259(d) (2) (A), (B) (defining "offsetting notional principal contract" as any agreement
which "includes ... a requirement to pay (or provide credit for) all or substantially all of
the investment yield (including appreciation) on such property for a specified period,"
and a "right to be reimbursed for (or receive credit for) all or substantially all of any
decline in the value of such property").
223. Cf. Hull, supra note 186, at 323 (noting that financial institutions that fail to
hedge their exposure properly on derivatives sold to clients.are "subject to an unacceptable
level of risk").
224. See Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Form 10-Q: Quarterly Report 31 (Feb.
28, 2001) ("[T]he Company's debt ratings can have a significant impact on certain trading
revenues, particularly in those businesses where longer term counterparty performance is
critical, such as over-the-counter derivative transactions.").
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(or, for that matter, shareholders) to distinguish sensible bets from less
sensible ones. Nor can employees, whose pay is tied to volume, be trusted
to take only well compensated risks. In response, major investment banks
generally have very strict risk management policies for derivatives dealers.2 25 These policies render it quite difficult for dealers to supply the
derivative needed to avoid section 1260. Usually, no mismatch is permitted between derivative and fund returns. Put another way, when it is the
dealer that must bear unhedged risk, as opposed to the investor (as in the
case of section 1259), risk becomes a discontinuous friction.
Given this difficulty, why are dealers able to supply derivatives for
avoidance of section 1259? After all, a dealer that offers customers a collar on one share cannot perfectly hedge by selling one share short, since
the economic returns do not match perfectly. 226 The key difference is
that for section 1259, but not section 1260, the relevant derivative is based
on a publicly traded asset. As a result, dealers can use hedging strategies
that rely on delta, the correlation of the derivative's value with underlying
stock prices. 227 To see such correlation, assume a share of stock is worth
$10, and someone has the right to buy the stock for $100. Since this call
option would not be used unless the stock price rises above $100, a $1
increase in the stock price, from $10 to $11, will not generate a full dollar
of appreciation in the option. Instead, the option might appreciate by
only a penny, reflecting the marginally increased likelihood that the stock
price will reach $100.

225. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., Form 10-Q: Quarterly Report 5 (May 11, 2001)
("As part of its trading activities, Merrill Lynch uses derivatives to facilitate customer
transactions, to take proprietary positions and as a means of risk management. The
Corporate Risk Management group monitors and manages these risks in accordance with
established risk management policies and procedures that include risk tolerance levels.").
These policies are considered sufficiently important that banks refer to them in public
disclosure. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Annual Report, supra note 125, at 25 ("Other risk
management objectives include... limiting proprietary risk-taking; and closely monitoring
our long-term exposure to illiquid assets."); Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., supra note
224, at 34 ("The risks associated with the Company's derivative activities, including market
and credit risks, are managed on an integrated basis with associated cash instruments in a
manner consistent with the Company's overall risk management policies and
procedures."); see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., Form 10-K. Annual Report 53
(Feb. 16, 2001) (noting that Morgan Stanley assigns market risk limits to each major
trading division worldwide, as well as to smaller subdivisions of the firm, and noting that
"[t]rading division risk managers, desk risk managers and the Firm Risk Management
Department monitor market risk measures against limits in accordance with policies set by
senior management").
226. Assume the dealer sells a $95 put and buys a $115 call, giving the dealer most,
but not all, of the return from owning the stock: risk of loss below $95, and opportunity
for gain above $115. A short sale of a single share does not offer complete protection. The
problem is that the dealer will lose $15 on the short sale as the stock rises from $100 to
$115, but will not make this money back on the collar because opportunity for gain on the
call begins only at $115.
227. See supra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
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This sensitivity of a derivative to changes- in the underlying stock's
value is used by dealers in so called "dynamic" hedging. 228 For instance,
assume a collar leaves a dealer exposed to risk of loss below $90 and opportunity for gain above $110 on 1000 shares of a publicly traded stock
currently worth $100. For every dollar change in the underlying stock's
value, the collar's value will change by an observable number of cents,
which will be less than a dollar. The reason for this divergence is that the
collar does not cover the full range of stock returns.2 2 9 There is a gap
between $90 and $110. As a result, since the collar is based on 1000
shares, the dealer would not hedge by shorting a full 1000 shares, but an
amount fewer than 1000 shares. If a $1 change in the asset price induces
an $.85 change in the collar's value, the dealer's offsetting short would be
85% as large (i.e., shorting 850 shares to hedge a collar on 1000
shares).230 Delta will vary as the underlying stock price changes, reflect23 1
ing different probabilities that the derivative will yield a profit or loss.
Thus, the dealer must constantly monitor delta and make corresponding
232
adjustments in the size of the hedge.
For two reasons, then, dynamic hedging is feasible only for publicly
traded assets, and not for hedge fund positions. First, computation of
delta requires data about the relationship between derivatives and the
underlying asset, and such a rich supply of data is available only for a
publicly traded asset. 23 3 Second, constant adjustments in the size of the
228. See generally Hull, supra note 186, at 298-324 (describing dynamic hedging
strategies); Taleb, supra note 189, at 115-31 (discussing role of delta in hedging
strategies).
229. For a discussion, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
230. If delta is .85, then as the price of the underlying stock falls from $100 to $99, the
dealer would lose $.85 per share on the collar (because of the reduced likelihood of
profiting from the $110 call the dealer has purchased, and the increased likelihood of
having loss on the $90 put the dealer has sold). Total loss on the collar would be $850
(i.e., .85 * 1000 shares). To make up for this loss, the dealer must short 850 shares, thereby
earning $1 per share, or $850.
231. For instance, if the stock price is $100, the stock price must climb to $110 before
the dealer will begin to profit from the call it owns with a $110 exercise price. An increase
from $100 to $101 thus will not induce a full $1 of appreciation on the option, given the
less-than-100% probability that the price will attain the $110 level. On the other hand, a
price increase from $210 to $211 will have a much greater influence on the $110 call
option's value, since the option holder can collect this gain by exercising the option.
Hence, the option is likely to appreciate by almost a full dollar.
232. See Hull, supra note 186, at 299-300 (noting that "delta changes with both
changes in the stock price and the passage of time," so "the hedge has to be adjusted
periodically," a process known as "rebalancing" the hedge).
233. If the dealer knew the details of the fund's trading strategy, the dealer might be
able to use this information to hedge. Yet funds are secretive about their trading strategies,
a trade secret that justifies high management fees. See Lessons of LTCM, supra note 203,
at D-5 ("Hedge funds view banks as competitors ....Therefore, most hedge funds are very
reluctant to share information on their trading strategies [with banks] . . . ."). This
secretiveness creates an additional friction for hedge fund derivatives, which also existed
before the enactment of section 1260: According to tax lawyers involved in structuring
these deals, some hedge funds do not allow a securities dealer to be a fund investor.
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hedge are feasible only in an extremely liquid market-and certainly not
with a hedge fund, which might allow redemptions only once a month.
Although delta hedging is not feasible for a hedge fund derivative,
one investment bank was once willing to sell such a derivative without
perfectly hedging it-a notorious exception that proves the rule. In
1996, Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) provided this service to the principals of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). Specifically, UBS
sold an at-the-money call option and hedged (imperfectly) by investing in
the fund. 23 4 Thus, UBS gave up opportunity for gain in LTCM, but remained fully exposed to risk of loss. 23 5 Even in 1996, when LTCM's value
was soaring, UBS reportedly was the only securities dealer willing to do
this transaction (except for Credit Suisse First Boston, which took a much
smaller stake); senior UBS executives apparently were eager to invest in
LTCM-both on behalf of UBS and personally-and hoped this transaction would give them access to an otherwise closed fund. 236 In any event,
the economic disparity between the derivative and underlying fund interest helped the client's tax analysis, 23 7 but proved disastrous for UBS when
LTCM failed three years later. The dealer's $800 million position to
hedge the derivative became essentially worthless. 238 UBS also lost the
$300 million option premium, which it had invested in LTCM for its own
account. 23 9 This transaction is well known on Wall Street and, in my ex-

234. The transaction reportedly was devised by Myron Scholes, a founder of LTCM.
Nicholas Dunbar, Inventing Money 170-71 (2000). Professor Scholes's insightful work on
frictions is discussed above. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
235. Dunbar, supra note 234, at 171-72.
236. Id. at 168-69, 172-73 (describing desire of UBS's CEO to cement closer
relationship with LTCM).
237. This transaction predated enactment of section 1260. So why was an economic
mismatch needed between the derivative and fund? After all, transactions were commonly
done without a mismatch under prior law. See supra Part III.A. The difference is that
those transactions usually involved passive investors, who did not have access to information
about the fund's trading strategy. Passive investors thus were less likely to be regarded as
owners of the fund under tax common law because they lacked a key attribute of tax
ownership-so called "dominion and control" over the partnership interests, including the
ability to vote, inspect partnership books, obtain an accounting, and otherwise to monitor
and help govern the partnership. See Rev. Rul. 77-137, 1977-1 C.B. 178 (holding that
control over "residual powers" affects which party is viewed as partner in partnership);
NYSBA Tax Section, Comments on H.R. 3170, supra note 206 (concluding based on
analysis of authorities predating section 1260 that "dominion and control" and residual
rights determine ownership of a partnership for tax purposes). But this argument is not
available when the taxpayers run the fund, as in the UBS-LTCM transaction. As a result, an
economic mismatch was thought to be necessary.
238. UBS reportedly had the right to convert its equity stake into debt, but this
feature ultimately proved unhelpful. Dunbar, supra note 234, at 172. ("The economic
effect of this clause was insidious . . . . For Meriwether and his partners, the clause
transformed what looked like a call option into a put option-the right to sell their
deferred stake at its current price.").
239. Id.
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why securiperience, investment bankers often mention it in explaining
240
transactions.
these
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risks
taking
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ties dealers are wary
3. Responses. - Although the language of section 1259 was transplanted into section 1260, methods of avoiding section 1259 are not so
easily borrowed, due to the dealers' difficulty in supplying the necessary
derivative. With this simple route closed, taxpayers have explored other
possibilities. This subsection describes eight alternatives, and the frictions and tax rules constraining them. The first six structures involve variations on the return, location, or subject matter of the derivative. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these six are relatively rare, either because of
daunting frictions or the risk of an adverse tax result. Considerably more
common are the last two, which do not use derivatives at all: purchase of
an insurance contract or of stock in an offshore insurance company. Yet
frictions and tax risks burden these as well and, unlike the avoidance
techniques for section 1259, these insurance structures probably could be
halted with targeted regulatory responses.
a. Responses Involving Derivatives. - Taxpayers have attempted to use
modified derivatives to avoid section 1260, with only limited success. The
first four structures attempt to salvage the derivative with a modified return. The fifth still uses a derivative, but moves it offshore instead of
changing the economic return. The sixth changes the subject matter of
the derivative.
i. Call Options. - One alternative, pursued recently by Bear Stearns,
is to sell call options. Specifically, Bear Stearns has organized a so called
"fund of funds" that invests in six funds run by Bear Stearns investment
managers. 241 Not only can clients invest directly in this master fund, but
242
they also can buy a cash settled call option based on the fund's value.
240. A recent development dramatizes this point. During the market decline of 2000
and 2001, a limited number of financial intermediaries began selling exchangeable notes
that provide the "upside" of a hedge fund, while protecting holders from risk of loss. For
instance, the investor pays $100, receives no coupon, and in five years receives the greater
of $100 or the value of a specified fund (currently worth $100). The intermediary hedges
by investing in the fund. Notably, although the intermediary seems to be bearing risk of
loss in the fund, this is not the case. If the fund declines below a threshold, the investor
loses the right to share in fund appreciation, receiving only $100 at maturity (i.e., even if
the fund is worth more). This "knock out" feature lets the intermediary sell a fund that is
losing value, while salvaging enough to buy a Treasury bond that pays $100 at maturity. I
learned these details in August 2001 from an investment banker familiar with these deals.
Incidentally, the transaction is not tax motivated. Although it avoids section 1260, it is
subject to accelerated timing and ordinary tax rates under the contingent debt regulations
of Treasury Regulation section 1.1275-4. .Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (as amended in 1999). See
Schizer, Sticks and Snakes, supra note 23, at 1379-80, 1383-84 (describing tax treatment
under regulations and noting that taxable holders generally avoid contingent debt).
241. In other words, this "master" fund will buy interests in each of the other funds.
Thus, investors in the master fund will have pro rata investments in each of the six funds.
242. Geraldine Fabrikant, For the Rich, a Hedge Fund with an Eye on Taxes, N.Y.
Times, July 1, 2001, at BU 7 (describing warrants that Bear Stearns is offering on its fund of
funds).
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The call option sells for one-third the price of a direct investment, has an
exercise price of 120% of a direct investment's initial value, and has a
term of seven and a quarter years. 243 Since this transaction resembles the
LTCM option described above, on which UBS incurred sizable losses, it is
surprising that Bear Stearns is willing to offer this deal. The difference is
that Bear Stearns manages the underlying fund-a fact that presumably
enables the bank to hedge satisfactorily, or to tolerate an imperfect
2 44
hedge.
Yet although this relationship may help Bear Stearns to hedge, the
tie weakens the client's tax analysis-not under section 1260, but under
tax common law principles of ownership. Once again, there is a tension
between avoiding a friction and ensuring a tax result, a recurring theme
in this Article. The concern here is that the client might be taxed as
owner of a partnership interest (with annual inclusions of short term capital gain) instead of as owner of an option. Since the derivatives dealer
and hedge fund manager are related, it is easier for the government to
treat the client's payments to the dealer for an option as, in substance,

243. Id. For instance, assume a fund interest currently costs $1 million. The investor
pays $330,000 for the option. After seven and a quarter years, if the fund has appreciated
above $1.2 million, the investor receives a cash payment of this excess. Thus, if the fund's
value is $2 million, the investor receives $800,000 (for a profit of $470,000, net of the
premium). But if the fund does not appreciate (or, indeed, declines in value), the investor
receives no payment and loses the premium. Thus, if the fund is worth only $1 million
when the option matures, the investor loses $330,000. For the investor to break even, the
fund must appreciate to $1.53 million (i.e., a 53% return) before the option matures.
244. I do not know how Bear Stearns hedges this position, but three possibilities come
to mind. First, after selling a call to an investor, the derivatives dealer might, in turn, buy
an identical call option from the underlying fund. Obviously, it is easier for the dealer to
secure this accommodation from a fund run by Bear Stearns, as opposed to an unaffiliated
fund. The net effect would be that direct investors in the fund receive a call premium in
exchange for sharing gains above 20% with optionholders.
Alternatively, the derivatives dealer might use its knowledge of the funds' trading
practices to hedge dynamically. The dealer would have to track the trading practices of
each fund, establish offsetting positions, and then adjust these offsetting positions as prices
(and thus deltas) change and as the funds' portfolios change. The trick is that the dealer
must have adequate information about the funds' trading practices-something that is not
usually possible. See supra note 233. Yet this strategy might be feasible here because the
fund manager is a Bear Stearns affiliate.
Finally, if the derivatives dealer simply holds the underlying fund interests, the call
premium protects the dealer from losses of up to one-third of the fund interests' value.
For instance, if the master fund's value declines from $1 million to $700,000, Bear Stearns
will lose $300,000 on the fund, but will keep the $330,000 call premium, for a net gain of
$30,000. This cushion obviously would not be adequate for a more dramatic decline in
value, as UBS discovered. Yet Bear Stearns has the advantage of diversification here, since
the option is based on the value of six funds. In choosing which funds to include,
moreover, Bear Stearns could have chosen funds that are less volatile and do not correlate
with each other. For added protection, Bear Stearns could add a "knock out" feature in
which the call option would expire upon declining below a certain threshold (e.g., 70%)
unless the investor were to pay an additional premium.

2001]

FRICTIONS AND TAX PLANNING

1379

payments to the fund manager for a partnership interest. 24 5 Even aside
from this tax risk, a call option offers less of a tax benefit-specifically,
less tax deferral-than the derivatives used before section 1260 was enacted. The difference is that options do not generate any deductions until they expire or are terminated (e.g., seven and a quarter years later),
whereas other derivatives, such as equity swaps, can yield deductible pay2 46
ments every year.
Not only do these call options offer less appealing tax treatment, but
they also are burdened by significant frictions. Instead of choosing which
fund she prefers, the taxpayer can invest only in the six funds selected by
Bear Stearns. More importantly, call options are costly. The taxpayer
must pay a large premium, and will not break even unless the fund appreciates by 53% (so the taxpayer can recover the 33% premium and 120%
exercise price).247 Given these tax risks and frictions, the volume of these
248
transactions reportedly is modest.
245. In other words, the dealer would be viewed as an agent for its fund manager
affiliate. Although the taxpayer's economic return-a share of gains above 120%diverges from the economic return on other partnership interests, the government could
argue that the taxpayer's claim is still a partnership interest, but one of a different type
(e.g., a "profits" interest). Inclusion of a "knock out" feature would further weaken the tax
analysis by creating an even closer economic connection between the option and the
underlying partnership interest: Since the client could only keep her investment by paying
extra cash as the fund depreciates, the arrangement would closely resemble an investment
in the partnership funded by a margin loan.
246. Options generally yield a capital loss when they expire, see I.R.C. § 1234(a) (2)
(treating option as if it had been sold on the day it expired), or when they are terminated,
see id. § 1234(a)(1) (providing capital loss upon termination). In contrast, equity swaps
provide for annual interest type payments. These "periodic payments" generally are
deductible in the year accrued. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e) (2) (i) (as amended in 1994)
(providing that taxpayer must recognize ratable daily portion of periodic payment for tax
year to which portion relates). To see the difference, assume a taxpayer has $1 million.
Instead of investing directly in a hedge fund, she acquires either an option or a swap, while
putting the rest of her money in interest-bearing bonds. If she buys the option, she will not
have any current deductions to shelter interest income from these bonds. In contrast, the
swap arguably does provide deductions. Appendix D offers a numerical example involving
a swap and bonds. However, this advantage of swaps does not actually materialize if, as
some practitioners claim, such periodic swap payments are not in fact deductible. See
generally Steinberg, supra note 205, at 229 (describing view of some practitioners that,
when swaps provide for periodic interest type payments and a single contingent payment at
maturity, deduction of periodic payments should be deferred under the "'clear reflection
of income' principle" (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(b))).
247. According to one expert:
Bear Stearns seem[s] to be offering leverage and tax avoidance, and we would not
necessarily advise our clients to make an investment decision based on tax
-ramifications or leverage, but rather on the underlying funds. If they are
compelling enough, why risk placing a leveraged bet on hedge funds, many of
which are already leveraged, and why risk unknown tax ramifications?
Fabrikant, supra note 242 (quotingJames R. Hedges IV, head of L.J.H. Global Investments,
a hedge fund research and advisory firm).
248. According to an investment banker familiar with the transaction, these Bear
Stearns call options have not proven to be popular with investors, who instead usually
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ii. Reduced Opportunityfor Gain. - Aside from call options, what else
can securities dealers offer? Theoretically, they could sell a derivative in
which they retain opportunity for gain, without taking on risk of loss-on
the theory that losses are especially troubling to dealers. Thus, assume a
dealer sells the client a $120 call, takes a $100 put in return, and hedges
by purchasing a fund interest for $100. The dealer's net exposure would
be to profit from appreciation between $100 and $120. Yet although
dealers will not object to this exposure, they reportedly will not pay for it,
at least at major investment banks. 24 9 As a result, clients are charged for
the full opportunity for gain, without a discount for the $20 of appreciation kept by the dealer. For example, assume a direct investment in the
fund would cost $100. For the derivative, the client would pay approximately $103 (i.e., the price of the hedge fund plus a 3% fee).25 ' While
the tax treatment is better, no pretax profit is earned until the underlying
fund appreciates by 20%. This deal makes sense only if a very high pretax
return (and thus a high tax bill) is expected on the fund. Anecdotal
evidence suggests this transaction is rare.
Eventually, dealers may start paying for this 20% of retained exposure, since this bet clearly has positive value. For instance, less well
known investment banks might do so to attract new business, although
these dealers would have to consider the effect of a risky hedge fund
portfolio on their creditworthiness. If this transaction becomes common,
it will illustrate the point that frictions can prove unstable. My research
suggests, however, that at the present time, this friction remains effective.
iii. Catch-Up Structures. - Instead of paying for this exposure, dealers
have looked for ways to give this return to the client. For example, the
client could receive no payment for the fund's first 20% appreciation,
while receiving double credit for the next 20%. As the fund appreciates
from $120 to $121, the client receives not one, but two dollars. When the
fund reaches $140, the client claims $40 of appreciation (i.e., $2 for each
dollar of appreciation between $120 and $140). As long as the fund appreciates to $140, the client benefits from all appreciation in the underlying fund, sharing none with the dealer.
invest directly in the Bear Stearns master fund. Many clients apparently believe the cost of
the option premium outweighs the (uncertain) tax benefit.
249. This observation is based in part on my experience advising investment banks
about section 1260 while this measure was pending. To update this knowledge, I discussed
the issue with two investment bankers at major institutions who are seeking to develop
transactions to avoid section 1260, more than a dozen New York tax lawyers familiar with
such efforts, and one investment banker at a smaller institution who had recently surveyed
market practices on this issue. These conversations occurred between April 2000 and
August 2001.
250. Here the dealer would want a fee paid in cash, instead of in the form of extra
option value on the derivative (i.e., the method used in collars that avoid section 1259, as
noted above). See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. The difference is that a
dealer cannot convert this option value into cash here because dynamic hedging is not
feasible.
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Yet again, accommodating the friction weakens the tax argument.
To avoid section 1260, the return on the derivative and underlying fund
must diverge in a meaningful way. In this transaction, a difference arises
only if the fund's maturity value is between $100 and $120 (and, to some
extent, between $120 and $140). For some funds, the end value is reasonably likely to be in this range. Yet for many funds, the likelihood is
remote. As a result, although some investment banks have1 considered
25
offering this transaction, the volume reportedly is limited.
iv. Inclusion of a Third Party. - Since the dealer does not value the
exposure between $100 and $120 and, for tax reasons, the client should
not take it, another approach is to transfer this exposure to an unrelated
third party. 252 The dealer would thus sell the right to this appreciation as
a separate "stub" security. Because the dealer will collect payment for the
stub, the dealer can reduce the price of the main derivative.
Nevertheless, several investment bankers describe this strategy as impractical. Since the dealer will not tolerate unhedged exposure for any
amount of time, the dealer cannot keep the stubs as inventory, to be sold
whenever a suitable customer is found. Rather, two unrelated customers
must appear simultaneously, and must want to invest in the same fund.
In addition, if one customer wishes to terminate the derivative prior to
maturity (e.g., to claim tax losses), the other must be compelled to do so
because the dealer cannot hedge one without the other. In effect, the
stub must have an uncertain term, terminating whenever the main derivative terminates. This requirement would reduce the price an investor
would pay.
Even if these problems could be solved-for instance, by forming a
fund that regularly buys stubs-individual investment bankers might not
consider the task worthy of their time. Cultivating a stubs market would
be a slow process with an uncertain return. Investment bankers, however,
usually have a short time horizon: They want results in time for their
annual bonus and, in this mobile market, may leave the firm after a year
or less. In other words, agency costs are impeding an avoidance strategy.
In addition, as with any innovation, the innovator bears all the risks and
expenses (for instance, in educating the market), but shares the rewards
251. The sources for this observation are described in supra note 249. Advisors vary
in their assessment of this "catch-up" structure. Some believe it can never work, while
others believe that the answer depends upon the fund and, in particular, the likelihood
that the fund's end date value will fall between $100 and $140.
252. The two customers must be unrelated so the government cannot treat the two as
one person and deem them, jointly, to be subject to section 1260. Notably, however,
section 1260, unlike section 1259, grants no explicit authority to consider the activities of
related parties. Compare I.R.C. § 1259(c)(1) (defining constructive sale to include
specified actions by either "the taxpayer (or a related person)"), with id. § 1260(d)(1)
(defining constructive ownership to include specified transactions by the "taxpayer," while
not mentioning related parties). The Treasury should use its regulatory authority to fill
this gap.
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with competitors. If the stubs market catches on, others will sell them
too, thereby reducing the innovator's expected profits.
v. Offshore Vehicles. - Instead of changing the derivative's economic
return, the taxpayer can hold the derivative through an offshore corporation. As a result, the taxpayer will no longer own a derivative, at least not
directly. Instead, she will own common stock in a corporation, an investment not explicitly covered by section 1260. Nor will section 1260 apply
to the corporation itself, as long as the entity is not subject to U.S. tax (as
a foreign corporation with no business effectively connected to the
U.S.).253 Foreign tax is not a concern if the corporation is in a tax haven,
nor are costs of setting up an offshore vehicle prohibitive. Even so, this
structure has two potential vulnerabilities. First, passive investments in
offshore corporations can trigger other anti-abuse rules, including the
passive foreign investment company (PFIC) 25 4 and controlled foreign
corporation (CFC) 255 rules. While a comprehensive examination of

these regimes is beyond this Article's scope, the bottom line is that care2 56
ful planners often can thread these needles.
The real vulnerability is caused by section 1260 itself. In addition to
covering a list of derivatives transactions, which admittedly does not include this structure, section 1260 provides regulatory authority to cover
"transactions . . . that have substantially the same effect" as the
listed

ones. 257 The government could easily shut down this structure through a
253. In general, firms that are not incorporated in the United States do not pay U.S.
tax unless their profits are from U.S. investments or are effectively connected to a U.S.
trade or business. See Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation 25 (2000) ("A domestic
corporation is subject to U.S. tax on its worldwide income; a foreign corporation only on
income derived from U.S. investment or business.").
254. I.R.C. §§ 1291, 1293-1298.
255. Id. §§ 951-962, 964.
256. For instance, the CFC rules can be avoided if the taxpayer owns less than 10% of
the vehicle. See id. § 951(b) (providing that taxpayers qualify as "United States
shareholders" under the CFC rules only if they own at least "10 percent or more of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote"). To avoid adverse
results under the PFIC regime, the taxpayer could make a so called qualified electing fund
(QEF) election. Id. § 1295. The election waives the usual PFIC penalties-ordinary
character and an interest charge-and instead taxes the corporation on a pass-thru basis.
Because section 1260 does not trigger any tax consequences until the derivative is settled,
there is no income to pass through to the taxpayer until the derivative is settled. What if, a
month before the derivative matures, the U.S. taxpayer sells her PFIC stock at a gain?
While as an economic matter, a portion of this gain would derive from the derivative, the
profit arguably would not be recharacterized because section 1260 has not been triggered
yet.
257. Id. § 1260(d) (1) (D). Before section 1260 was enacted, the NYSBA suggested
clarification that the "substantially the same effect" catch-all covered this offshore
structure. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on Constructive
Ownership and H.R. 1703, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, July 15, 1999, LEXIS, 99 TNT
135-33. No language or legislative history was added, presumably because the drafters
already thought the point was clear. In the interests of full disclosure, I should state that I
was the principal author of the NYSBA report.
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notice that retroactive regulations will cover it. Indeed, the possibility of
258
this action should already be a fairly effective deterrent.
vi. Managed Accounts. - Still another possibility is to change the subject matter of the derivative. 259 For instance, what if the derivative is
based not on a hedge fund, but on the performance of a specified portfolio of securities held by an investment bank (a so called "managed account")? Section 1260 applies only to derivatives based on "financial assets," defined as "any equity interest in any pass-thru entity."260 The term
is arguably not broad enough to include a free-standing portfolio (even if
managed by a hedge fund manager or, for that matter, by the taxpayer
herself).261 The portfolio is not held in an entity such as a partnership or
262
trust, the argument goes, and so section 1260 should not apply.
Whatever the merits of this technical argument, 263 the Treasury could

258. Taxpayers can strengthen their argument that retroactive regulations should not
apply by differentiating the economic return on their common stock from the economic
return on the derivative. For instance, the offshore corporation could hold other assets,
such as mortgages. Yet addition of these other assets would increase transaction costs.
Moreover, the regulations might still apply, as long as the government undertakes to
bifurcate or look through the common stock.
259. Mark Fichtenbaum emphasizes that section 1260 does not apply to derivatives
based on plain vanilla common stock. See Mark Fichtenbaum, Tax Planning
Opportunities Still Exist Even After the Enactment of the Constructive Ownership Rules, J.
Tax'n Fin. Products, Summer 2000, at 30, 32 ("[I]nvestment activities with respect to the
stock of any corporation that is not a 'pass-thru entity' continues to avoid the constructive
ownership rules."). He also advocates section 1256 contracts, as well as certain options and
other contracts subject to mark-to-market accounting. As he points out, gains on these
contracts offer 60% long term capital gain, even if held for less than one year. Id. at 31.
260. I.R.C. § 1260(c) (1) (A). The term also means: "to the extent provided in
regulations-(i) any debt instrument, and (ii) any stock in a corporation which is not a
pass-thru entity." Id. § 1260(c)(1)(B).
261. In a similar strategy, the derivative could be based on an "index" that reflects the
trading strategy of a particular hedge fund. Jeffrey J. Lonsdale, What LIES Beneath the
Investor's Quest for a Scalable Capital Gain Holding Period?, J. Tax'n Fin. Products,
Spring 2001, at 5, 8 (analyzing transaction in which taxpayer invests with hedge fund and
the investment is not for a partnership interest, but for "an index investment tied to a
mathematically defined, market neutral hedging strategy").
262. According to one well respected practitioner who expressed skepticism about
this strategy, sometimes the portfolio actually is held in an entity, but the entity is
disregarded under the "check the box" rules., He felt that this was not a helpful fact,
especially with an unsympathetic judge.
263. Even without section 1260, the government might argue that the client is the real
tax owner of the managed account. While the merits of this argument turn on the
particular facts, the government's case is strengthened considerably if the client is giving
directions about how the account should be traded (as is sometimes the case). This
transaction has been described to me both by investment bankers and by tax advisors. In
the latter group, some believe it "works" and some do not.

1384

COLUMBIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 101:1312

override it through retroactive regulations, 264 a reality that should reduce
2 65
the volume of this transaction.
264. Under section 1 260(g), "[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section." I.R.C. § 1 260(g).
Section 1260(c)(1)(B) authorizes the Secretary to expand the definition of "financial
asset" to include debt and common stock. Id. § 1260(c)(1)(B). Further authority can be
found in section 1260(d) (1):
[A] taxpayer-enter[s] into a constructive ownership transaction with respect to
any financial asset if the taxpayer...
(D) to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, enters into
one or more other transactions (or acquires one or more positions) that
have substantially the same effect as a transaction described in any of the
preceding subparagraphs.
Id. § 1260(d)(1), (d)(1)(D). Some practitioners have told me that they do not view this
last phrase as authority to reach a managed account. They say that this language, which is
part of section 1260(d)'s definition of a "constructive ownership transaction," does not
broaden the definition of a "financial asset," which is defined in a different section (section
1260(c)). Once the taxpayer has a derivative based on a "financial asset," they argue, this
language reaches various derivatives of this type, including those with slightly different forms
(e.g., contingent notes) or economic returns. Yet other practitioners read this "catch all"
language more broadly. Congress's purpose, they say, is to reach transactions that have a
similar effect, and Congress did not limit itself to a particular type of similarity. These
conversations occurred during the spring of 2001.
265. Barbara Flom suggests another way of gaming the "financial asset" definition.
What if the derivative is based on a hedge fund (which admittedly is a financial asset) and
something that is not a financial asset (e.g., a commodity index)? She argues that such a
transaction avoids the regime, although she notes that the government could reach it
through regulations, for instance, by bifurcating the derivative into a constructive
ownership transaction and a separate position. See Flom, supra note 209, at 27.
Under a plausible reading of the statute, though, this transaction is already covered, at
least if a swap or forward contract is used. These derivatives are caught if they "provide
credit" for changes in a financial asset's value-presumably, even if other factors, such as a
commodity index, also influence the forward's or swap's value. For instance, assume the
hedge fund appreciates by $100 and the commodity index appreciates by $75, yielding a
$175 profit on the derivative. The contract has "provided credit" for the $100 hedge fund
profit. Under this reading, the derivative would be a constructive ownership transaction.
While I doubt the phrase "provide credit" was meant to reach this transaction, an
unsympathetic judge might well read the rule in this way. I.R.C. § 1260(d) (3) (treating
notional principal contract as constructive ownership transaction if the taxpayer "(A) has
the right to be paid (or receive credit for) all or substantially all of the investment yield ...
and (B) is obligated to reimburse (or provide creditfor) all or substantially all of any decline
in the value of such financial asset" (emphasis added)); id. § 1260(d)(4) (defining
"forward contract" as "any contract to acquire in the future (or provide or receive credit for the
future value oJ) any financial asset" (emphasis added)).
Admittedly, this reading raises knotty questions. For instance, it would seem
inappropriate to recharacterize the $75 of commodity based gain. But what theory is used
to avoid this result? Is this gain deemed net underlying long term gain? See id. § 1260(a);
supra note 212 (defining "net underlying long term capital gain"). Or is the derivative in
effect bifurcated (i.e., so that ordinary character and an interest charge are applied only to
gains attributable to the hedge fund component)? These approaches yield comparable
results on the assumed facts. But the approaches diverge, for instance, if the hedge fund
yields a profit but the commodity index yields a loss.
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b. Responses Not Involving Derivatives. - Section 1260 thus has impeded the use of derivatives to attain better tax treatment for hedge fund
returns. To an extent, taxpayers can still pursue this goal with deals involving insurance. Of course, avoidance is avoidance, whether taxpayers
are using derivatives, insurance, or something else. Yet frictions already
block insurance based end runs to a degree, and targeted tax rules could
finish the job. These reforms probably would not require legislation, and
its attendant political challenges, because the Treasury arguably has the
necessary regulatory authority under current law. As we have seen, the
same cannot be said for section 1259.
i. Variable Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts. - One end run-a
"variable" life insurance policy or annuity whose return is based on a
hedge fund 266-is a novel twist on an old practice. Favorable treatment
of life insurance and annuities is longstanding, due to sympathy for bereaved life insurance beneficiaries, administrability problems with taxing
2 67
annuities and, no doubt, the political clout of insurance companies.
While variable contracts based on bonds and mutual funds are a staple of
middle class tax planning, contracts based on hedge fund returns are
available only in private transactions for very wealthy taxpayers. 2 68 To an
extent, these contracts can substitute for derivatives listed in section
1260.269

The tax treatment of these products, however, can be less favorable
than the treatment of derivatives before section 1260 was enacted. Like
these early derivatives, annuities and life insurance offer deferral. Taxpayers do not owe tax while the hedge fund appreciates (as hedge fund
partners do), and are taxed only upon receiving cash. But unlike these
early derivatives, which offered long term capital gain, annuities yield ordinary income and, except in two scenarios, life insurance shares this dis266. In a "variable" contract, the size of death benefits (for life insurance) or annual
payments (for annuities) depends upon the performance of specified assets, chosen by the
taxpayer from a range of options. In a "fixed" contract, these payments are preset.
267. See generally Chirelstein, supra note 202, at 32-39 (discussing tax treatment of
insurance and annuities).
268. Thomas J. Boczar & Stephen B. Lipton, VLIP: A Vehicle for Enchancing Aftertax Investment Returns, Trusts & Investments, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 36, 40 ("This structure is
generally available only for wealthy families desirous of moving $1 million or more of their
assets to the next generation in a tax-efficient manner."); Roger D. Silk, How Privately
Placed Tax Advantaged Products Can Benefit Hedge Fund Investors and Managers, Hedge
Fund News (Dome Capital Mgmt., Inc.), May 2000, 1 (noting that these deals "are more
particularly appropriate for those with at least $10 million available to invest in hedge
funds"), available at http://www.hedgefundnews.com/news-njinfo/articledetail.php?
id=163 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
269. Insurance companies hedge by investing directly in the fund. Their tax bill is
unaffected because, like securities dealers, they are subject to mark-to-market accounting.
See Edward D. Kleinbard & Thomas L. Evans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a
Realization-Based Tax System, 75 Taxes 788, 802 n.97 (1997) (discussing tax treatment of
insurance companies that hold assets in segregated accounts).
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advantage. 270 The first exception is that payments are tax free when. the
insured dies (so tax character is irrelevant).271 Although helpful to those
who are investing for their heirs, this boon is useless to taxpayers who
want to spend their gains. 272 Second, policy loans and certain withdrawals are sometimes available tax free, but only if the life insurance policy is
not a "modified endowment contract" (MEC), and even then complex
restrictions may apply.2 73 Esoteric details aside, the main way to avoid
MEC status is by staggering the payment of policy premiums over seven
years, instead of investing a single premium up front. 274 Yet this slow
pace carries a cost. Funds that have not yet been invested cannot begin
275
enjoying tax deferred or tax free investment growth.
In addition, these deals present frictions of their own. First, the taxpayer must place a mortality bet 276 so that the contract will qualify as life
270. Hedge fund derivatives used to yield long term capital gain, which was taxed at
20% for individuals, instead of the higher tax rate for short term capital gain and ordinary
income (a maximum of 39.1% for individuals in 2001). See supra text accompanying note
205. In contrast, life insurance and annuities generate ordinary income because,
technically, there has been no sale or exchange of a capital asset and no termination of
rights with respect to a capital asset. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1 (as amended in 1963)
(noting that section 72 provides for inclusion of life insurance and annuity payments in
gross income unless other provisions provide a contrary result); see also I.R.C. § 1221
(defining capital asset); id. § 1234A (providing capital gain treatment for certain
terminations of rights with respect to capital assets). For a description of this tax cost of
life insurance and annuities, see Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 38 ("With a [modified
endowment contract] a policyholder can make withdrawals during his or her lifetime, but
the withdrawals are taxable as ordinary income."). In some cases, a 10% penalty is
imposed on withdrawals before the taxpayer reaches age 59.5. Id.
271. I.R.C. § 101 (excluding death benefit from income tax). If structured so that the
policy is excluded from the taxpayer's estate, life insurance can offer the added benefit of
avoiding estate tax. See Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 41 (noting that variable life
insurance could "potentially eliminate both the income tax on investment earnings, as well
as estate taxes on the wealth so invested"). Scheduled repeal of the estate tax in 2010
reduces the significance of this advantage. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
272. Derivatives held until death have also offered tax forgiveness under section 1014,
although this basis step-up rule is scheduled for repeal in 2010. See Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 38, 76
(amending I.R.C. § 1014); supra note 198.
273. See I.R.C. § 7702A (defining MEG); Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 38
(noting that non-MECs may allow policy loans and certain tax free principal withdrawal
rights, but noting tax penalties associated with certain withdrawals in first fifteen years).
274. See I.R.C. § 7702A(b) (providing "7-pay" test to define MEG).
275. See Silk, supra note 268, 7 (noting tradeoff between a non-MEC, which allows
tax free loans once the policy is paid for, and an MEC, which does not permit tax free
loans but "offers the opportunity of getting the maximum amount of cash into the policy
as soon as possible").
276. In other words, payments must depend to a significant degree on how long the
taxpayer (or someone else) lives. Thus, life insurance generally is not payable until the
taxpayer dies. An annuity, in contrast, usually stops making payments when the taxpayer
dies. An annuity can also last for a fixed term of years, so it does not necessarily require a
mortality bet. Yet annuities offer less favorable tax treatment than life insurance, as noted
above. See id.; supra text accompanying note 270.
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insurance for tax purposes. 277 The extra cost and risk from this bet could
prove unattractive, since the taxpayer's preferred bet on a hedge fund
would be intertwined with a wager on longevity that she may not want. 278
The latter bet may not even be available to a taxpayer who is old or in
poor health. 279 Second, significant fees and out-of-pocket costs erode the
investment return. For policies issued by a U.S. insurance company, state
excise taxes and a federal "deferred acquisition" (DAC) tax are approximately 4% of premiums. 28 0 This cost is lower for policies issued by offshore insurers, which are subject only to a federal excise tax of 1%.281
Not only do money managers collect a fee, as they would in a direct
hedge fund investment, but so do the insurance broker, insurance company, and bank custodian. 282 Third, the taxpayer must accept less con277. See I.R.C. § 7702 (prescribing that to qualify as life insurance, a contract must be
treated as such under state law and also must satisfy either "cash value accumulation test"
or "guideline premium requirements"); Gordon 0. Pehrson et al., Annuities, Life
Insurance, and Long-Term Care Insurance Products A-18 (Tax Management, Portfolio No.
546, 1999) (noting that section 7702's definition of life insurance contract requires that
investments or built-up cash value not be too large relative to the mortality based death
benefit); AALL Variable Life Ins., Innovative Offshore Financial Products That Are
Compliant with Current U.S. Legislation, at http://www.aall.com/Aall/servicesvl.html (last
visited Aug. 7, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Efficient and reliable
monitoring of limitations on contributions and size of investment is critical to the
maintenance of status as insurance."); see also Silk, supra note 268, 8 ("To qualify as life
insurance under US tax law, the total death benefit of the policy must exceed the cash
value by a certain amount (the exact amount varies, and is calculated according to a
complex formula).").
278. See William D. Kornreich & Robert M. Burkarth III, Offshore Life Insurance in
Wealth Preservation Strategies, Offshore Fin. U.S.A. Mag., May/June 1999,
20 (noting
that "the charge that has the most dramatic effect on performance" is the cost of life
insurance (COI) component, which is based on the difference between the value of
invested assets and the death benefit at the time), at http://www.escapeartist.com/
OffshoreFinanceUSA/OffshoreLifeInsurance.html
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
279. See AALL Int'l Deferred Variable Annuity, Frequently Asked Questions, at http:/
/www.aall.com/Aall/servicesidvafaq.html
(last visited Aug. 7, 2001) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that life insurance requires the investor to be insurable).
280. Grant Thornton LLP, How to Eliminate Income and Estate Tax on Securities
Investments with a Variable Life Insurance Wrapper, at http://www.grantthornton.com/
content/1023.asp (last visited Aug. 7, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that the state premium tax is approximately 2% and the DAC tax is also
approximately 2%).
281. I.R.C. § 4371.
282. See Alison Steed, Wrapper May Not Be the Best Package, The Weekly Telegraph
Globalnetwork.co.uk, 5 (Feb. 13, 2001), at http://www.globalnetwork.co.uk/global/01/
2/13/foshor3.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Commission rates on these
types of investment products are high-often 7, 8 or 9 [percent] ... ." (quoting Fiona
Middlemiss of Alan Steel Asset Management)). Fees are higher for life insurance policies
that allow for tax free policy loans. See Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 38 (stating that
administrative fees charged by non-MECs are thirty to forty basis points higher each year).
According to practitioner Roger Silk, "[t] he average annual cost of these contracts typically
ranges around 150 basis points. Organizational costs vary between a few tens of thousands
to a few hundred thousand dollars." Silk, supra note 268,
9.
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trol over invested funds. U.S. insurance companies traditionally offer a
slate of approved money managers, which might not include the taxpayer's preferred manager; offshore funds are more accommodating,
since the regulatory environment is more flexible. 283 Yet even then, the
U.S. tax analysis is stronger if taxpayers limit their role in investment decisions, and tax lawyers have told me that some deals push the envelope on
this issue. 284 Finally, although offshore insurance companies offer lower
excise taxes and more flexibility, their credit may be less well 2established,
85
and the regulatory environment can inspire less confidence.
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, 28 6 insurance is becoming an increasingly common method of securing tax advantaged hedge fund re283. Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 41 ("In a domestic VLIP [variable life
insurance policy] the investor can select from an entire suite of mutual funds. In an
offshore VLIP the investment managers may additionally include hedge fund and other
alternative investment managers .... ). According to one practitioner, this difference
between U.S. and offshore transactions has faded because certain U.S. jurisdictions have
begun allowing variable policies based on hedge funds. The relevant conversation
occurred in June 2001.
284. Limiting the taxpayer's role in managing the investment and supervising the
fund manager is helpful under general principles of tax ownership. The point is for the
insurance company, not the taxpayer, to be regarded as the real owner of invested assets.
See generally David S. Miller, Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax Ownership: Current Law
and Future Prospects, 51 Tax Law. 279, 303-04 (1998) (discussing law of ownership as
applied to variable annuities and life insurance, and noting that favorable tax treatment is
available only "so long as [the taxpayer's] ability to manage investment return is narrowly
circumscribed"). Relatedly, insurance-specific authorities treat the taxpayer as the direct
owner of the underlying investments-and thus deny favorable tax treatment associated
with variable insurance-when the taxpayer has too much control over investment
decisions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 13 (offering series of fact patterns for
purposes of determining whether mutual fund shares underlying an annuity contract are
owned by contract holder or life insurance company); Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at
39 (noting that "investor control" rulings might apply). See generally Pehrson et al., supra
note 277, at A-46 to -51 (discussing investment control authorities). During conversations
in the spring of 2001, some tax advisors said that they believe some of these contracts are
vulnerable to attack on these grounds.
A related issue is that the invested assets underlying the life insurance or annuity must
be diversified. See I.R.C. § 817(h) (providing that annuity and life insurance are not taxed
as such if underlying investments are not adequately diversified); AALL Variable Life Ins.,
supra note 277 ("Funds must be a minimum of five different investments."). But cf.
Pehrson et al., supra note 277, at A-51 (noting technical argument as to why diversification
requirement may not apply to offshore funds).
285. See Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268, at 40 (warning of the "looser regulatory
framework of a less stringently regulated foreign jurisdiction," and noting that "investors
may not have as much confidence in a foreign country's legal system or political stability");
20 (observing that lax insurance oversight in
Kornreich & Burkarth, supra note 278,
offshore jurisdictions could lead to higher administrative charges). In the United States,
funds invested in "separate accounts" generally are not available to pay the insurance
company's general creditors, and are available only to pay the investor on his annuity or
insurance contract. Yet not all offshore jurisdictions offer such protection. Silk, supra
note 268, 1 5 ("It could be unnecessarily risky to have a policy from a company in a
jurisdiction which does not have a separate account law.").
286. Other issues in these complicated transactions include:
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turns. One offshore firm reportedly has issued $450 million of these poli2 87
cies, and expects to raise this number to $5 billion within three years.
Even so, section 1260 arguably could extend even to insurance and annuities. The Treasury has regulatory authority to cover transactions having
"substantially the same effect" as the enumerated ones. 28 8 This language
arguably is broad enough to reach annuities and insurance contracts that
offer tax deferred hedge fund returns, although there is a credible argument to the contrary.28 9 As a practical matter, the Treasury probably
could stop the practice immediately with a brief notice that regulations
will be issued with a retroactive effective date.
A broader point merits emphasis here. Efforts to tax most investments can be avoided, to a degree, if insurance and annuities are not also
covered. This reality is especially significant because derivatives and inactuarial issues, reinsurance, choice of custodian, custody arrangements, methods
of payments and cash flow management, obtaining required legal and/or tax
opinions, awareness of and compliance with relevant excise taxes,
communications, compliance with any relevant securities and/or insurance laws,
as well as a sound economic analysis to determine whether the contemplated
transaction is likely to achieve the desired goals for the client.
19.
Silk, supra note 268,
287. Hal Lux, The Great Hedge Fund Reinsurance Tax Game, Institutional Investor,
Apr. 2001, at 52, 53 (discussing Cayman Islands based insurer Scottish Annuity & Life
Holdings). I have no personal experience with this transaction, but press reports and
practitioner articles suggest a growing trend. See, e.g., id. (noting that "several well-known
U.S. hedge fund operations" are entering this business, "including Lee Ainslie's Maverick
Capital and New York hedge fund adviser Tremont Advisors"). One practitioner reports
that "[a] large and growing number of sophisticated, high net-worth individuals and
families are currently taking advantage of the unique planning opportunities presented by
these types of vehicles." Silk, supra note 268, 20. The fact that practitioners are writing
articles recommending this strategy is a further indication of its popularity. See, e.g.,
Boczar & Lipton, supra note 268; Grant Thornton LLP, supra note 280; Kornreich &
Burkarth, supra note 278; Silk, supra note 268. Likewise, an Internet search reveals
references to this strategy. For instance, an instructor in an online course on estate
planning emphasizes his experience in these deals. See Lawline.com Bio: James R.
Cohen, at http://www.lawline.com/cle/bio_cohen.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2001) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that "Jim has been involved with private placement
variable life insurance for many years, acting as legal counsel to insurance brokers for such
policies, investors who have purchased such policies, and hedge fund managers managing
funds for such policies" and has "lectured widely on tax, estates, investment fund and
hedge fund life insurance issues").
288. I.R.C. § 1260(d)(1)(D).
289. The counterargument is that the effect is not "substantially the same" because
the economics of the transaction are different (given the mortality risk) and because the
tax result is different (the character here is ordinary). Indeed, one of section 1260's
consequences-recharacterization of long term capital gain as ordinary income-applies
awkwardly to contracts that yield either ordinary income or no income, although section
1260's interest charge presumably could be applied. While these objections have force,
their persuasiveness depends on the scope of the regulations (e.g., whether they exempt
policies with more than a requisite concentration of mortality risk) and, ultimately, on the
degree of discretion the Treasury is thought to have in writing regulations. If section 1260
is not adequate authority, moreover, the Treasury might attack these contracts on other
grounds, such as the degree of "investor control." For a discussion, see supra note 284.
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surance have become increasingly similar in function, as each can allocate risk in nuanced ways to implement both business and tax objectives.2 90 Yet significant disparities remain in the taxation of these two
product groups, as illustrated above. To an extent, frictions keep taxpayers from substituting one for the other. Some of these frictions, however,
such as state regulatory limits on the type of contracts insurance firms can
sell, are likely to dissipate over time. Global competition, coupled with
the regulators' natural sympathies for their regulated industry, are likely
to expand insurance companies' market reach. Thus, greater tax consistency for these substitutes will be needed to prevent widespread planning.
One institutional handicap is that, in my experience, tax lawyers who are
experts in one area tend to know considerably less about the other, perhaps because each area is the product of its own history, is governed by
different parts of the code, and is quite detailed and esoteric. As practitioners become more "interdisciplinary" in response to market trends,
government reformers will need to do so as well. The purpose here is to
emphasize the problem, and to suggest that narrow measures aimed at
derivatives should be coupled, as needed, with complementary measures
aimed at insurance. Broader responses are also warranted here, and further research in this area is needed.
ii. Offshore Hedge Fund Reinsurers. - One final alternative warrants

discussion. Instead of buying an insurance policy, taxpayers can invest in
an offshore insurance or reinsurance company whose assets are managed

by a hedge fund manager-in effect, a hedge fund that also sells insurance. The fund is structured as a corporation rather than as a partnership. Thus, investors are not liable every year for tax on the fund's trad-

ing profits. 29 1 Rather, investors pay no tax until they sell their fund
interest, and are taxed at long term capital gain rates if they have held the

fund for at least a year. The fund itself will not pay U.S. (or other) in-

come tax if it is incorporated in a tax haven such as Bermuda. Such offshore "incorporated pocketbooks" are an old abuse, targeted by several
290. In addition to the example described above, potentially overlapping areas
between derivatives and insurance include public securities that resemble insurance
products, such as catastrophe bonds and securitized pools of credit derivatives, as well as
insurance products based on financial risks. See generally Viva Hammer & Ann Singer,
Insurance Derivatives: A Tax Angle,J. Tax'n Fin. Products, Spring 2001, at 29, 29 (noting
that "[t]he capital markets and the insurance/re-insurance industry have become
increasingly interrelated in recent years" and discussing tax issues associated with
derivatives that substitute for insurance products, including catastrophe futures and
bonds); Mark H. Leeds et al., Avoiding Accidents at the Capital Markets/Insurance
Crossroads: Legal and Tax Issues, Derivatives Rep., Apr. 2001, at 1, 1-6 (noting that
"capital markets [are] converg[ing] with the insurance industry" and discussing ways in
which insurance firms are expanding their product base to include insurance of financial
risks).
291. While a partnership is a pass-thru entity for tax purposes, a corporation is not.
See generally Howard E. Abrams & Richard L. Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation 1
(3d ed. 1995) ("The basic premise underlying subchapter C is that a corporation should be
a taxpayer distinct from its shareholders.").
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regimes. Most relevant are the PFIC rules of 1986, which generally apply
to firms, such as hedge funds, that are engaged in investing and other
"passive" businesses. 292 If the PFIC regime applies, there is no tax advantage over a domestic partnership. Investor returns would be recharacterized as ordinary income, and an interest charge would be imposed, as
under section 1260. The trick here is that the PFIC regime does not apply to insurance companies, a statutory exception not yet elaborated by
293
regulations.
To ensure that the fund qualifies as an insurance company for purposes of the PFIC regime, taxpayers must contend with additional frictions that will deter some taxpayers. First, the fund must sell insurance,
and thus must bear some mortality or casualty risk. 2 9 4 In some cases,
292. See I.R.C. §§ 1291, 1293-1298 (prescribing rules for passive foreign investment
companies). Other regimes include the controlled foreign corporation regime, see id.
§§ 951-962, 964, and the foreign personal holding company regime, see id. §§ 551-558.
But these rules generally apply only if U.S. taxpayers own more than a minimum
percentage of the entity. See, e.g., id. § 951(b) (defining "United States shareholder" as "a
United States person . . . who owns ...

10 percent or more of the total combined voting

power of all classes of stock entitled to vote"); id. § 957(a) (defining controlled foreign
corporation as "any foreign corporation if more than 50 percent of (1) the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock ... entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of the stock...
is owned . . . by United States shareholders"); see also id. § 552(a) (defining "foreign
personal holding company" as a foreign corporation in which more than 50% of the firm,
measured by vote or value, is owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer U.S. individuals,
and which earns at least 60% of its income in the form of certain passive investment
income known as "foreign personal holding company income"). These rules thus can be
avoided if U.S. taxpayers purchase sufficiently small stakes, both individually and as a
group.
293. To be precise, foreign corporations qualify as PFICs if more than a minimum
percentage of their income or income-producing assets are passive. See id. § 1297(a).
Income from "the active conduct of an insurance business" generally is deemed not to be
passive:
Except as provided in regulations, the term "passive income" does not include
any income(B) derived in the active conduct of an insurance business by a corporation
which is predominantly engaged in an insurance business and which would
be subject to tax under subchapter L if it were a domestic corporation.
Id. § 1297(b)(2).
294. As noted above, the PFIC regime does not treat as passive "any income . . .
derived in the active conduct of an insurance business" if the corporation "is
predominantly engaged in an insurance business" and would be subject to tax under the
Code's special regime for insurance in subchapter L. Id. Under regulations implementing
subchapter L, the key factor is, in effect, whether the "primary and predominant" business
of the corporation is selling insurance and annuities:
The term insurance company means a company whose primary and predominant
business activity during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or annuity
contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies. Thus,
though its name, charter powers, and subjection to State insurance laws are
significant in determining the business which a company is authorized and
intends to carry on, it is the character of the business actually done in the taxable
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these risks can substantially erode returns. 2-95 Yet because these risks are
actuarially predictable, risk is likely to function here as a continuous friction, as with section 1259. Taxpayers will accept marginal increases, to a
point, as the price of a lower tax. Second, the fund's ability to reinvest
profits may be limited. The purpose of the fund's investments supposedly is to fund insurance liabilities. If these reserves dwarf the liabilities,
it is not credible to claim that the fund is an insurance company. 296 One
solution is to sell more insurance (although this means accepting more
insurance risk). Another possibility is to return taxable cash to investors. 29 7 Third, to satisfy credit rating agencies and insurance regulators,
firms cannot invest all their reserves in hedge funds-and the prevailing
practice of 40% presumably is a less concentrated hedge fund bet than
many would prefer. 298 Fourth, the firm must set up a real infrastructure,
for instance, by hiring employees to manage insurance liabilities. 299 Finally, offshore insurance firms also face other tax issues, such as whether
their insurance activities are effectively connected to the U.S., and thus
3 °
subject to U.S. tax. 0
While these costs deter some taxpayers, this transaction is becoming
more common. According to an April 2001 InstitutionalInvestor report,
year which determines whether a company is taxable as an insurance company
under the Internal Revenue Code.
Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a)(1) (as amended in 1972).
295. Lux, supra note 287, at 55 (noting that Stockton Re, a hedge fund reinsurer
comanaged by a Goldman Sachs affiliate, suffered insurance related losses last year).
296. The general principle is that reserves should be consistent with the reasonable
needs of the insurance business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.80 1 -4 (a) (as amended in 1972)
(defining "life insurance reserves" as reserves based on actuarial predictions, reserves
designed to fund insurance liabilities, and reserves required by law); see also S. Rep. No.
100-445 (1988), [2001] 13 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 31,620, at 57,413-14 ("Thus,
income derived by entities engaged in the business of providing insurance will be passive
income to the extent the entities maintain financial reserves in excess of the reasonable
needs of their insurance business.").
297. Distributions or pro rata redemptions would be treated as dividends taxable in
full at ordinary rates. I.R.C. § 301 (stating that dividends are taxed as ordinary income to
the extent of earnings and profits). Certain non pro rata redemptions would be taxed at
capital gains rates with a basis offset. Id. § 302(b) (describing conditions under which
redemptions are taxed as sales).
298. Lux, supra note 287, at 57 (noting that offshore hedge fund reinsurers currently
allocate 40% of investable assets to hedge fund investments and attributing this constraint
to ratings agencies). "In the U.S., even if reinsurers wanted to invest a very large portion of
their assets in hedge funds, they couldn't because of the investment policies of state
insurance regulators. The rules are more relaxed in Bermuda." Id.
299. This cost is less daunting for reinsurance companies, which tend to have lean
infrastructures. Id. (noting that "[r]
einsurance fits well with hedge fund strategies because
it's a wholesale business that doesn't require large staffs for dealing with the public").
Even so, reinsurance talent is now "at a premium in Bermuda," id. at 53, and some players
are concerned that hedge fund reinsurers are not scrutinizing insurance risks with
adequate sophistication. Id. at 55.
300. Profits that are effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business are subject to
U.S. income tax. See I.R.C. § 864.
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"[b]ankers estimate that dozens of hedge fund managers have tried to
launch Bermuda reinsurance companies in the past couple of years.
30
Most have failed."1
' Even so, major investment banks and hedge funds
have established such funds, presumably with more to follow. 3° 2 Some of
this volume arises because there are no regulations defining an insurance
company under the PFIC rules. In this void, taxpayers take aggressive
positions that minimize the effect of relevant frictions. For instance,
some entities hedge or reinsure insurance risks, so the investor's economic return is based solely on the investment portfolio. If rigorous regulatory requirements are imposed, many of these transactions will be
stopped. 30 This is an easy step, mechanically, since the Treasury can issue a brief notice that retroactive regulations are forthcoming. 3° 4 The
ease of this course should not be overstated, though. The proper regulatory standard presents difficult questions beyond this Article's scope. To
an extent, the PFIC regime's distinction between active and passive entities is murky when applied to financial intermediaries. After all, a key
business objective even of "real" insurance firms is to earn high investment returns, which allow for reduced premiums and more customers.
The purpose here is not to develop the appropriate rule for offshore insurance companies or, for that matter, offshore investments in general.
Rather, the point is that impeding a particular tax motivated use of
derivatives-a mission that section 1260 has discharged more successfully
than section 1259-is not the end of the job. Planners will seek other
opportunities. Two common ones, used in this context and others as
well, are insurance contracts and offshore vehicles. This dynamic illustrates a familiar limitation of narrow transactional reforms. By itself, one
reform will seldom be enough. On the other hand, a series of targeted
measures-for instance, one aimed at derivatives, another at offshore insurance companies-sometimes can keep taxpayers from attaining a popular planning objective such as tax advantaged hedge fund returns. Simi301. Lux, supra note 287, at 57. While I have no personal experience with these
transactions, I have learned of their growing popularity through conversations with a
dozen New York tax lawyers between October 2000 and May 2001.
302. Fixed income hedge fund manager William Michaelcheck has established a $200
million Bermuda reinsurer called Select Reinsurance. A Goldman Sachs affiliate manages
Bermuda reinsurer Stockton Reinsurance. Asset Alliance, a New York hedge fund firm, is
establishing Asset Alliance Re in Bermuda, and J.P. Morgan is involved in Hampton Re
Holdings. Id. at 53. "It's a relatively new idea, but it's definitely an emerging trend." Id. at
58 (quoting Robert Schulman, President of Tremont Advisers, a New York hedge fund
adviser).
303. According to one expert, only one hedge fund reinsurer could satisfy the SEC
that it truly is an insurance company. Id. at 58 ("[Max Re is] the one hedge fund
insurance company that I know about that would satisfy U.S. securities regulators."
(quoting Scott Willkomm, CEO of Cayman Islands based Scottish Annuity & Life Holdings,
a competitor of Max Re)). Presumably, if the tax authorities applied similar standards,
many of these players would be eliminated.
304. Indeed, Institutional Investor quotes an anonymous IRS source indicating that the
agency might take up the issue this year. Id. at 55.
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larly, adding one reform can be significant, if others already are on the
books. For this incremental strategy to be effective, policymakers must
know where the next hole in the dike will be-that is, where frictions are
weakest.
C. Normative Implications: Cost-Benefit Analysis
As noted above, the main purpose of the case studies is to highlight
the effect of frictions, rather than to judge the merits of each provision.
Yet understanding frictions and avoidance contributes to better normative judgments.
Thus, section 1260 makes two contributions, again assuming the tax
burden here should be maintained or increased.3 0 5 Like section 1259,
the rule offers symbolic benefits. In addition, the measure is more effective than section 1259 at stopping the targeted derivatives transaction.
Efficiency is enhanced as taxpayers invest directly in hedge funds, avoiding the higher costs of derivatives (e.g., the investment bank's 3% fee).
Likewise, vertical equity is also advanced as wealthy hedge fund investors
pay a higher tax. As with section 1259, this progress would not materialize if taxpayers responded, instead, by investing in slightly different derivatives not reached by the rule. The key insight of the case studies is that,
unlike in the case of section 1259, this response is not likely because of a
discontinuous friction: the difficulties dealers face in hedging a "partial
return" hedge fund derivative.
Section 1260 is not cost free, though. It adds to the tax law's complexity, and imposes new compliance and administrative costs. The measure cannot be successful, moreover, if taxpayers disregard frictions and
305. As with section 1259, there is a threshold question, beyond this Article's scope, as
to whether investment returns should be taxed and, if so, at what rate. Indeed, much ink
has been spilled over whether there ever should be a preferential rate for capital gains. See
generally Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1993) (summarizing this literature). Assuming there
should be, a further question is whether the preference should apply to hedge fund
returns. The answer depends in part on the rationale for the preference. For instance, the
rationale might be to discourage short term transactions as socially wasteful, on the theory
that speculation is a zero sum game from society's perspective. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Why the
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives, 48 Duke LJ. 701, 745, 771 (1999) (discussing whether speculation is a zero
sum game). Another theory might be that short term investors do less socially useful
monitoring of management. Under these rationales, the preferences should not be
extended. On the other hand, hedge funds are sophisticated and often engage in useful
market equilibrating arbitrage, and so concerns about speculation as a zero sum game may
not be persuasive. Moreover, if the rationale for long term treatment is to favor deferred
consumption, the preference ought to be extended because hedge fund investors
generally reinvest their gains. As with section 1259, although arguments can be made on
both sides, the question is easier for our purposes. The tax burden on hedge fund returns
can be reduced more straightforwardly without wasteful self help. See, e.g., Cynthia Blum,
Rollover: An Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41 Tax L. Rev. 385, 399-401 (1986)
(providing a "rollover rule" through which tax would be deferred on any gain that was
reinvested).
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respond with more drastic methods of avoidance, such as making investments in insurance contracts or offshore insurance firms-or, for that
matter, indexed mutual funds or other investments unrelated to hedge
funds. These responses generate new waste (for example, as taxpayers
assume mortality risk they do not want) without raising revenue, and
could also redistribute wealth in questionable ways (e.g., by transferring
fee income from securities dealers to insurance firms). The net effect of
section 1260 depends on the balance of these competing considerations.
Section 1260 is likely to merit a more favorable assessment than section 1259, although better empirical information is needed for a more
definitive judgment. The constructive sale rule is commonly avoided for
positions worth at least $1 million. While the Treasury could ease this
volume somewhat with regulations-for instance, by focusing on loans of
stock from taxpayers to securities dealers-a significant volume of hedging is likely to continue. Only broad legislation using, for example, the
"substantial diminution" standard, could halt this practice, a step that is
politically unattainable for now. In contrast, the constructive ownership
rule is more difficult to avoid, and many strategies have been abandoned.
Of course, as long as some strategies remain, section 1260, like section
1259, induces a certain amount of planning related waste, and a comparison turns on empirical questions. A difference, though, is that the main
surviving strategies for section 1260, involving insurance, probably could
be blocked with regulations, or even notices of forthcoming regulations.
Even though the regulatory process is not free of politics, it would not
entail the frenetic lobbying sometimes associated with congressional action. Because of frictions, then, end runs are easier to block for section
1260 than for section 1259, even though the two measures employ the
same statutory test. Of course, ease of avoidance is not the sole test of a
provision's worth.3 0 6 But it is a key factor, and frictions account for the
difference.
CONCLUSION

The recent record of tax reformers is sobering. Efforts to tax investments have a familiar pattern. The government learns of a transaction
that exploits an inconsistency in the law, but cannot repair the inconsistency for political or administrability reasons. Instead, reformers lob a
narrow response at the particular transaction. This transactional reform
can yield symbolic benefits in the short run, but the system becomes
more complex, and planners sometimes respond with variations that
avoid the rule. Social waste often increases, while revenue from wealthy
taxpayers does not.
These realities raise questions about the whole enterprise of transactional reforms. One contribution of commentators is to build political
support for comprehensive measures that would be more effective. This
306. See supra Part L.A (discussing normative tradeoffs in targeting tax planning).
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Article's contribution, instead, is to suggest improvements in transactional responses. The latter effort is critical because, at least in the near
term, these measures will remain important.
When will transactional reforms actually stop the targeted planning,
instead of inducing a new variation? The answer lies in frictions, such as
accounting rules, commodities laws, the risk management policies of securities dealers, and the technological limits of dynamic hedging. If a
discontinuous friction blocks a transaction, the tax law does not have to
block it too. For derivatives transactions, a key discontinuous friction in
some cases is the dealer's inability to hedge. In these circumstances, taxpayers predictably will resort to insurance and offshore alternatives, so
frictions for these strategies should be considered as well. Because the
frictions separating derivatives from insurance are eroding, inconsistencies in taxation of these substitutes merit greater attention.
More generally, to rely on frictions, reformers need information
about them: how much they matter to taxpayers, whether they can be
avoided through restructuring, and other pragmatic issues. These facts
usually are not publicly reported, and hard data is seldom available. As a
result, reformers need assistance in learning about frictions. The factual
intricacies of sophisticated commercial transactions, however, are not
commonly detailed in law reviews. More attention to these matters is warranted, and legal academics should offer greater assistance. Without a
grounding in frictions, transactional reforms are unlikely to play a constructive role.
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COMPARING RETURNS FROM SELLING AND HEDGING

In discussing section 1259, Part II observes that the need to retain
risk often is not a strong friction, especially if the taxpayer expects the
hedged asset to appreciate.3 0 7 To develop this point, this Appendix compares returns from a taxable sale and various hedges. The objective is to
consider the extent to which post-section 1259 hedges, such as collars, are
less appealing than pre-section 1259 hedges, such as short sales against
the box.
Several assumptions are needed for these sample calculations. The
appreciated asset is assumed to be 100,000 shares of a publicly traded
stock that does not pay dividends, with each share worth $100 (the
"hedged asset"). Current fair market value thus is $10 million, and basis
is assumed to be zero. Hedging transactions are assumed to last for three
years. To simplify the comparison, it is assumed that the hedge is physically settled after three years: The taxpayer delivers the appreciated
property to settle the hedge, and thus is taxed. This assumption is necessary for a clear comparison with sales, but understates the benefits of
hedging. To attain greater tax deferral, the taxpayer could instead settle
the hedge in cash-so that no tax would be due on the hedged assetand then could enter into a second hedging transaction.
Assumptions about market prices and rates of return are also
needed. In these hypotheticals, a risk free Treasury bond yields 5% per
year, while an equity investment yields 15% per year. The taxpayer's borrowing rate is generally 8%, but the discount on a secured prepaid forward is 6.5%. The cost of borrowing stock is .5% of the shares' initial
value and, for simplicity's sake, is assumed not to change. Protection
from risk of loss below $100 (i.e., a put option with a $100 exercise price)
has the same value as opportunity for gain above $151 (i.e., a call option
with a $151 exercise price). To compensate the hedging counterparty,
though, the taxpayer usually exchanges the $100 put for a more valuable
call with an exercise price of $120. In other words, the investment bank's
fee is paid in the form of the right to any appreciation between $120 and
$151, which on assumed facts is worth 7.5% of the asset's value.3 08 For
individuals, the tax on capital gains is assumed to be 30% (i.e., 20% federal and 10% state) and the tax on ordinary income is assumed to be 50%
(i.e., 40% federal and 10% state). For corporations, the tax on all income is assumed to be 45% (i.e., 35% federal and 10% state).3 0 9 All of
the figures in the following tables have been rounded to the nearest dollar at each step in the calculations.
307. See supra text accompanying note 115.
308. For the assumptions behind this calculation, see supra note 129.
309. The assumed federal tax rates approximate the maximum rates in effect when
this Article was written. See supra note 218 (discussing federal rates for individuals); supra
note 151 (discussing federal rates for corporations).
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A. Hedging or Sale Followed by Fixed Income Investment
Section A describes the taxpayer's return from either selling or hedging and then reinvesting in fixed income assets such as Treasury bonds.
This scenario shows that the retained risk required under section 1259
sometimes is a meaningful friction. Unlike a short sale against the box,
which can offer the taxpayer a fixed income yield, a collar or other partial
return hedge offers a return like that of a convertible bond: principal
protection and the possibility of profit if the hedged asset appreciates. As
a result, this return is very appealing if the hedged asset appreciates, but
less so if it does not. This effect is explored first for individual taxpayers,
and then for corporations.
1. Individuals. - Three scenarios are compared: a taxable sale, with
the after-tax value invested in Treasuries; a short sale against the box with
the proceeds invested in Treasuries; and a collar with retained exposure
between $100 and $120. The future nominal value of the taxpayer's investment after three years is compared.
a. Taxable Sale. - Sale of the position yields $7 million after taxes. If
this amount is invested in a taxable bond yielding 5% per year, the taxpayer will have $7,538,234 after three years.
TABLE 1
YEAR

JANUARY

1
2
3
Final

1 VALUE

PRETAX RETURN

AFrER-TAx RETURN

$350,000
$358,750
$367,719

$175,000
$179,375
$183,859

$7,000,000
$7,175,000
$7,354,375
$7,538,234

b. Short Sale Against the Box. - With a short sale against the box, the
taxpayer can reinvest 95% of the sale proceeds in Treasuries. After three
years, she will have the after-tax return on the Treasuries plus $7 million
(i.e., the $10 million locked in on the hedged asset minus $3 million in
taxes). This total will be reduced, though, by the fees she must pay for
borrowing stock (which are assumed here to be deductible). Thus, after
three years she will have $7,653,571, which is $115,337 more than if she
made a taxable sale.
TABLE

YEAR

2

JANUARY 1

BOND PRETAX

PRETAX NET

ArER-TAX

VALUE

RETURN

BORROW FrE

RETURN

RETURN

1

$9,500,000

$475,000

$50,000

$425,000

$212,500

2
3

$9,712,500
$9,930,313

$485,625
$496,516

$50,000
$50,000

$435,625
$446,516

$217,813
$223,258

Final

$7,653,571

c. Collar. - Because the collar entitles the taxpayer to sell stock for
$100 in three years, she will have a minimum of $10 million pretax, or
$7 million after-tax. This minimum return is less favorable than that
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yielded by the taxable sale (by $538,234) and the short sale against the
box (by $653,571). The difference is that, in the latter two scenarios, the
taxpayer receives the $7 million at the outset and reinvests it in a profitable investment (i.e., the Treasuries). In the collar, in contrast, the taxpayer ultimately has an amount higher than $7 million only if the hedged
asset appreciates. The maximum the taxpayer can earn is $12 million
pretax, or $8.4 million after-tax, which is considerably better than the return offered by the fixed income investments, but also is riskier. While
the taxpayer theoretically can borrow against the collar's value to invest
in a Treasury, the transaction will not yield a profit because the taxpayer's
310
borrowing cost will exceed the Treasury yield.
2. Corporate Taxpayers
a. Taxable Sale. - Sale of the position yields $5.5 million. If this
amount is invested in a taxable bond yielding 5% per year, the taxpayer
will have $5,966,343 after three years.
TABLE
YEAR

JANUARY 1 VALUE

1
2
3
Final

$5,500,000
$5,651,250
$5,806,660
$5,966,343

3

PRETAx RETURN

AFTER-TAx RETURN

$275,000
$282,563
$290,333

$151,250
$155,410
$159,683

b. Short Sale Against the Box. - If the taxpayer does a short sale
against the box and reinvests 95% of the proceeds in Treasuries, it will
have $6,220,711 after three years, which is $254,368 better than a taxable
sale. The relative advantage of a deferral strategy is greater here because
the tax rate on gain for corporations is higher.
310. Theoretically, the taxpayer can raise the collar's minimum return so it
approximates the return in the other cases. The key is that the put option's exercise price
must be higher than the stock's current value. For instance, if the put exercise price is
$109, the minimum sale proceeds are $10.9 million, instead of $10 million (i.e., $109 per
share, instead of $100), yielding $7.6 million after taxes. The problem, though, is that this
put option is more valuable than one with a lower exercise price, so the dealer will demand
either a cash payment (which defeats the purpose of improving the taxpayer's minimum
return) or a more valuable call option. Yet the latter demand-in effect, a call option with
a lower exercise price that would offer the dealer more opportunity for gain-can trigger a
constructive sale because the taxpayer will not retain enough exposure. In a sense, the
problem here is the dealer's fee. If the dealer were willing to take a call option that was no
more valuable than the client's $109 put, a call of $129 would satisfy this requirement on the
facts assumed here. This $109-$129 collar would expose the taxpayer to a 20% spread,
presumably enough to avoid a constructive sale. However, the dealer will not agree to this
transaction. The dealer's call option must be considerably more valuable than the client's
put option. If the call's exercise price is reduced (e.g., to $112), a 20% spread obviously
will not be possible. As in supra note 129, these calculations assume a .4 volatility, a three
year term, and a 5% interest rate, and were computed with the NAG Option Calculator, at
http://www.nag.com/numeric/CL/Financial/StdBlack-Scholes.asp.
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JANUARY 1

BOND PRETAX

YEAR

VALUE

RETURN

1
2
3
Final

$9,500,000
$9,733,750
$9,973,928
$6,220,711

$475,000
$486,688
$498,696
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4

BoRRow

PRETAX NET

AFTER-TAX

RETURN

RETURN

$425,000
$436,687
$448,696

$233,750
$240,178
$246,783

FEE

$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

c. Collar. - The collar ensures the taxpayer at least $10 million
pretax or $5.5 million after-tax, which is less than in the other scenarios
(i.e., $466,343 less than the taxable sale and $720,711 less than the short
sale against the box). Yet the maximum return under the collar, $12 million pretax or $6.6 million after-tax, is more than under the other scenarios (i.e., by $633,657 and $379,289, respectively).
B. Taxable Sale or Hedge Followed by Reinvestment in Equities
Section B describes the results when the taxpayer either sells or
hedges and then reinvests in equities. On the assumed facts, partial
hedges will outperform a taxable sale only if the hedged asset appreciates.
1. Individuals. - Three scenarios are compared: a taxable sale, with
the after-tax value invested in equities; a short sale against the box, with
95% of the proceeds reinvested in equities; and a collar-type prepaid forward in which proceeds are reinvested in equities. The future nominal
value of the taxpayer's investment after three years is compared.
a. Taxable Sale. - Sale of the position yields $7 million after taxes. If
this amount is invested in equities yielding 15% per year, the taxpayer will
have $9,552,287 after three years, assuming she realizes the gain on this
reinvestment in equities after three years.
TABLE
YEAR

1

2
3
Final

5

JANUARY 1 VALUE

PRETAX RETURN

TAX DUE

$7,000,000
$8,050,000
$9,257,500
$9,552,287

$1,050,000
$1,207,500
$1,388,625

$0
$0
$1,093,838

b. Short Sale Against the Box. - With a short sale against the box, the
taxpayer can reinvest 95% of the sale proceeds in equities. After three
years, she will have the after-tax return on the equities plus $7 million,
which is the guaranteed after-tax value of the hedged asset. Again, this
total will be reduced by deductible fees she must pay for borrowing stock.
It is assumed that the borrowing fee is financed through deductible borrowing at 8%. Thus, after three years she will have $10,385,779, which is
$833,492 more than if she made a taxable sale.
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6
AFTER-TAx FEE

1

YEAR

JANUARY
VALUE

1
2
3
Final

$9,500,000
$10,925,000
$12,563,750
$10,385,779313

PRETAX
RETURN

BORROW
FEE

AND INTEREST
3 11
TO DATE

TAX DUE

$1,425,000
$1,638,750
$1,884,563

$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

$25,000
$51,000
$78,040

$0
$0
$4,484,494312

c. Variable Delivery PrepaidForward. - A taxpayer who wishes to reinvest in equities without making a sale faces a liquidity problem. How will
she find cash to buy the new investment? The most straightforward way is
to enter into the collar described above, and then to borrow against its
value. But the margin rules are likely to limit how much she can borrow
to reinvest. 3 14 To avoid this constraint, the taxpayer can implement the
same business terms through a formally different instrument: In a variable delivery prepaid forward, the dealer pays the taxpayer an amount up
front in return for delivery of stock in the future. Because this up front
payment is not formally a loan, but a prepayment for a good to be delivered in the future, the margin rules are commonly considered inapplicable. 3 15 To avoid a constructive sale, the amount of stock to be delivered
will vary with the stock price. 3 16 For instance, if the stock price is below
$100, the full 100,000 shares are delivered (the equivalent of exercise of a
$100 put by the taxpayer). On the other hand, if the stock price rises
above $120, the taxpayer keeps a number of shares worth $2 million-as
a way to retain appreciation between $100 and $120. Often taxpayers also
keep a share of appreciation above $120.
The main cost here, as with a loan, is that the taxpayer must compensate the hedging counterparty for advancing money up front. Instead of
receiving $10 million after three years, the taxpayer receives only, say,
$8.2 million up front, and receives no further payments. 3 17 Under this
311. Assuming the annual interest charge is 8% and is deductible, the after-tax cost is
4% if the tax rate is 50%.
312. The 30% tax on the hedged asset is $3,000,000. The 30% tax on the $4,948,313
gain on the equity portfolio is $1,484,494, yielding a total tax of $4,484,494.
313. Before it is sold, the equity portfolio is worth $14,448,313. The taxpayer is also
entitled to an additional $500,000 of proceeds from the short sale against the box, an
amount that the broker has been holding (i.e., because only 95% of the proceeds have
been released). After subtracting the tax of $4,484,494 and the borrow fee and interest of
$78,040, the taxpayer has $10,385,779.
314. See supra note 131.
315. See supra note 131.
316. For the relevant statutory language and legislative history, see supra note 194.
317. Although this $1.8 million is akin to interest, it technically does not qualify as
such and thus does not offer a deduction to offset the 50% tax on ordinary income;
instead, this expense offsets capital gain, which is taxed at a lower rate. See Deputy v.
Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1939) (holding that a contract to deliver securities does not
qualify as a loan for tax purposes and so interest is not deductible). See generally Schizer,
Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock, supra note 10 (discussing trust structure, which
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structure, reinvestment is more costly than under the short sale against
the box, since the time value charge here is much higher than the stock
borrow fee in the latter structure (6.5% on the assumed facts here, instead of .5%). Because of this cost, the hedge outperforms a taxable sale
on these assumed facts only if the hedged asset appreciates. By earning an
extra $2 million pretax on the hedged asset, she will earn $10,213,386,
which outperforms a taxable sale by $661,099.318 (In some deals, as
noted above, the taxpayer can earn more than $2 million as the hedged
asset appreciates above $120). Without any added yield from the hedged
asset, the minimum return of $8,813,386 underperforms a taxable sale by
$738,901.
TABLE

7

JANUARY 1

PRETAX RETURN

YEAR

VALUE

ON PORTFOLIO

TAX DUE

1
2
3
Final

$8,278,491319
$9,520,265
$10,948,305
Between
$8,813,386
and
$10,213,386321

$1,241,774
$1,428,040
$1,642,246

$0
$0
$3,777,165320

EXTRA PRETAX
RETURN ON

EXTRA
TAX

HEDGED ASSET

DUE

-

$2,000,000

$0
$0
$600,000

The following table compares the results from a taxable sale with a
short sale against the box.
includes variable delivery prepaid forward). Prepaid forwards may thus be less tax efficient
for investors than collars and loans, which generate potentially deductible interest. To an
extent, the taxpayer must choose between avoidance of the margin rules (prepaid
forwards) and favorable tax treatment (collars and loans). Yet the choice is not as stark as
it may seem. The interest deduction on a collar and loan is severely restricted by the
investment interest limitations of section 163(d) and, more importantly, by the straddle
rules of section 26 3 (g). See I.R.C. § 163(d); id. § 263(g). For discussion of proposed
section 263(g) regulations, which render a deduction even harder to attain, see supra note
157.
318. Note that the fee to the investment bank-in effect, the appreciation between
$120 and $151 on the stock-serves the reduce this maximum return by $3.1 million
pretax (or less, of course, if the taxpayer is sharing in some of this appreciation).
319. This number, which is the amount the hedging counterparty is assumed to pay
on the prepaid forward, is the discounted value of $10,000,000, assuming a 6.5% discount
rate over three years.
320. The 30% tax on the $8,278,491 received for the hedged asset is $2,483,547. The
30% tax on the $4,312,060 of return on the equity portfolio is $1,293,618. The total of
these amounts is $3,777,165.
321. The equity portfolio grows to $12,590,551. After $3,777,165 of tax is deducted,
the remaining value is $8,813,386. The taxpayer also retains appreciation on the hedged
asset, earning $2,000,000 pretax if the stock appreciates from $100 to $120. After a 30%
tax, this extra $1,400,000 would increase the final value to $10,213,386.
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TABLE
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8
SHORT SALE AGAINST

THE Box

TAXABLE SALE

END VALUE

-$1,572,393

-$738,901

Less than $100

-$172,393

$661,099

Greater than $120

2. Corporate Taxpayers. - The above cases are rerun here for corporate taxpayers. The key difference is that corporate taxpayers pay a
higher tax on gain, and so deferral strategies are more valuable.
a. Taxable Sale. - Sale of the position yields $5.5 million. If this
amount is invested in equities, the taxpayer will have $7,075,647 after
three years.
TABLE 9
YEAR

JANUARY 1 VALUE

1
2
3
Final

$5,500,000
$6,325,000
$7,273,750
$7,075,647

PRETAX RETURN

TAX DUE

$825,000
$948,750
$1,091,063

$0
$0
$1,289,166

b. Short Sale Against the Box. - After a short sale against the box and
reinvestment of 95% of the proceeds in equities, the taxpayer will have
$8,135,389 after three years, which is $1,059,742 better than a taxable
sale.
TABLE 10
AFTER-TAx FEE
YEAR

JANUARY 1
VALUE

PRETAX
RETURN

BORROw
FEE

AND INTEREST
322
TO DATE

TAX DUE

1
2
3
Final

$9,500,000
$10,925,000
$12,563,750
$8,135,389324

$1,425,000
$1,638,750
$1,884,563

$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

$27,500
$56,210
$86,183

$0
$0
$6,726,741323

c. DECS. - The corporation is assumed to issue a public security
that closely resembles the variable delivery prepaid forward described
above. Although funds might be used to invest in equity of a different
firm, we might also assume that these funds finance the corporation's
322. Since the taxpayer is subject to a 45% tax rate, the after-tax cost of a $50,000
borrowing fee is $27,500 (i.e., 55% of $50,000). Moreover, it is assumed that the fee is
financed with a deductible loan. Assuming the pretax interest rate is 8% and the tax rate is
45%, the after-tax interest rate is 4.4%.
323. When the taxpayer sells the hedged asset, the tax liability will be $4,500,000 (i.e.,
45% of $10,000,000). In addition, the pretax portfolio has appreciated by $4,948,313,
yielding a 45% tax of $2,226,741. The total tax, therefore, is $6,726,741.
324. The total pretax value of the equity portfolio is $14,448,313, and the taxpayer is
also entitled to $500,000 of additional proceeds from the short sale. This total of
$14,948,313 is reduced by the tax bill of $6,726,741, leaving $8,221,572. This sum is
further reduced by the cost of $86,183 for borrowing stock, leaving $8,135,389.
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business opportunities and generate a return of 15% per year. Even so,
the assumption here is that this profit is not taxed until the third year
after the DECS is issued (consistent with an equity investment). Likewise,
the interest is assumed to be deductible without limitation, 325 and is
funded from other borrowing (i.e., instead of through a reduction in the
amount reinvested). The underwriter is assumed to collect a 3% fee,
such that the taxpayer has only $9.7 million of proceeds. On these facts,
the partial hedge significantly outperforms the taxable sale if the asset
appreciates, but yields a slightly lower amount if the asset does not
appreciate.
TABLE 11
AFTER-TAX
JANUARY

1

PRETAX

YEAR

VALUE

RETURN

1
2
3
Final

$9,700,000
$11,155,000
$12,828,250
Between
$6,899,936
and
$7,999,936328

$1,455,000
$1,673,250
$1,924,238

EXTRA PRETAX

INTEREST TO

DATE

326

TAX DUE

$440,000
$899,360
$1,378,932

$0
$0
$6,773,620327

RETURN ON

EXTRA

HEDGED ASSET

TAX

-

$2,000,000

$0
$0
$900,000

The following table compares the results from a taxable sale with a
short sale against the box.
TABLE
END VALUE

Less than $100
Greater than $120

TAXABLE SALE

-$475,711
$624,289

12
SHORT SALE AGAINST THE

Box

-$1,535,453
-$435,453

325. Thus, it is assumed that the interest would not be capitalized under section
263(g). For a discussion of this issue, see Schizer, Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock,
supra note 10, at 16-17. Recent proposed regulations under section 263(g) would lead to
capitalization in future transactions, though. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(g)-3(c)(3), 66
Fed. Reg. 4749, 4750 (Jan. 18, 2001); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(d)-1 (d), 66 Fed. Reg. 4751
(Jan. 18, 2001); supra note 157.
326. The annual coupon is assumed to be 8%, or $800,000. Since the amount is
assumed to be deductible, the after-tax cost (at a 45% tax rate) is $440,000. Payment of
this amount for three years, plus an after-tax borrowing cost to fund these amounts of
4.4%, yields a total of $1,378,932.
327. The 45% tax on the $5,052,488 pretax profit on the equity portfolio is
$2,273,620. The 45% tax on the hedged asset is $4,500,000, yielding a total tax of
$6,773,620.
328. The pretax value of the equity portfolio is $14,752,488. This amount is reduced
by the $6,773,620 of tax and the $1,378,932 of interest expense, yielding $6,599,936. Since
the taxpayer has retained appreciation to avoid a constructive sale, the taxpayer would
earn another $2,000,000 pretax, or $1,100,000 after-tax, if the stock appreciates from $100
to $120, yielding a position worth $7,699,936.
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APPENDIX

B:

EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC HEDGING TRANSACTIONS:

DECS AND PHONES

The discussion of constructive sales in Part II observes that public
corporations hedge by issuing public securities.3 29 These securities,
called by acronyms such as "DECS" and "PHONES," are exchanged at
maturity for stock in unrelated firms (i.e., the stock that the issuing corporation is hedging). This Appendix lists various such securities offerings. Specifically, the following table describes sixteen matches, filed during the 1999 calendar year, from the following search in the
EDGARPlus® Database on LEXIS: "(maturity w/10 shares w/10 stock w/
10 exchang!) and (contingent w/4 debt w/4 regulation)." Duplicate entries are omitted, as are so called "shelf' filings in which the issuer is not
currently issuing securities, but instead is offering disclosure about potential future transactions. The rationale for this search is that, in public
hedging transactions such as DECS and PHONES, the public security is
exchangeable for the hedged asset, allowing the issuer to satisfy its obligation under the security by tendering the hedged stock. Disclosure for
such exchangeable instruments generally mentions the contingent debt
regulations of Treasury Regulation section 1.1275-4, as long as the public
security is documented as a debt security. The total dollar value of these
transactions-and thus the dollar amount of the stock being hedged
through DECS and PHONES transactions in
1999-was
$5,940,350,366.330
TABLE
SECURITIY

ISSUER

Cox Communications, Inc.
Comcast Corp.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.

NAMtE

PRIZES
ZONES
Reset PERQS

13

OFFERING

FILING

AMoum[r

DATE

MATURITY

DATE

$1,106,250,000
$1,000,000,000
$17,027,300

11/16/1999
10/13/1999
10/12/1999

11/15/2029
10/15/2029
10/31/2001

Sprint PC
Sprint PCS
FDX

$25,000,000 10/07/1999
$17,181,900 10/07/1999

12/15/2001
10/06/2000

Oracle
Hewlett-Packard

UNDERLYING STOCK

(MSDW)
MSDW
Salomon Smith Barney Holdings,

Reset PERQS
ELKS

Inc.
Reliant Energy, Inc.
Enron Corp.

ZENS
Exchangeable

$1,000,000,000 09/16/1999 09/15/2029 Time Warner
$222,500,000 08/11/1999 07/31/2002 Enron Oil & Gas

MSDW
Kerr McGee Corp.
MSDW
Southwest Securities Group, Inc.
MSDW
MSDW
Tribune Co.
Comcast Corp.
MSDW

Notes
Reset PERQS
DECS
Reset PERQS
DARTS
PERQS
Reset PERQS
PHONES
PHONES
Reset PERQS

$18,000,839
$287,259,450
$134,543,750
$50,000,000
$29,899,212
$95,000,025
$1,099,000,000
$718,293,750
$120,394,140

08/06/1999
07/29/1999
07/21/1999
06/11/1999
05/21/1999
05/18/1999
04/09/1999
03/15/1999
03/02/1999

08/15/2001
08/02/2004
08/01/2001
06/30/2004
05/22/2000
05/30/2001
05/15/2029
05/15/2029
03/15/2001

Qualcomm
Devon
Cisco Systems
Knight/Trimark Group
Nokia
Sun Microsystems
America Online
AT&T
MCI WorldCom

329. See supra Part II.B.3.d.

330. This amount may be slightly overstated because, in some cases, investment banks
do not issue these securities to hedge appreciated positions, but to accommodate a client
that wishes to hold a particular type of DECS. Yet this outcome is more likely for small
transactions, which have a relatively modest impact on the overall volume reported here.
Offsetting this effect, moreover, is the likelihood that some hedging transactions were
omitted because the search parameters were underinclusive. For instance, transactions
that do not mention the contingent debt regulations would not register in this search.
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APPENDIX

C:

EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC HEDGING TRANSACTIONS:
TRUST STRUCTURES

Since individuals, family partnerships, and other family vehicles are
not suitable registrants under the securities laws, these taxpayers might
form investment vehicles in order to hedge through the public markets. 3 31 The following chart shows the "trust" structures that were filed in
1999, based on the following search in the EDGARPlus® Database on
LEXIS: "(Treasury w/4 securit!) w/10 (forward w/4 contract) w/10 stock
w/20 trust." The relevance of Treasury securities is that the trust usually
has two assets: a prepaid forward contract to purchase stock from the
taxpayer and Treasury securities that fund a periodic payment to public
holders. This chart does not include duplicative entries (i.e., transactions
that were posted more than once), or transactions that were not designed
to hedge appreciated stock. Of the twenty transactions that were filed
with the SEC, fifteen were never finalized. They were filed in preliminary
form only, without listing prices and (in some cases) the underlying security. These deals probably were abandoned because transaction costs
are relatively high in these trust transactions. As a result, many taxpayers
who consider using the trust structure ultimately decide to use a private
transaction instead. The transactions completed in 1999 have an aggregate value of $428,967,264.
TABLE
SECURITY

ISSUER

NAME

14
FILING

OFFERING

AMouNT

MATURITY

DATE

DATE

UNDERLYING STOCK

SanDisk PEPS Trust

PEPS

Never finalized

10/13/1999

11/15/2002

TARGETS Tntst V
DECS Trust IV

($200,000,000)
TARGETS $32,066,014
DECS
$95,625,000

09/29/1999
08/09/1999

11/15/2002 Amgen
08/15/2002 Crown Castle Int'l

METS Trust
Ameritrade Automatic Common Exchange
Trust
Eleventh Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
Fourteenth Automatic Comtnon Exchange
Security Trust
Thirteenth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
Twelfth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
TARGETS Trust III
Ninth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
Tenth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
Seventh Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
TARGETS Trnst II
PIES Trust I
PIES Trust 11
Eighth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust
Trust Issued Required Equity Exchange
Security Trust
DECS Trust IV
Sixth Automatic Common Exchange
Security Trust

METS
TRACES

SanDisk

Never finalized
Never finalized
($150,000,000)
Never finalized

07/20/1999
07/12/1999

-

07/06/1999

-

Not indicated
Ameritrade Holding
Class A
Not indicated

Never finalized

07/06/1999

-

Not indicated

Never finalized

07/06/1999

-

Not indicated

Never finalized

07/06/1999

-

Not indicated

$65,887,500
Never finalized

06/24/1999
05/03/1999

Never finalized

05/03/1999

-

Not indicated

Never finalized

04/20/1999

-

Not indicated

$72,888,750
Never finalized
Never finalized
Never finalized

04/12/1999
03/16/1999
03/15/1999
03/03/1999

05/15/2001
-

Lucent
Not indicated
Not indicated
Not indicated

Never finalized

03/01/1999

-

Not indicated

$162,500,000
Never finalized

02/10/1999
01/26/1999

02/15/2002
-

Maxtor
Not indicated

TRACES
TRACES
TRACES
TRACES
TARGETS

08/15/2002
-

MCI WorldCom
Not indicated

TRACES
TRACES
TRACES
TARGETS
PIES
PIES
TRACES
T-REX
DECS
TRACES

331. See supra text accompanying notes 144-146.
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HEDGE FUND SWAP

Part III discusses the constructive ownership rule, which targets derivatives that simulate a direct investment in hedge funds. This Appendix
uses a numerical example to show why, before section 1260 was enacted,
a derivative would yield a superior after-tax return. Specifically, this discussion compares a direct investment of $10 million in a hedge fund with
investment in a hedge fund derivative of the same notional amount. The
tax rate on short term capital gain and ordinary income is assumed to be
50% (i.e., 40% federal and 10% state) and the tax rate on long term
332
capital gain is assumed to be 30% (i.e., 20% federal and 10% state).
The hedge fund is assumed to earn 15% a year. (The assumption is that
the hedge fund earns the same 15% available on an equity investment,
but is subject to less risk. As the pretax return on the fund grows, the tax
advantage of a derivative over a direct investment increases.) After this
comparison, results are compared on the assumption that the fund declines in value. Note that no comparison is run for corporate transactions, as corporations have much less to gain from this planning strategy
because they are not eligible for the reduced rate for long term capital
gains.
A. Direct Investment: 15 % Annual Return
The hedge fund is assumed to distribute 50% of its gains each year to
cover the investor's tax liability. After three years, a $10 million investment grows to $12,422,969.
TABLE 15
YEAR

JANUARY

1 VALUE

1
2
3
Final

$10,000,000
$10,750,000
$11,556,250
$12,422,969

15% RETURN

TAX DUE

$1,500,000
$1,612,500
$1,733,438

$750,000
$806,250
$866,719

B. Hedge Fund Swap: 15 % Return

Alternatively, assume the taxpayer invested $10 million in Treasuries,
which were used to secure her obligation on a swap. The swap requires
the parties to measure the value of a $10 million investment after three
years (the "Value"). For computation of the Value, it is assumed that any
distributions by the fund (e.g., to cover taxes) were immediately reinvested in the fund. This reinvestment is the way the swap reflects the
benefits of tax deferral-the investor is allowed to reinvest dollars that
otherwise would fund the tax liability. If the Value is less than $10 million
332. Here as well, the assumed federal tax rates approximate the maximum rates in
effect when this Article was written. See supra note 218 (discussing federal rates for
individuals); supra note 151 (discussing federal rates for corporations).
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(i.e., because the fund depreciates), the taxpayer must pay the difference.
On the other hand, if the Value exceeds $10 million (i.e., because the
fund appreciates, as is assumed here), the taxpayer receives this excess,
which is treated as long term capital gain. Assuming 15% annual appreciation, the Value is as follows.
TABLE
YEAR

1

2
3
Final

'JANUARY I VALUE

$10,000,000
$11,500,000
$13,225,000
$13,646,125

16
15% RETURN

$1,500,000
$1,725,000
$1,983,750

TAX DUE

$0
$0
$1,562,625

In addition, the taxpayer must pay an annual fee equal to $10 million times the Treasury yield plus 1%. In essence, the taxpayer is paying
over the return earned on the Treasury bonds, plus a 1% annual fee to
the investment bank. Swap expenses generally constitute ordinary deductions under section 212. 33 3 Accordingly, the taxpayer has a net pretax
expense of 1% per year, which is deductible. 334 Assuming the taxpayer
funds these annual net payments of $50,000 after taxes by borrowing at
8%, the total expense after three years is $162,320. Hence, the final return, net of expenses, is $13,646,125 minus $162,320, or $13,483,805.
Compared with the $12,422,969 earned through a direct investment, the
derivative yields an extra $1,060,836.
C. What if the Hedge Fund Suffers Losses? Comparison of Direct Investment
and Derivative
As long as the fund appreciates, there is a tax benefit in deferring
the gain and converting it from short term to long term capital gain. If
the fund declines in value, deferral and conversion carry a corresponding
tax penalty: a deferred deduction, converted from a short term to a long

term capital loss. However, in such cases the parties can settle the swap
prematurely, before the end of the taxpayer's tax year. As a result, losses
333. See I.R.C. § 212 (allowing deduction of expenses for production of income);
Steinberg, supra note 205, at 230 (analyzing swap expenses as expenses under section 212).
334. Since swap expenses are generally considered a miscellaneous itemized
deduction, the amounts are subject to the 2% limitation for such deductions under section
67 and also are not deductible under the alternative minimum tax. See I.R.C. § 67; id.
§56(b)(1)(A) (disallowing deduction of miscellaneous itemized deductions in
computation of alternative minimum tax); see also Schizer, Executives and Hedging, supra
note 25, at 485-86 (discussing limits on deducting swap expenses that are miscellaneous
itemized deductions); Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New
Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 Taxes 91, 91-95 (1988) (explaining history and rationale
behind alternative minimum tax). Likewise, some practitioners believe that "clear
reflection of income" principles require that the deduction of such periodic payments be
deferred. See Steinberg, supra note 205, at 229. For simplicity's sake, these limitations on
the deduction are ignored.
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need not be deferred or converted to long term. Thus, while investment
in the swap will not carry any tax advantage in this loss scenario, there
generally will be no tax disadvantage. An exception would be if the fund
has ordinary losses-for instance, from currency trading-that are converted to short term capital losses. Putting this exception aside, the main
reason a direct investment would be preferable is in avoiding the fees and
transaction costs associated with the derivative.

